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ABSTRACT 
 
 
LAUREN CAMERON: Renegotiating Science: British Women Novelists and Evolution 
Controversies, 1826-1876 
(Under the direction of Beverly Taylor) 
 
 
 “Renegotiating Science: British Women Novelists and Evolution Controversies, 
1826-1876,” examines the cultural and literary discourses surrounding the publication of 
controversial evolutionary theories in mid-nineteenth century Britain. This project focuses on 
the intersection of genre, gender, and interventions in scientific discourse, arguing that the 
novel offered women an opportunity to act as serious investigators of the social implications 
of evolutionary theories and to voice their evaluations of the validity and usefulness of such 
theories alongside male fiction and nonfiction writers. In the nineteenth century, 
nonscientists could take scientific developments as open to collective negotiation, not as 
authoritative proclamations to be outright accepted or rejected. The women writers my 
dissertation focuses on reshaped evolutionary theory to meet social and individual needs 
from an applied perspective; their arguments forwarded the ethical values that were more 
salient from their gendered standpoint. While these scientific developments were still new 
and at their “most fictive”—as Gillian Beer put it in her seminal work, Darwin’s Plots— 
Mary Shelley, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Elizabeth Gaskell, and George Eliot constructed 
thought experiments that highlighted the problematics of theorizing evolution as an 
embodied experience and of failing to consider the concrete nature of evolution’s 
consequences for all populations, whether privileged or vulnerable. Moving away from a 
  
iv 
unidirectional model of influence from science to literature, my project instead draws on the 
insights of rhetorical theorists to argue that literary and scientific texts are similarly 
constructed, mutually constitutive, and equally representative of the cultural discourses from 
which they arose. The novels this dissertation focuses on individualize the lived experience 
of evolution and consider from multiple perspectives the ethical impulses and failures that 
arise from evolutionary theories, particularly the struggles of women to have their 
perspectives validated in a globalizing and modernizing world that was increasingly being 
shaped by scientific culture. 
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Introduction 
 
 In January 1874, George Eliot published the first installment of what was to be her 
final finished novel, Daniel Deronda. The opening sentence read: “Was she beautiful or not 
beautiful? and what was the secret of form or expression which gave the dynamic quality to 
her glance?” Shortly thereafter, a review in The Examiner criticized “her affected use of the 
‘slang’ of science”—the word “dynamic” was too technical for this reviewer and many 
others who objected to the harshness of such scientific jargon.
1
 To a twenty-first century 
audience, the term “dynamic” does not strike the ear as jargon, and it can be difficult for us to 
recognize the jarring nature of it and similar scientific terms in Victorian novels without such 
contemporaneous responses. The Examiner review is particularly interesting, though, 
because in its attempt to satirize Eliot’s “increasing tendency” to target an audience “whose 
culture is scientific,” the reviewer reveals a deep-seated anxiety about the inroads science has 
made into popular culture: “Our children may sing with rapture such staves as: ‘Her eye was 
kinetic, her voice was pneumatic, / Her mouth was hydrostatic, sweet Molly Malone’” (125). 
In the context of the review, this is meant to be a joke, though it rings hollow to a modern 
reader, especially one who has read such dystopic science fiction as Aldous Huxley’s Brave 
New World (1932). But it raises a number of questions: Why is scientific language such a 
source of concern to a mid-century Victorian? Why is terminology specifically the target of 
worries about the influence science wields over broader culture? Why is George Eliot’s 
                                                          
1 “A New Novel by ‘George Eliot’,” The Examiner (London: 1808), 3548 (1876: Jan. 29), p.125. 
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scientific language singled out as problematic? And what role did her novel, and novels more 
generally, play in the cultural negotiation of the meaning of such scientific developments? 
ABSTRACT OF ARGUMENT 
My dissertation seeks to answer the preceding and other related questions by 
considering the interdiscursive relationship of science and literature in the nineteenth century 
at the sites of four major and controversial developments in evolutionary theory, which 
combined the insights of multiple emergent sciences and so represents a fusion unparalleled 
by any other nineteenth-century scientific field. The interpretative possibilities evolutionary 
theory offered for writers of the time were taken up and hotly debated by scientists, 
academics, theologians, scientific thinkers and popularizers, and fiction writers in a number 
of popular outlets. Novels allowed women writers specifically to intervene in this male-
dominated discussion by constructing thought experiments that explored the feasibility and 
validity of such evolutionary schemas in the social world, a move that at once worked within 
and expanded the bounds of realism. Many of these women writers focused on the ethical 
implications of societies and individuals embodying evolutionary principles and resisted the 
traditional teleological movement of “Development Hypotheses” that overlooked individual 
struggles. Moving away from a unidirectional model of influence from science to literature, 
my project instead considers the conversational nature of debates over developments in 
evolutionary theory. Each of my chapters seeks to deepen our understanding of how literary 
authors—and particularly women novelists—influenced the shape of the scientific project by 
acting as serious investigators of the social implications of evolutionary theories—as 
philosophers of science—and to recognize that when science does initiate ideas, it does not 
necessarily divorce itself from the strategies of narrative, nor does a literary work respond in 
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a direct and singular way. The dates that I have outlined for this project, 1826 to 1876, not 
only mark the publication of the earliest literary text under consideration (Mary Shelley’s 
The Last Man) and the conclusion of the three-volume text of the latest Victorian novel I 
focus on (George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda), but also the emergence and dominance of 
Victorian women writers and the establishment of evolutionary theory as a cultural and 
scientific force.
2
 In the last quarter of the century, transformations in publication patterns and 
evolutionary debates (which tended to be more or less centralized under the header of 
Darwinism) fundamentally changed the cultural landscape. 
OVERVIEW OF RELATED HISTORICAL RESEARCH AND LITERARY CRITICISM 
The study of science and literature in the nineteenth century is by no means a new 
one—Lionel Stevenson’s 1932 Darwin among the Poets is still a valuable resource, and 
articles on male canonical poets especially were published in a steady trickle throughout the 
mid-twentieth century. The creation of the subject as a subfield in its own right, however, can 
be traced to the 1980s, particularly the seminal works Darwin’s Plots (1983) by Gillian Beer 
and Darwin and the Novelists (1988) by George Levine. As is evident from the titles 
mentioned in the past couple of sentences, studies of Darwin’s influence in nineteenth-
century culture, literary and otherwise, have predominated. Such a trend has only been 
reinforced by the 2009 celebration of the bicentenary of Darwin’s birth, which sparked a 
series of collections and special issues dedicated to Darwinian studies. The scholarly 
movement to acknowledge and study the multivocality of nineteenth-century evolutionary 
theory—which is generally considered the quintessential science of the time because of its 
controversial nature and its fusion of other emergent scientific disciplines, including botany, 
                                                          
2 Even though Mary Shelley is a second-generation Romantic, she wrote well into the Victorian period with the 
intention of selling to a Victorian audience, and her 1826 text reflects anxiety about cultural belatedness so 
often attributed to the Victorians 
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geology, biology, chemistry, anthropology, sociology, archaeology, astronomy, medicine, 
and psychology—has been slow and halting, but nonetheless growing over the past few 
decades.  
 Literary studies has in many ways dominated the study of nineteenth-century science 
and culture because of its interdisciplinary tendencies to draw on other fields of cultural, 
historical, and philosophical analysis done on the same subject, and to focus on texts that 
represent similar fusions or distillations of contemporaneous concerns about the subject. The 
question of the level of self-awareness of the writers who, as Beer puts it, “assimilated and 
resisted” evolutionary theory “within the subtle enregisterment of narrative” in order to test 
“the extent to which it can provide a determining fiction by which to read the world” is an 
open one.
3
 Nonetheless, literary scholars have studied the explicit and implicit engagement of 
nineteenth-century fiction with evolutionary theory through overt references, formal or 
structural elements, cultural exchanges, rhetorical figures, and lines of argument or plot 
shared in common.
4
 In so doing, scholars have come to the consensus that literary authors’ 
personal resolutions to the conflicts sparked by evolutionary controversies can be seen as 
reflecting larger patterns in their culture that contemporaries likely also shared, and that 
literature served the important function of addressing cultural concerns and questions about 
scientific developments that were raised by the general accessibility of scientific prose at the 
time.
5
 Even more substantially, however, the field has been moving away from a 
unidirectional model of influence in which science makes objective truth claims to which 
literature responds—a model that, as Levine puts it, “implicitly affirmed the intellectual 
                                                          
3 Beer, 2. 
 
4 See, for example, Beer; Franklin; and Gliserman, “Part I.” 
 
5 Beer, Darwin’s Plots, xxviii; Gliserman, “Part I,” 278. 
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authority of science over literature.”6 Instead, the poststructuralist denial of the binarism of 
categories such as science and literature has been gradually embraced, and the texts produced 
in each field have been treated as similarly constructed, mutually constitutive, and equally 
representative of the cultural discourse from which they arose.
7
 
 The inherent narrativity of much scientific endeavor, especially nineteenth-century 
evolutionary theory, has been increasingly acknowledged and theorized by literary critics.
8
 
As Beer influentially stated the idea, “When it is first advanced, theory is at its most fictive.”9 
The explanations provided for such a phenomenon are multiple. Recent psychological studies 
have demonstrated the persuasiveness of narratives, regardless of whether they are labeled 
factual or fictional.
10
 Evolutionary theory in particular is about growth, development, and 
change over time—processes that are inherently narrative and unidentifiable in one moment 
in time or without a retrospective approach.
11
 Narratives, especially novels, as Levine puts it, 
“are often about questions of justifiable belief,” as are the pursuits of philosophy and 
science.
12
 Therefore, scientists in emergent fields in the nineteenth century turned to literary 
models for evidence in order to express the concerns of their pursuits in compelling and 
persuasive ways.
13
 As a consequence, terms in common use were re-valenced, preexisting 
narratives (such as the anthropocentric and the Biblical) were displaced, new epistemologies 
                                                          
6 Levine, Realism, Ethics and Secularism, 168. 
 
7 See Levine, Realism, Ethics and Secularism, 166-80. 
 
8 See, for example, Livingstone. 
 
9 Beer, 1. 
 
10 See, for example, Green and Brock. For a less empirical approach, see Cunningham. 
 
11 Beer, 5-6, 99; Graver, 43. 
 
12 Qtn. from Levine, Dying to Know, 11. See also Levine, Realism, Ethics and Secularism, 180. 
 
13 Beer, 84. 
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emerged, old debates were intensified, and traditional plots of identity, memory, and time 
were questioned.
14
 Cultural moral values also became the center of debates about 
evolutionary theory and its ability to provide a scientific foundation for behavioral norms of 
individuals and societies.
15
 
 Most scientific disciplines as we know them today began to take form in the 
nineteenth century, and most likewise made significant steps toward defining and answering 
the questions that still concern their disciplinary descendants.
16
 Many of the critiques leveled 
against science today—such as its privileged status, its level of technicality that prevents 
laypeople from understanding and critiquing its methodologies and implications, and its 
pretension to objectivity—would not have been fairly leveled in the nineteenth century 
because of thinkers’ greater investment in establishing science’s cultural value.17 Our 
perspectives on the work of such scientists is also constantly changing; after all, Charles 
Darwin’s and Charles Lyell’s ideas were widely considered refuted at the beginning of the 
twentieth century but now are treated as dominating the century’s scientific viewpoints.18 
The view from the ground in the nineteenth century itself, however, was that of multiplicity; 
as J. Jeffrey Franklin puts it, “there was no single evolution controversy, not least because 
there was no unified theory of evolution.”19 Natural history and evolutionary theory went 
hand-in-hand and were often used as interchangeable terms for the field of study; both are 
                                                          
14 Beer, 13-14; Franklin, 141-44; Levine, Dying to Know, 17; Zimmerman, 1-4. 
 
15 Graver, 43; Henson, 13; Levine, Darwin and the Novelists, 3 and Dying to Know, 26. 
 
16 Wilson, 95. 
 
17 Gliserman, “Part I,” 279-81. 
 
18 Wilson, 95. 
 
19 Qtn from Franklin, 161. See also Bowler. 
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also frequently referred to as the “Development Hypothesis,” since they relied on 
contemporaneous notions of history as a developmental process.
20
 In seeing nature as 
following widely accepted social models of orderly unilateral progress, natural historians 
were working within preexisting paradigms, which arguably made their work less threatening 
to the religious establishment; on the other hand, they offered an alternative explanation for 
the traditional world view, which could have made their theories even more threatening.
21
 
This emphasis on development also tied evolutionary theory to literary traditions such as the 
Bildungsroman.
22
 Those scientific thinkers we might call evolutionary theorists more than 
natural historians tended to discard Uniformitarian notions and present discontinuous or 
disordered visions of nature’s “development.” Nonetheless, most natural historians were 
amateurs and many were even clergymen who had the free time to collect and catalog 
specimens, like the amiable and nonthreatening Mr. Farebrother of Middlemarch (1871-
72).
23
  
 As has been suggested in the preceding paragraphs, nineteenth-century science 
generally—and evolutionary theory especially—was not a privileged discourse with an 
entirely distinct community of professionals intent primarily on communicating with one 
another. In fact, for much of the nineteenth century there were few people who could be 
called scientific professionals. Very little science was taught in English universities and very 
little empirical research was conducted by academics; the government’s support for the 
sciences consisted of little more than small grants to the Royal Society of London, foreign 
                                                          
20 Beer, 1; Bowler, 5; Graver, 40; Nisbet, 139-58; Teggart, 77-127. 
 
21 See Bowler, 5, versus Gliserman, “Part II,” 441. 
 
22 Beer, 97. 
 
23 Gates, “Introduction,” 539-41. 
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specimen hunting expeditions, and the occasional pension fund for a particularly 
accomplished individual; and scientists lacked “an institutionalized career structure such as 
that which characterized the legal, medical, and clerical professions.”24 The independent and 
loose structure of British scientific networks (compared to the more formalized institutions of 
the French) and the common educational tracks shared by scientists and other middle- and 
upper-class men (and here I take the gendered term intentionally) had a number of 
consequences.
25
 Although as the century went on, “specialized scientific disciplines with 
increasingly technical vocabularies and a developing emphasis on trained experts” developed 
and consolidated cultural authority, in the early and mid-1800s, it was difficult to identify a 
“locus of intellectual authority” on the questions tackled by scientists.26 Even an esteemed 
institution like the Royal Society, made up of wealthy and powerful members and endorsed 
in part by government financial support, was not accepted as a clear and sole source of 
scientific authority.
27
 In order to lay claim to authority over certain questions of cultural 
interest (e.g., what are fossils and where do they come from?), as well as to methods of 
answering such questions, scientists wrote in a language accessible to a broad, educated 
readership. These questions carried social and religious implications, and so were of 
substantial interest to the general public, even if the debates ranged into the minutiae of 
technical and abstruse details seemingly of interest only to professionals.
28
 Moreover, 
because most scientists with formal educations were trained in a humanistic background, 
                                                          
24 Qtn from Yeo, 9. See also Wilson, 99. 
 
25 Wilson, 103. 
 
26 Dawson et al., 14; Yeo, 7. See also Kucich. 
 
27 Sheffield, 4. 
 
28 Shuttleworth, 16-17. 
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their writing drew from the style and strategies of literary, historical, and philosophical 
texts.
29
 Thus, Beer claims, to their contemporaries, scientists’ “texts could be read very much 
as literary texts.”30 
 Quite a bit of historical and literary scholarship has, in fact, demonstrated that 
scientific works were not only read as literary texts, but with them in the periodical press. Not 
only were scientific ideas including evolutionary theory often published and debated in non-
scientific periodicals, but the strong mid-nineteenth-century periodical culture also provided 
a common intellectual discourse for general readers to encounter scientific, philosophic, 
literary, economic, theological, and political ideas.
31
 Such ideas did not merely sit side-by-
side on the pages of a periodical, but were often intentionally intertextual, as writers and 
editors alike borrowed from multiple discourses to make their points and to guide readers to 
make connections between different disciplinary approaches to similar topics.
32
 This held 
true for many of the preeminent literary journals of the mid-century, including Household 
Words, Cornhill Magazine, Westminster Review, Fortnightly Review, Illustrated London 
News, and Punch.
33
 Even if a reader or a family purchased a literary journal for the latest 
installment of a serialized novel, it was unlikely that the rest of a magazine would go 
unread.
34
 Popular and well-regarded reviewers would also move freely between disciplinary 
                                                          
29 Beer, 5. 
 
30 Beer, 4. 
 
31 See Dawson et al.; Ellegård; Shattock and Wolff; Yeo, 9; and Young. 
 
32 Dawson et al., 2-3; Wynne, 3. 
 
33 Dawson et al., 2, 18; Kucich, 121. 
 
34 Wynne, 3. 
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subjects that would be increasingly specialized as the century reached its end.
35
 Many famous 
and influential scientific works first appeared in periodicals, and even those that were 
published as books were “often primarily known through their representations in periodicals, 
whether in reviews, extracts, abstracts, advertisements, correspondence, or passing 
comments.”36 Literary and popular science journals alike offered established leisured 
gentlemen of science as well as up-and-coming young professionals an influential platform to 
promote the cultural importance and authority of science.
37
 Therefore, not only was the 
periodical an important forum for debating the cultural significance of science and 
controversial developments, but it also served as a catalyst for public discussion and interest 
in such subjects.
38
 
 Periodical culture, like scientific culture generally, was never dominated by female 
voices in the nineteenth century, though the former was more open to women’s involvement 
than the latter. While many rhetorical and historical studies consider nineteenth-century 
women’s importance as popularizers of science or as technicians in husbands’ laboratories, 
and so argue that women were more involved in science in a greater variety of domains than 
many people realize, most scholars still admit the limited nature of the opportunities 
available for women who wanted to publish on science.
39
 Levine argues that such gendered 
problematics arose from cultural notions of women’s excessive self-effacement that tended 
not to objective observation but to the embodiment of sentiment; as a consequence, women 
                                                          
35 Dawson et al., 11-12; Yeo, 9. 
 
36 Dawson et al., 3. 
 
37 Barton; Dawson; Dawson et al., 11-20. 
 
38 Dawson et al., 2; Yeo, 9. 
 
39 See, for example, Baym; Gates and Shteir; Phillips; Neely; and Watts. 
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could fill the role of mediators but not generators of scientific knowledge.
40
 Many female 
intellectuals, however, were interested in the threat and the promise posed by scientific 
inquiry and so, I argue in this dissertation project, turned to the novel to participate in cultural 
debates over scientific developments and their (socially) normative implications; as such, 
women novelists acted as philosophers of science in popular and influential forums. John 
Kucich has noted that “fiction was one of the few cultural domains in which women could 
legitimately express themselves, which meant that the novel was also a medium in which the 
impact of ideas on private life, or on non-privileged social groups, could be dramatized.”41 
The novel's genre does not detract from the serious and considered response to scientific 
ideas that it might contain, but rather makes use of its popularity and overt fictionality to 
grant the female author more creative and even philosophical license than the typical female 
form of the non-fiction didactic popular science work, while being more commercially 
successful (given fiction's greater appeal) and thus having a greater effect on the burgeoning 
scientific discourse of the time. Many female literary authors sought to integrate a moral 
element into evolutionary discourse, which is consistent with the strategies of female 
popularizers of science that Barbara T. Gates has demonstrated.
42
 Such a concern with 
morality is also consistent with the tradition of modern science in the Enlightenment period 
and foundation of the Royal Society, but dropped off in masculine scientific discourse in the 
nineteenth century; these women are thus participating in and attempting to keep alive an 
important strand of what had culturally defined science up to the mid-nineteenth century. 
                                                          
40 Levine, Dying to Know, 126-44. 
 
41
  Kucich, p. 121. 
 
42 Gates, Kindred Nature, 48. See also Cohen on how women’s novel writing resembled scientists’ work in its 
ethical imperative and goal of producing social knowledge (331). 
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RHETORICAL FRAMEWORK 
 Although much of this dissertation takes the form of historical research and close 
readings, it adopts a fundamentally intertextual approach to science and literature that would 
not be possible without recent influential work from the field of rhetoric of science. By 
intertextual analysis, I here rely on the Kristevan sense of society and text as being co-
constitutive. Or, as Mikhail Bakhtin describes in “Discourse in the Novel,” I approach each 
novel with the intent of understanding how it “participates both in the ‘unitary language’ [of 
the text] . . . and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia.”43 Rhetorical 
scholarship offers numerous fine theoretical and practical models for constructing cultural 
conversations in which texts are situated and which they also construct. Rhetorical analysis 
likewise provides a valuable tool for understanding the underlying arguments present in 
literary and nonliterary works alike, as well as for tracing how such lines of argument were 
developed and altered over the course of cultural debate(s). 
 Rhetoric of science understands scientific knowledge as the product of argument and 
conviction, and as not uninvested in suasion.
44
 This field, therefore, deprivileges scientific 
discourse and discovery in order to examine its operations on a social level. Two 
foundational figures in the study of the persuasive intent of scientific prose writing in the 
mid-twentieth century were Kenneth Burke and Thomas Kuhn, though the latter achieved 
more renown on a broad cultural level in bringing attention to the rhetorical and communal 
                                                          
43 Bakhtin, 272. 
 
44
 See the definitions of rhetoric of science in Gross, 91; Harris, xii; and Prelli, 89. 
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construction of scientific paradigms.
45
 Nonetheless, it took the field of rhetoric of science 
some years to establish itself, to recognize that claims of objectivity may strive to protect 
scientific discourse from interrogation of its motives and to aid in building its cultural 
power—a recognition that perhaps was clearer in the mid-nineteenth century, but that is of 
increasing importance in our modern technology-driven world where forms of knowledge are 
progressively specialized.
46
 Rhetoric of science’s methodology thus does not distinguish 
between the structures, strategies, and argumentative ends of fiction and of science, although 
it is sensitive to patterns and figures of speech that scientific discourse tends to adopt.
47
 It 
also offers some of the most useful theoretical approaches to considering how genre operates 
as social action in a communicative system that constructs the expectations of rhetors and 
readers alike. 
 As articulated most influentially by Carolyn Miller in 1984, rhetorical studies have 
come to the consensus that genre is a mode of social action.
48
 As James Zappen explains it, 
“The study of rhetoric and communication since ancient Greece and Rome has been 
concerned with the relationship of rhetoric to modes of inquiry and to the social community, 
with the relationship of language to thought and action.”49 Genre particularly has been 
viewed in the past few decades as a means of connecting preexisting context, audience 
expectations, and exigence to take communicative action—all in order to shape a social 
                                                          
45 Freedman and Medway, 3. Foucault’s The Order of Things (1966) was also influential in the scholarly 
community for its theoretical and historical approach to the development of the human sciences. 
46 Herrick, 211; Lyne, 272-73. 
 
47 See, for example, Fahnestock’s analysis of rhetorical figures common in science writing and Gross’s 
discussion of the strategies of scientific prose (102). 
 
48 Medway, 123; Russell, 226. 
 
49 Zappen, 145. He goes on to explain that scientific rhetoric of the nineteenth century witnessed a return to 
dominance of the concerns of the relationship of language and civilization (145). 
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moment.
50
 Or, put another way, genres negotiate linguistic markets by strategically adapting 
their preexisting structures to the needs of a cultural moment by creating dynamic patterns of 
content, form, and style that express and shape ideologies.
51
 More culturally privileged 
genres, such as those used in scientific discourse, “can reproduce forms of symbolic power 
that can literally shape their receivers’ view of the world.”52 To Miller, then, genre choice is 
not just a matter of form but of pragmatism; it responds to exigence, which represents a 
motive, “an objectified social need” and “provides the rhetor with a socially recognizable 
way to make his or her intentions known.”53 Genre must arise from recurrent, and not 
singular, situations in order to achieve a recognizable and stable form that shapes audience’s 
expectations; a one-off form is a cypher, whereas a recurrent form is a set of instructions on 
how to interpret norms and deviations.
54
 She thus defines genre as “a rhetorical means for 
mediating private intentions and social exigence; it motivates by connecting the private with 
the public, the singular with the recurrent”; furthermore, “genres help constitute the 
substance of our cultural life” by serving “as an index to cultural patterns and…as keys to 
understanding how to participate in the actions of a community.”55 Subsequent rhetorical 
theorists of genre have taken up Miller’s formulation and expanded it into considerations of 
                                                          
50 Yates and Orlikowski, 109. 
51 Schryer, 95. 
 
52 Schryer, 84. 
 
53 Qtn. from Miller, 157, 158; see also 153. 
 
54 Miller, 159. 
 
55 Miller, 163, 165. 
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how genre bridges the performative and the textual and links writers to powerful social 
systems.
56
 
 Charles Bazerman has been recognized as building on Miller’s idea of genre as social 
action in developing his important notion of genre systems.
57
 Bazerman uses the imagery of 
“a system of a complex societal machine in which genres form important levers” to illustrate 
his idea that interrelated genres interact with one another in social systems to achieve an 
endgoal.
58
 He argues that “Only a limited range of genres may appropriately follow upon 
another in particular settings, because the success conditions of the actions of each require 
various states of affairs to exist….The intervention of each of the follow-up genres with its 
attendant macro-speech act, if successful, will have consequences for other genres and 
speech acts to follow.”59 Genres have thus been seen as serving coordinative functions for 
social actions and understandings, as providing a community with expectations of 
communicative structures and their consequences.
60
 Without this chain of interrelated genres 
and the expectations it establishes, “others would not know what kind of thing we were 
doing,” much less “understand our act and accept it as valid,” according to Bazerman.61 One 
of the important implications of this idea of genre systems, David Russell points out, is that 
“one text might function as more than one genre, if it is used in more than one activity 
                                                          
56 Knapp, 290; Russell, 226. 
 
57 See, for example, Russell, 227. 
 
58 Qtn. from Bazerman, 79; see also 97. 
 
59 Bazerman, 98. 
 
60 Russell, 227; Yates and Orlikowski, 104, 108. 
 
61 Bazerman, 100. 
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system”62; going back to Bazerman’s image of a series of levers in a machine, we can 
imagine a pinball machine where the different levers can be arranged in different formations 
to achieve different trajectories. When understood as part of genre systems, then, individual 
genres represent not just actions but possible intentions, which can be accurately interpreted 
in a number of ways but never in isolation.
63
 
 This notion of a text taking part in multiple genre systems, depending on the 
intentions and actions attributed to it, is consistent with Kenneth Burke’s understanding of 
terministic screens, particularly as scientific terminology and poetry interpret aspects of 
humanity. In a striking metaphor, Burke describes a terministic screen as equivalent to a 
color filter imposed on a photograph; as he puts it, “something so ‘factual’ as a photograph 
[can reveal] notable distinctions in texture, and even in form, depending upon which color 
filter [is] used for the documentary description of the event being recorded,” and these visual 
differences correspond to “differences in the nature of the event as perceived, recorded, and 
interpreted.”64 Terminology operates in the same way. The system of terms in which an idea 
or observation is described operates as a terministic screen, not necessarily reflecting reality 
so much as selecting some aspects for our attention while deflecting others.
65
 Terministic 
screens are impossible to avoid since we have to speak within a system of terms in order to 
be comprehensible to ourselves and others; some terminologies, however, especially in the 
sciences, are overly selective and fail to give a comprehensive vision of humanity.
66
 Burke 
                                                          
62 Russell, 228. 
 
63
 Bazerman, 82. 
 
64 Burke, 45, 46. 
 
65 Burke, 45. 
 
66 Burke, 50-52. Burke’s ideas here are similar to those of White’s “The Value of Narrativity in the 
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suggests that the best way to overcome such shortcomings is to borrow from several 
terminologies to produce a more general “philosophic terminology of motives,” and this is an 
area in which he sees the literary arts as excelling because of their tendency to cut across 
disciplines and to carefully and conscientiously read systems of signs.
67
 Although the 
scientist might argue for a greater objectivity to his or her observations—a freedom from 
ideological terministic screens that allows for an immediate and accurate recording of the 
biological, physical, psychological, and social phenomena under discussion—Burke argues 
that we humans are too enmeshed in our symbolic verbal structures to truly treat “words as 
the signs of things,” and instead inevitably impose an interpretative framework onto the 
natural world so that our descriptions of them reflect our own social values and order, 
making “things the signs of words.”68 On the other hand, Burke describes literary writers as 
more balanced in using personal and universal terminologies to describe their ideas and in 
using terministic screens to symbolically resolve social tensions or problems; thus, a literary 
critic’s job is to analyze a particular terministic screen to determine “the kinds of observation 
implicit in the terminology [the author has] chosen,” regardless of “whether [the] choice of 
terms was deliberate or spontaneous.”69 
 While Burke upholds the role and power of literary artists, he uses the term “poet” to 
stand in for all such authors (including dramatists and novelists)
70
; Mikhail Bakhtin, on the 
other hand, theorizes the novel as a unique genre because, as one translator puts it, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Representation of Reality,” especially his assertion that narrativity is both inherently selective in its focus and 
inherently part of human consciousness and so unavoidable in the sciences (1-26). 
 
67 Qtn from Burke, 51-52; see also 368. 
68 Burke, 378-79. 
 
69 Qtn. from Burke, 47; original emphasis. See also Burke 28-33. 
 
70 Burke, 57. 
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represents “a consciously structured hybrid of languages.”71 Like Burke, Bakhtin believes 
that language does not truly reflect an objective reality but rather constructs our 
understanding of the world and reveals our values.
72
 Bakhtin’s theorization of the novel has 
presented genre theorists with an important model for the complicated tensions inherent in 
discourses that define cultures and subcultures.
73
 For Bakhtin, the novel is unique because it 
developed as a literary genre in the modern world and is still in the process of developing; as 
such, the genre itself embodies the notions of open-ended process and heteroglossia.
74
 
Because modernity is defined by its nature as polyglot—as global, inclusive, and 
complicated—the novel as a modern genre is able to encompass multiple languages and 
genres in ways that parody, reformulate, and accentuate them.
75
 Bakhtin uses the term 
“language” roughly as we might use “register” or “terminological system,” and thus his 
definition of the novel’s generic heteroglossia can embrace scientific language and genres. 
This is particularly the case because heteroglossia is defined by Bakhtin as “another’s speech 
in another’s language, serving to express authorial intentions but in a refracted way”76; the 
presence of scientific terminology in novels would serve as evidence for the modernity of the 
genre and for its heteroglot nature. Furthermore, it would be an oversight not to understand 
science as one of the languages incorporated into the novel’s heteroglossia, since he 
describes the novel as “assum[ing] leadership in the process of developing and renewing 
                                                          
71 Holquist, xxix. 
 
72 Herrick, 235-36. 
73 Coe et al., 6; Holquist, xxviii. 
 
74 Bakhtin, 4-12. 
 
75 Bakhtin, 5, 8-9, 12. 
 
76 Bakhtin, 324. 
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literature in its linguistic and stylistic dimension” in a modern setting, one in which 
“epistemology [became] the dominant discipline.”77 Any “living”—or concrete—literary 
representation has to be defined by its chronotope, or fusion of time and space, in order to 
have a relationship to reality.
78
 Therefore, for Bakhtin, novels must embody the social 
discourse of their times and the heteroglossia represented by “stratification present in every 
language at any given moment of its historical existence.”79 The novel as a genre, then, 
“denies the absolutism of a single unitary language—that is, that refuses to acknowledge its 
own language as the sole verbal and semantic center of the ideological world.”80 In Bakhtin’s 
formulation, the novel represents the perfect Burkean acknowledgement of the diversity of 
terministic screens, an important social function that is inseparable from the other genres 
with which it interacts in a social system of meaning. 
 The preceding rhetorical theorists—Miller, Bazerman, Burke, and Bakhtin—have 
informed this dissertation project in substantial ways. Rather than thinking of the mid-
nineteenth-century novel independently as a genre, I approach it as part of a genre system 
that included scientific publications; reviews of scientific developments published in 
periodicals; nonfiction pieces debating the cultural significance and relevance of such 
scientific developments by theologians, scientists, scientific thinkers, and cultural 
commentators; prose and poetic fiction that theorized, systematized, and explored scientific 
theories; and public and private responses to such fiction, which include reviews, diaries, 
salon discussions, and letters. I therefore work to excavate and explicate these genre systems 
                                                          
77 Bakhtin, 12, 15. 
 
78 Bakhtin, 243. 
79 Qtn. from Bakhtin, 263; see also 259. 
 
80 Bakhtin, 366. 
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to better understand the social actions undertaken by the women novelists whose work is the 
focus of my chapters. As Miller argues, though, such genre systems only gain meaning as 
recurrent exigencies (to form a recognizable pattern that rhetors recognize themselves as 
acting in), and as social actions that mediate private and public responses. This dissertation is 
therefore structured around controversies in evolutionary developments that occurred 
multiple times throughout the century and that consequently built on one another, both in 
terms of their science and theoretical structure and in terms of the nature of the debates that 
surrounded them. I also analyze the narrative and rhetorical structures of the scientific works 
and novels in similar and interdiscursive ways. As Burke argues, although it is 
commonsensical to state that words are the signs of things, things can also be the signs of 
words in that there is no observation of the natural world that is unmediated through a 
sociopolitical framework (i.e. a terministic screen), and so statements about nature reveal 
such situated perspectives. Fiction and science, then, are both creating narratives that rely on, 
build systems of, and critically interrogate terminology that constructs the natural world. 
They do so in the mid-nineteenth century, though, in ways that are more self-aware than 
scientific discourse in the modern day, in which scientists can critique one another’s situated 
perspectives and failure to attain ideals of objectivity, but lay persons lack the vocabulary 
and privilege to make such critiques and to point out blind spots in the narrativity of 
scientific work. I am aware that each of the novels under consideration is heteroglot in ways 
that exceed my analysis, and that in focusing on my particular terministic screen, I am 
invariably ignoring and obscuring other important elements of the novels. Nonetheless, the 
terministic screens I apply in this project have never before been employed in critical 
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analysis of these novels and so highlight important discourse systems that bring us to a fuller 
understanding of the social action the novels are participating in. 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Both Gillian Beer and George Levine have commented that nineteenth-century 
science, and evolutionary theory especially, brought up more questions than it could contain 
or address; the novel was able to bring evolutionary theories to fuller meanings and deeper 
interrogations because of the fluidity and expansiveness of the generic form. Novels allowed 
women writers specifically to intervene in a male-dominated and ground-changing debate 
over the status of human identity. By constructing thought experiments that tested the 
applicability of evolutionary schemas in the social world, a move that at once worked within 
and expanded the bounds of literary realism, writers like Mary Shelley, Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning, Elizabeth Gaskell, and George Eliot considered the lived experiences of 
individuals and ethical implications for society in such a worldview, offering readers 
argumentative and evaluative messages about the usefulness and validity of evolutionary 
theories. My dissertation project recognizes the development and dissemination of 
nineteenth-century evolutionary theory as a conversation in motion, one that was not limited 
to or even dominated by Darwinism. My research not only recovers and repositions women’s 
voices in scientific and literary endeavors, but also facilitates recognition of the affective and 
embodied nature of scientific practice. 
 The first chapter of this dissertation, “Shifting the Center: Mary Shelley’s Cuvierian 
Revolutions in Nature and Time,” focuses on how Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (1826) uses 
many of Georges Cuvier’s topoi, or common rhetorical themes and lines of argument, as 
heuristics. I argue that she fictionalizes these topoi to interrogate their validity and to apply 
22 
 
them to new contexts. Georges Cuvier is often at best a footnote in modern histories of 
biology, but he first established that species go extinct, that fossils are a valid way to study 
previous lifeforms, that various parts of an organism are correlated, that animals are fitted to 
their ecological niches, and that geological time is not consistent with human time, and in 
fact occasionally consists of violent breaks with previously steady states. He brought 
enormous prestige to the European scientific endeavor and in many ways founded the field of 
paleontology. Cuvier’s ideas radically affected cultural views, but such influence is rarely 
traced in any depth in literary studies, with the exception of the despair of Byron’s Cain 
(1821). Shelley’s The Last Man is more than just a text of despair, however; its presentation 
of catastrophe provides deep and enduring insights into what it would mean for humans to be 
aware of their subjection to natural processes, like any other animal species, and of the fact 
that nature blindly extinguishes species without a larger purpose.  
Furthermore, I argue that Shelley tackles issues that Cuvier avoids in his Discours; 
she applies her insights to human culture and to the future, whereas Cuvier looks at the 
natural world and the past. Traditional notions of temporality are challenged by both 
Shelley’s The Last Man and Cuvier’s Discours; both writers share a sense of time as divided 
between the human and the global. Shelley clearly invokes Cuvier’s model for history—
steady states interrupted unexpectedly by violent upheavals—showing that until catastrophe 
strikes, social problems (including class, race, and nationalistic conflicts) as well as human 
nature (particularly male and female types and relationship dynamics) do not change in any 
significant way. Shelley seems here to be pondering the purpose of Cuvier’s studies of the 
past: they fail to provide insight into the present and the future, and so, breaking with the 
antiquarian model for knowledge building that Cuvier proposes for himself, she instead 
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proposes a more relativistic and personal—even if objectively flawed—literary approach to 
understanding civilization. 
Chapter two, “Politics and Metaphysics: Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s Opposition to 
The Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation in Aurora Leigh,” focuses on how Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning took part in the cultural evaluative process of the controversial Vestiges in 
her verse-novel Aurora Leigh (1856). Often overlooked in scientific and cultural histories, 
but wildly popular and widely influential, Robert Chambers’s Vestiges of the Natural History 
of Creation (1844, but with an important and widely reviewed people’s edition of 1853) 
intentionally crossed disciplinary boundaries in order to establish generalists’ place in the 
newly important scientific disciplines (and thereby prevent the formation of a dogmatic 
scientific clerisy) and to establish scientists as the heralds and leaders of social progress. 
Victorians widely responded to Vestiges and coopted its ideas for a number of religious, 
political, and ideological ends; the work provided a grand theory of the age that claimed 
humans had evolved from apes (not to mention fish and plants), and that the universe 
developed materialistically, with no repeated interventions from God. This chapter seeks to 
reconstruct the literary and non-literary critical conversation over the meaning and value of 
Vestiges’s theories in the decade and a half following its publication. Aurora Leigh was 
famously composed by EBB in part to represent her age—even those components not 
typically considered appropriate poetical material—and in part to register her “highest 
convictions upon Life and Art,” many of which conflicted with the worldview presented by 
Vestiges. As I will explore in this chapter, EBB contrasts her poetic and philosophical 
convictions with the gender, religious, political, and developmental ideologies of Vestiges 
through a number of rhetorical strategies. 
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Vestiges not only presented the first universal evolutionary schema in English, but 
also was read as a Bildungsroman of the Earth, one that suggested an alternative 
developmental narrative to that of religion or social reformers without being incompatible 
with either. This evolutionary theory was a major force in the secularization of science and 
the deprivileging of the human species as uniquely created and endowed with spiritual 
capacities. Aurora Leigh, EBB’s own Bildungsroman that straddles the female-coded genre 
of the novel and traditionally male poetic epic, demonstrates that the author thoroughly 
understands the system that Chambers builds in Vestiges, as well as its implications on a 
number of social, natural, and philosophical levels; unlike Tennyson, however, she finds 
Vestiges’s “ bare inference[s]” (a phrase used by Chambers in the 1853 preface to critique the 
unsatisfying generalities of scriptural geologists, and now turned on him) unconvincing and 
ultimately irreconcilable with what her “own instinct” and “pure reason” tell her about the 
world in which she found herself, a world in which progress must proceed on the individual 
level by incremental steps, not by species-wide leaps; a world in which women’s writing 
needs to be valued as serious thought and art; a world in which the poet provides the clearest 
and most comprehensive natural and social vision. 
Chapter three, “Working through Darwin’s Origin: Elizabeth Gaskell’s Sylvia’s 
Lovers as a Novel of Evolutionary Despair,” carefully considers how Sylvia’s Lovers (1863) 
applies some of the bleakest implications of Darwinian tropes to human society. In 
November 1859, Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection 
was first published; in that same month, Elizabeth Gaskell traveled to the Yorkshire coast to 
find inspiration for the novel project that ended up becoming Sylvia’s Lovers. Gaskell’s 
Wives and Daughters (1864-65) is often discussed as partially inspired by Darwin, but no 
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scholars have more than mentioned the possibility that Sylvia’s Lovers might consider the 
implications of Darwinian theory. This silence could, in part, be due to Wives and 
Daughters’s generally positive take on natural history and those who practice it, whereas 
Sylvia’s Lovers is frequently described as “the saddest story [she] ever wrote.” I argue that by 
the time that Gaskell worked through the doubts and depression inspired by Darwin’s Origin, 
she was able to write a novel of evolutionary triumph in Wives and Daughters; Sylvia’s 
Lovers, on the other hand, is the record of Gaskell’s evolutionary struggle: of her realization 
of the inherent unfairness in both natural and social gendering processes, of the Sisyphean 
nature of human suffering, and of the evacuation of meaning from timescapes. 
Although Darwin did try to emphasize a more positive view of evolutionary processes 
in Origin, natural selection can be interpreted pessimistically by focusing on the violence 
inherent in the theory; selection of only a handful of organisms to survive and reproduce is 
hardly an uplifting vision of nature. For Gaskell, a Dissenter immersed in intellectual life in 
the scientific hub of Manchester, Darwin’s Origin offered generative, if disheartening, 
narrative possibilities. In particular, I argue in this chapter, Gaskell took to their logical, if 
nihilistic, conclusions such Darwinian tropes as sexual division and competition, the 
adaptation of organisms to their often harsh and destructive landscapes, and the nature and 
shape of time. In these cases, Gaskell demonstrates the bleakness of a Darwinian worldview 
and the despair Darwin’s Origin could invoke in its readers by not necessarily endorsing 
Darwinism, but by applying its consequences to a social vision that emphasizes the 
minuteness of a human life against the landscape that sustains it. Her note of resistance to 
Origin-induced depression is clearest when Gaskell tackles the issue of death and 
remembrance in considering what kind of narrative best serves humankind’s needs. Darwin’s 
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Origin endorses evolutionary narratives in which humans are deprivileged, a single 
generation’s experiences are essentially meaningless, and very few organisms leave any 
records of their existence behind them. Gaskell, on the other hand, upholds oral tradition and 
the power of historical, fictional narratives to recover and recognize the value in human 
experience. 
Chapter four, “The Shape and Limits of Mental Development: George Eliot’s Daniel 
Deronda and Spencerian Evolutionary Psychology,” studies George Eliot’s final completed 
novel, Daniel Deronda (1876), in light of Herbert Spencer’s evolutionary psychology. 
Spencer was responsible for persuading his contemporaries that evolution could inform all 
branches of natural, physical, and social science; he also became a foundational figure in a 
number of social sciences by transitioning fields like sociology, anthropology, and especially 
psychology from personal and philosophical reflections to biologized practices informed by 
standards and statistics. Nonetheless, Spencer has been and remains a deeply unpopular 
figure in historical, literary, cultural, and scientific studies. Several historians of science and 
literary critics have outlined the reasons for this neglect, but on the whole the trend can be 
explained by a tendency to caricature or scapegoat Spencerian political thought as Social 
Darwinism while simultaneously fearing any association with that disreputable doctrine. 
When it comes to Eliot, then, literary critics tend to dismiss Spencerian thought as 
incompatible with Eliot’s social vision, treating it as mechanistic, misogynistic, dogmatic, 
and socially regressive. To her contemporaries, however, Eliot was seen as more Spencerian 
than Darwinian. 
Spencer himself took a Lamarckian approach to evolution, combining the notion of 
the inheritance of acquired characteristics with human mental capacities to permanently 
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biologize the study of psychology. He committed throughout his career to a vision of 
evolution as progressive, continuous, universal, observable in all life forms and societies no 
matter how small and localized, and tending toward increasing happiness. Eliot was 
particularly influenced by Spencer’s synthesizing of ethics with evolutionary development on 
both an individual psychological and a global cultural level. Eliot’s philosophy, like 
Spencer’s, was deeply enmeshed in the scientific concepts, debates, and methodologies of the 
day. This chapter first outlines Spencer’s evolutionary thought and biography, focusing 
particularly on his intellectual and personal relationship with Eliot. I then shift into an 
analysis of Daniel Deronda in light of Spencerian evolutionary psychology, ethics, and 
philosophy. Ultimately, I seek to demonstrate that not only did Eliot both rely upon and 
critique Spencerian frameworks in a complicated manner, but also that she approached 
similar topoi—nationality, trauma, experience, inheritance, gender, sympathy, 
epistemology—informed by a Spencerian synthesis, in which concepts of human 
development and limitations on both the individual and social level must be informed by 
evolutionary theory in order to be properly understood. Her main point of distinction from 
Spencer’s ideology is in her focus on the individual gendered case study rather than 
generalizations at the level of societies, global movements, or philosophical abstraction. 
The women novelists I study in this dissertation are prescient in their questioning of 
the telos inherent in evolutionary models, voicing a skepticism about whose values and 
experiences are valued in such theories and whether the world as they knew it and as they 
hoped it might be in fact reflects evolutionary schemas. All four novelists question 
evolutionary schemas that place British white males at the top of the developmental 
hierarchy and instead strive to give voice to the struggles of those disenfranchised by 
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narratives of anthro- and ethno-centrism, crushing secularism, blind chance, and inevitable 
male dominance that evolutionary theories could reinforce. Thus, the novels this project 
focuses on expand the potential and explore the implications of evolutionary theories by 
virtue of the women writers’ commitments to real social improvements and to individuating 
ethical consequences as they would be experienced firsthand. Looking at these women’s 
interventions in moments of potential social crisis can give us pause as we consider the 
implications for twentieth- and twenty-first-century culture of the rise of scientific privilege 
and perspective; I explore this issue briefly in the coda focused on Neo-Victorian fiction. 
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Chapter 1:  
“Shifting the Center: Mary Shelley’s Cuvierian Revolutions in Nature and Time” 
 
 One of the most prominent scientific paradigms of the early nineteenth century was 
formulated by Georges Cuvier. Cuvier is often at best a footnote in modern histories of 
biology, but he first established numerous profoundly influential theories: that species go 
extinct, that fossils are a valid way to study previous lifeforms, that various parts of an 
organism are correlated, that animals are fitted to their ecological niches, and that geological 
time is not consistent with human time, and in fact occasionally consists of violent breaks 
with previously steady states. He brought enormous prestige to the European scientific 
endeavor and in many ways founded the field of paleontology. Cuvier’s ideas radically 
affected cultural views, but such influence is rarely traced in any depth, particularly in 
literary studies. This chapter undertakes an examination of the topoi, or common rhetorical 
themes or lines of argument, that Cuvier either initiated or popularized through his Discours 
préliminaire (1812) and British Romantic writers’ conversations about and developments of 
such topoi, focusing on Mary Shelley’s third novel, The Last Man (1826). Although Lord 
Byron’s Cain has probably been discussed in relationship to Cuvier’s ideas more than any 
other piece of British literature, as I argue, Mary Shelley’s The Last Man is in fact the most 
extended and nuanced treatment of the most popular geological theory in British 
Romanticism. 
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 In The Last Man, Shelley uses many of Cuvier’s topoi—such as fragmentary 
evidence, disaster, anti-anthropocentricism, and the contrast between human and global 
time—as heuristics: she fictionalizes these topoi to interrogate their validity and to apply 
them to new contexts. But Shelley also tackles issues that Cuvier avoids in his Discours; she 
applies her insights to human culture and to the future, whereas Cuvier looks at the natural 
world and the past. In the Discours, Cuvier discusses competing geological systems and uses 
comparative historiography to date the most recent natural revolution, avoiding 
considerations of how his ideas might apply to broader cultural concerns. In The Last Man, 
Mary Shelley devotes quite a bit of time to considering what a Cuvierian natural revolution 
would mean for the individual human psyche as well as for communities and societies. 
 Mary Shelley’s project of considering the implications of Cuvier’s topoi for 
contemporaneous British society is underscored by her narrative structure in The Last Man, 
as she layers time periods upon one another—the narrative is presented as a nineteenth-
century translation of a rediscovered ancient Greek text about a late twenty-first century 
series of events—casting the novel in the mode of prolepsis. Prolepsis is a rhetorical figure of 
anticipation, even of speculation.
81
 That is, Shelley represents a future state as though it has 
already come to pass through Lionel’s narrative, though of course no pandemic or geological 
revolution threatening the species with extinction has in fact occurred.
82
 Shelley clearly 
invokes Cuvier’s model for history—steady states interrupted unexpectedly by violent 
upheavals—showing that until catastrophe strikes, social problems (including class, race, and 
nationalistic conflicts) as well as human nature (particularly male and female types and 
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82 O’Dea, 294. As Fisch points out, “No one…is dead yet” (279). 
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relationship dynamics) do not change in any significant way.
83
 Shelley seems here to ponder 
the purpose of Cuvier’s studies of the past: they fail to provide insight into the present and 
the future, and so, breaking with the antiquarian model for knowledge building that Cuvier 
proposes for himself, she instead proposes a more relativistic and personal—even if 
objectively flawed—literary approach to understanding civilization.84 
GEORGES CUVIER 
 Georges Cuvier (1769-1832) made his name in 1796 in a famous lecture to the 
prestigious Institut de France on fossil bones.
85
 In this lecture, he essentially established that 
the Siberian mammoth and American mastodon (also called a “mammoth” at the time) were 
neither of the same species as each other nor as modern elephants, and were in fact extinct.
86
 
In so doing, Cuvier proved that extinction was irrefutably real and set the project of inquiry 
for paleontology for the next twenty years.
87
 Throughout the first decades of the nineteenth 
century, Cuvier continued to expand his scientific prestige, garnering national and 
international respect in his position at the Muséum d’Histoire Naturelle, “the world’s most 
prominent institution for research in all the sciences—animal, vegetable, and mineral—that 
were grouped together as natural history,” as he “established a reputation as a patient 
observer who stuck to the facts.”88 He was widely known as “the legislator or arbiter of 
natural history,” acknowledgement of his status as “the greatest naturalist of the age” granted 
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even by scientists who disagreed with him professionally.
89
 His influence on popular and 
professional understandings of natural history was felt not only in France, but also in Europe 
and the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century.
90
  
 Throughout his professional life, Cuvier proposed a number of different tenets 
underlying paleontological inquiry, largely through his work with fossils. In so doing, he laid 
the foundation for later evolutionary work in France and abroad (including for Charles 
Darwin in England) in a number of important ways, despite not believing in evolution or 
“transformism” himself. He developed a comparative method of examining fossils that 
helped him resolve debates about fossil identities, and his fame—including an overstated 
popular legend (that he in fact encouraged) that he could reconstruct an entire animal from a 
single bone fragment—cemented his authority.91 Cuvier’s fossil research was based on the 
idea that the different parts of an animal are perfectly correlated and not just “a jumble of 
[independent] characteristics,” as previous taxonomists had treated them.92 An herbivore, for 
example, will have teeth designed for grinding; it won’t have teeth designed for puncturing 
prey or claws for catching or holding prey, which are unnecessary for its lifestyle.
93
 Thus, 
organisms are fitted to their conditions of existence, or ecological niches, “to assure internal 
harmony as well as harmony with its environment.”94 Because of this correlation of parts and 
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93 Appel further notes that Cuvier’s focus on functional integrity was shared by British natural historians, 
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fittedness to conditions of existence, Cuvier believed, evolution cannot happen because the 
entire animal cannot evolve at once, and changing select parts of the body would throw off 
the correlation and make the animal unfit.
95
 This, of course, we now know to be untrue, but it 
was consistent with Cuvier’s findings of a lack of intermediate fossil forms.  
Cuvier’s Recherches and Discours 
In 1812, Cuvier gathered together his previously published paleontological articles 
and sketches of fossils to reissue them in Recherches sur les ossemens fossils des 
quadrupèdes (or Researches on Quadruped Fossil Bones, hereafter Recherches).
96
 This four-
volume work was intended to be an accessible and organized presentation of Cuvier’s body 
of work and has widely been regarded as Cuvier’s professional memoir.97 Recherches marks 
a milestone in Western science because it popularly “established the fact of extinction and 
the utility of fossils in providing a framework for geological time.”98 Perhaps the most 
important part of Recherches, however, was its stand-alone introduction, the Discours 
préliminaire (or Preliminary Discourse, hereafter Discours).
99
 The Discours was initially 
published along with the first volume of Recherches, but soon was printed separately, as it 
did not directly review or comment on the material included in the four volumes of 
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Recherches.
100
 The popularity of the Discours among professional and lay populations alike 
led to six French editions between 1812 and Cuvier’s death in 1832, and to prompt 
translations into all major European languages.
101
 The Discours was written as “a long essay 
pitched at the general educated public” that appealed “to readers with a general interest in the 
natural world and its significance for human life.”102 It was a venue for Cuvier to present his 
interpretations of his own work, and represented his only attempt to write generally about the 
debates his theories raised.
103
 The Discours, in particular, popularized Cuvier’s idea that 
extinctions are caused by geological or natural revolutions and that the most recent 
revolution was a widespread flood; this theory became widely known as catastrophism. For 
much of the rest of the nineteenth century, natural historians in Europe and America as well 
as thinkers invested in the implications of his research had to contend in some way with the 
prestige of this work.
104
  
In 1813, the most historically significant translation of Cuvier’s work was completed 
by a joint effort of Robert Kerr and Robert Jameson in Scotland; from the date of its 
publication until 1830, this translation remained “the most influential popular geology in 
Britain.”105 Kerr is generally credited with the translation of the body of Cuvier’s Discours, 
which was criticized from its first appearance in Britain as inaccurate, a charge that historians 
                                                          
100 Coleman, 12. Coleman notes that the Discours fails to reflect on the material of the four volumes that 
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continue to levy at the 1813 translation today.
106
 Kerr died as the translation was being 
completed, however, after which point Jameson took complete control of the work. Jameson 
studied geology and mineralogy in Germany with Abraham Gottlob Werner before returning 
to Edinburgh, where he became the chair of natural history at the University. Jameson, like 
his mentor Werner, adopted a Neptunist position in the geological debates raging at the time, 
especially in Scotland.
107
 James Hutton was the most prominent proponent of the opposing 
position, Plutonism, which argued that volcanoes were the primary geological forces 
responsible for shaping the earth’s surface;108 his Theory of the Earth (1788) was still being 
widely discussed in the early nineteenth century.
109
 Neptunists, on the other hand, argued that 
waters, particularly oceans, were the primary geological force.
110
 Jameson was drawn to 
Cuvier’s ideas because his portrayal of the most recent revolution as a major flood could 
bring his significant intellectual prestige to the Neptunist theory, if only the ideas were 
translated into that context. To accomplish this goal, Jameson appended a preface and a 
number of editorial notes that doubled or tripled the length of the Discours, which he 
published as a volume independent from the rest of Recherches entitled Essay on the Theory 
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of the Earth.
111
 The new (and inaccurate) title clearly placed Cuvier’s translation in 
conversation with Hutton’s famous text.112  
Jameson and Kerr highlighted elements of Cuvier’s theory that were consistent with 
the theological debates occurring in British geology at the time but that were generally of 
little concern to Cuvier or continental scientists.
113
 British reception of the work was 
“particularly enthusiastic,” especially among those thinkers who “were eager to find support 
for the authority of religion—and hence also support for the social order—from the authority 
of science.”114 Jameson’s notes also made explicit the link between the most recent 
geological revolution and the Biblical Flood, thus enlisting Cuvier’s “scientific evidence of 
the highest respectability” to support the historicity of Christian “traditional biblical 
interpretation” and Neptunist claims.115 But Cuvier, like most French natural historians, 
“rarely mentioned God or Providence in his work, nor did he attempt to correlate Genesis 
with the evidence of geology”—natural theology, or the attempt to find evidence for religious 
claims in nature, was a specifically British phenomenon.
116
 Cuvier was nominally a 
Protestant, which might have facilitated British science’s adoption of his ideas,117 but, as 
Rudwick has noted, “he was also a child of the Enlightenment, and he considered that 
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science and religion should not interfere in each other’s affairs, but should, for the good of 
both, be kept apart.”118 Cuvier did draw upon Hebrew accounts as evidence of “a major 
catastrophic event early in human history. But…the Genesis story featured as just one of 
many ancient multicultural records of the same kind, all equally garbled and unreliable unless 
treated with rigorous caution.”119 These nuances were undermined by Jameson’s edition of 
Cuvier’s work. Jameson and Kerr’s misrepresentations of Cuvier’s project inevitably 
influenced how his work was understood in Britain and other Anglophone countries 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
120
 
THE ROMANTICS’ RESPONSES TO CUVIER 
 Cuvier’s career (1792-1832) coincides with the literary period that we now identify as 
Romanticism, as well as with a number of dramatic social revolutions in Europe. The 
Romantics “were the first generation to know that they lived in a world of fossils,” and this 
mindset fed into a deep interest in searching for and negotiating the dynamics of “origins, 
originality, authenticity, [and] authority.”121 Cuvier responded to such cultural narratives, and 
in turn Cuvier’s retellings of these aforementioned social scripts appealed to literary and 
visual artists alike.
122
 Balzac thought of Cuvier as “the greatest poet of our century,” while 
Goethe “considered Cuvier to be one of the giant intellects of his time…and Cuvier returned 
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the compliment.”123 Prominent pre-Cuvierian Romantic thinkers, such as Volney,124 
Coleridge,
125
 Goethe, and Godwin,
126
 are uniformitarian in their approach to history,
127
 
whereas post-Cuvierian Romantics, such as Byron and the Shelleys, adopt the catastrophist 
vision of sudden breaks in geohistorical time, a scale of planetary time that does not 
necessarily map onto time as humans understand and measure it. 
 There is no direct evidence that either of the Shelleys read Cuvier: the reading list 
compiled by Paula Feldman from Mary and P. B. Shelley’s at-times shared journal (dating 
from 1814-22) does not list Cuvier in either the Jameson translation or French original.
128
 
But P. B. Shelley did read the works of Erasmus Darwin, and Cuvier influenced Darwin.
129
 
(And P. B. Shelley, in turn, influenced both his wife and Byron.) There is a possibility that P. 
B. Shelley directly read Cuvier’s Discours: “An 1822 letter from a Paris library to Shelley 
reveals that just before his death he had ordered the two available volumes of Cuvier’s 
palaeontological researches,” and these books were delivered to the Shelleys in April of that 
year.
130
 Cuvier was a household name in Britain by 1816, and it is likely that P. B. Shelley’s 
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order of two volumes of Recherches in 1822 did not reflect his first encounter with the ideas, 
directly or indirectly.
131
 His engagement with Cuvier’s ideas has been traced by critics to a 
number of his works: Cuvier’s theories of functional integrity underlay P. B. Shelley’s 
argument for vegetarianism in A Vindication of Natural Diet (1813); he likewise used 
Cuvier’s geological theories for images of changes in the earth’s climate in Queen Mab 
(1813) and anatomical theories in A Refutation of Deism (1814).
132
 It is striking that these 
three works follow so closely after Jameson’s 1813 translation of Cuvier’s Essay. Mont 
Blanc (1816) also demonstrates P. B. Shelley’s familiarity with Cuvier’s catastrophist ideas 
in both its portrayal of the indifferent destructive and creative powers of glaciers, especially 
in lines 94-117, and its contemplation of the mountain’s prehistory.133 Prometheus Unbound 
(1820), too, shows the influence of Cuvier, especially in Act IV’s images of fossils and 
concomitant vision of apocalypse, extinction, and despair (lines 274-318).
134
  
Byron’s Cain and Its Cuvierian Framework 
Lord Byron’s Cain: A Mystery (1821) represents the best-known, and most studied, 
application of Cuvier’s ideas to British literature.135 Byron overtly cited Cuvier in the Preface 
to Cain, a play which constituted “one of the most celebrated literary scandals of the 
nineteenth century.”136 Again, Cuvier was an established name in Britain by this time. Not 
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only did his fame and respect abroad bolster his reputation, but Jameson’s project of enlisting 
Cuvier’s (distorted) claims for religious conservatism had been continued in Britain by 
William Buckland, an ordained Anglican priest, a Cambridge professor in mineralogy and 
geology, and a prominent natural theologian.
137
 Natural theology, in essence, is the project of 
confirming religious claims through scientific study—or, alternatively put, of searching in 
the composition and processes of the natural world for evidence of divinity as presented in 
religious doctrine.
138
 Buckland became particularly famous after his discovery in the 
Kirkdale Caverns, Yorkshire, of a group of fossils that he termed an antediluvian hyena den, 
becoming “nearly as celebrated as Cuvier” as a consequence.139 His discoveries were printed 
in Reliquiae Diluviana (1823), which John Murray might have accepted in part to make up 
for the controversy of publishing Cain; this work was the culmination of Buckland’s efforts 
to reaffirm the Scriptural orthodoxy of Cuvier’s theories in light of Cain’s supposed 
blasphemies.
140
 Buckland’s vivid depictions of his fossil cave “brought a whole pre-human 
‘world,’ or ecosystem, into sharp focus.”141  Byron, like Buckland, tried to bring life to a 
“pre-human world” in his work, having Lucifer guide Cain’s title character through a tour of 
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extinct species, including the mammoth—a species that Cuvier used to scientifically establish 
the very notion of extinction.
142
 
 The Preface to Cain consists mostly of “a series of defenses” of the play that are 
evaluated by modern 
critics as ranging 
from “deeply ironic” 
to “wickedly 
disingenuous.”143 
One such 
disingenuous moment 
is the “Note” at the 
end of the Preface, 
which Byron presents 
as “appended…as a 
heavily affected 
afterthought.”144 It reads: 
Note.—The reader will perceive that the author has partly adopted in this poem the 
notion of Cuvier, that the world had been destroyed several times before the creation 
of man. This speculation, derived from the different strata and the bones of enormous 
and unknown animals found in them, is not contrary to the Mosaic account, but rather 
confirms it; as no human bones have yet been discovered in those strata, although 
those of many known animals are to be found near the remains of the unknown.”145 
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In this Note, Byron makes explicit to his readers that he drew on Cuvier for source material 
for his own play, but more interestingly, he summarizes Cuvier’s work in such a way as to 
present it as religiously orthodox—“not contrary to the Mosaic account”—highlighting the 
recent creation of humankind even while positing an older history for the Earth.
146
 We could 
assume here that Byron is being subversive, but he also might be presenting the facts as he 
understood them: even though one Byron scholar has suggested that he might have learned 
about Cuvier’s ideas (and Buckland’s work) through conversations with P. B. Shelley,147 and 
one contemporaneous reviewer accused Byron of having learned about Cuvier solely through 
a dictionary, Byron in fact probably read Cuvier’s Discours in Kerr and Jameson’s 1813 
translation.
148
 
 The pessimism inherent in Cuvier’s theories of extinction and geological revolutions 
seems to have appealed to Byron’s skepticism and sense of history.149 In  Cain, the effects of 
Cuvier’s theories of life and history are thoroughly depressing and diminishing: the human 
species takes on an insignificant role in the universe—displaced from its role as sole 
sovereign of the Earth—as does the act of Creation and the Fall; the Judeo-Christian God 
becomes “a sort of local deity rather than…[the] revered and immutable Almighty Lord who 
is the source of all Life”; and human time is placed in the perspective of planetary or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
368). 
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universal time scales, making it shrink into near nothingness.
150
 These conflicting timescales 
anger and frighten Cain,
151
 but more importantly they drain the “Romantic vision of 
apocalypse” of any sense of personal or universal meaning.152 Lucifer, a Cuvierian devotee, 
reinforces Cain’s sense of nothingness: this is the “human sum of knowledge, to know mortal 
nature’s nothingness” (2.2.417-24).153 The acquisition of knowledge, including scientific and 
geohistorical knowledge, is “exhilarating but ultimately soul-destroying,” as “Cain’s 
understanding of how the Earth is wrecked leads to the wreckage of his own soul.”154 The 
nihilistic implications of Cuvierian theory for humanity’s sense of itself were thus dramatized 
by Byron, and so the closet drama—never really intended for performance, but rather for 
private readings—was largely rejected by critics of the time. 
 Byron’s invocation of Cuvier’s orthodoxy “did not soothe his publisher or anyone 
who was disturbed by radical notions,” though the play did serve to popularize the new and 
struggling fields of geology and paleontology in Britain.
155
 Byron was accused of atheism—
often traced to P. B. Shelley’s influence by hostile reviewers—because of the play’s 
thoroughgoing skepticism.
156
 Byron’s correspondent, Thomas Moore, thought that Cuvier’s 
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presence in Cain gave the play a “desolating…deadly chill.”157 One reviewer claimed that the 
play was “‘propagating’ a deadly moral ‘plague’, calculated to ‘spread desolation’ by virtue 
of its aesthetic appeal.”158 At least one suicide was attributed to reading the drama.159 Even 
King George IV publicly registered his objections to Cain’s blasphemies (derived, 
remember, from Cuvier’s geological theories).160 Many attacks were mounted from the 
pulpit, as the Anglican clergy denounced Cain and sought to regain authority as the 
interpreters of the Bible’s relevance to the modern age;161 Cain was perceived as such a 
threat, after all, because Byron was so popular and his work so widely read.
162
  
 But there were a number of positive reactions to Byron’s Cain as well, including 
those of the Shelleys and Leigh Hunt.
163
 Both of the Shelleys were greatly impressed by 
Byron’s play.164 Mary Shelley wrote both before and after the publication of Cain that it 
struck her as “a revelation”: on 30 November she commented in a letter that the work “made 
a great impression upon me…from its power and beauty”; on 20 December, she said that 
both she and her husband saw Cain as Byron’s “finest production….one has thought of such 
things though one could not have expressed it so well….one has perhaps stood on the 
extreme verge of such ideas…[in] the midst of…darkness”165 It is striking, then, not only that 
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Cain might have inspired Mary Shelley, but that in this passage she perhaps confesses to 
having herself thought about the implications of Cuvier’s theories in a historical and 
geohistorical context. 
MARY SHELLEY’S THE LAST MAN 
Mary Shelley might have learned about Cuvier’s ideas through her independent 
reading (in Kerr and Jameson’s translation or the original French editions P. B. Shelley 
ordered in 1822) and her place in Romantic intellectual circles, or from her husband’s or 
Byron’s work. In any case, The Last Man represents a serious engagement with Cuvier’s 
topoi, or rhetorical themes and arguments. Despite the extensive scholarship that considers 
Frankenstein’s relationship to contemporaneous scientific developments, the only critical 
considerations of The Last Man’s treatment of scientific concerns have been limited to the 
subject of epidemiology. A couple of critics have noted that Cuvier’s ideas were topical at 
the time that Shelley wrote and published The Last Man, or that they influenced the work of 
other writers of last man narratives that influenced Shelley’s, but no critic has previously 
drawn the connection between Cuvier and Shelley.
166
 But read in light of other literary 
considerations of Cuvier’s work, debates in Britain about the religious and scientific 
implications of Cuvier’s ideas, and Cuvier’s contribution to Romantic theories of revolution, 
The Last Man becomes less enigmatic. 
Summary, Contexts, and Critical Responses 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
165 Both letters to Maria Gisborne (Letters, I, 150, 153). 
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 Korte, 154 n6; Stafford, 197-231. Wang notes the importance of “catastrophes” to the novel, but does not 
draw the connection between that heavily valenced word and Cuvier’s work, and in fact goes so far as to 
claim that “personal and political catastrophes inform but do not determine the political and poetic texture of 
Mary Shelley’s apocalyptic plague narrative” (Wang, 235). 
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The Last Man recounts the destruction of the human species at the end of the twenty-
first century. It is the first example in English of a secular apocalyptic story set in the future. 
The narrative, supposedly reconstructed by the nineteenth-century author from fragments 
found in the Cumaean Sibyl’s cave, is told from the perspective of Lionel Verney, the son of 
a debauched favorite of the English king who fell out of favor and died in obscurity; Lionel 
reconnects with the abdicated king’s son, Adrian, and marries Adrian’s sister, Idris. He goes 
on to live an idyllic life in the new English republic, marred only by the suicide of his sister, 
Perdita, after the death of her husband, Raymond, in the Greek wars to conquer the Turkish 
Empire. Soon, though, a plague sweeps across the world, threatening humanity with 
extinction; Lionel watches his fellow Britons and then his family die off until, he believes, he 
is the eponymous last man on Earth. Lionel himself records his story and leaves his 
manuscript deposited in Rome, in case anyone should come across it in the future, before 
sailing off in the hopes of meeting another survivor. Shelley’s novel was out of print for 
much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
167
 though it is now the most frequently 
reprinted and discussed of Shelley’s works after Frankenstein.168 
 When it was first published in 1826, there was an initial demand for Shelley’s The 
Last Man, as well as some positive reviews, but most reviewers and the general public 
reacted negatively to the book.
169
 The novel inspired a series of paintings on the subject by 
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169
 Sunstein attributes the demand to the book’s “subject, author, and advertised ‘portraits’ of Byron and [P. B.] 
Shelley” (271). Shelley does claim to have sketched a portrait of her husband in the novel (Letters, I, 341), 
though neither her letters nor journals contain any reference to attempts to portray herself, Byron, or any 
other contemporary.  
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John Martin,
170
 and after reading it, Thomas Lovell Beddoes abandoned his own attempt at 
writing a last man narrative, saying of Shelley “in almost every respect she will do much 
better….indeed she has no business to be a woman by her books.”171 Thomas Jefferson 
Hogg, a friend of the Shelleys, “was moved to tears at the achievement of his ‘Sybil’.”172 The 
novel achieved a notoriety that spawned a card game (the 1828 “The Sybil’s Leaves; or a 
Peep into Futurity”) and a parody in The Keepsake (the 1830 “A Dialogue for the Year 
2130…From the Album of a Modern Sibyl”), but this was a mocking and hollow kind of 
renown.
173
 A number of reviewers ridiculed her book because of the sense that the theme of 
“lastness” was overdone by 1826.174 Readers reacted against the gloominess of the book, and 
liberals and religious conservatives alike took offence to the idea of the secular end of the 
human species.
175
 Such reactions were not limited to Britain: The Last Man was banned 
outright in Austria.
176
 The novel was not only a financial flop, but also had serious personal 
ramifications for Shelley and her young son Percy, as its publication angered her father-in-
law, who suspended their living allowance as a consequence.
177
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 Sunstein, 271. Interestingly, Cuvier viewed Martin’s works and interpreted them as a visual portrayal of his 
own theories (Pendered, 133; Stafford, 209). 
171 Thomas Lovell Beddoes to Thomas Forbes Kelsall, 1 April 1826 (104). 
 
172 Sunstein, 271. 
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 Sunstein, 308. Sunstein notes that The Last Man became “more an ‘in’ topic than a book actually read” 
(271). 
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 Elmer, 355; Paley, 107. 
 
175 See Sunstein, 271. 
 
176 Sunstein, 271. 
 
177 Feldman and Scott-Kilvert note that “when The Last Man was published in January, ‘by the author of 
Frankenstein’ appeared on the title-page in lieu of Mary’s name. However, even though the first edition of 
Frankenstein had been anonymous, her name had appeared on the title-page of the 1823 edition which 
Godwin had brought out. Thus she was widely known to have been its author, and the reviewers referred to 
her by name, which angered Sir Timothy Shelley. Though Mary was certainly not to blame, Sir Timothy 
Shelley expressed his irritation by suspending her allowance” (Journals, II, 498 n2). 
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The text itself has proven popular with modern scholars in part because of its 
indeterminacy: its very structure “embraces a confluence of narratives that resists an 
interpretative closure or categorization: combining tales of multiple love-triangles, political 
debates, psychological struggles, historical vignettes, records of war, bits of travelogues, the 
text is cast as a dystopian vision invoking a classical myth,” not to mention “personal 
referents, aesthetic theories, and historical events.” 178 Part of what is so appealing for critics 
about the novel is the “overdetermined” (in the psychoanalytic sense of being “multivalent”) 
nature of many of the symbols and debates contained within it; as Betty Bennett notes, 
“parallel visions, in different guises, are at the core of all of Mary Shelley’s major fiction,” 
and The Last Man is no exception.
179
 The novel has been seen as a critique of the domestic 
sphere and its gender politics,
180
 the Romantic ethos,
181
 biblical injunctions about 
humankind’s roles and responsibilities in the world,182 quests for glory and power,183 
environmental ethics,
184
 British national identity,
185
 pastoralism,
186
 imperialism,
187
 modern 
patterns of commerce,
188
 and Godwin’s and P. B. Shelley’s idealistic political ideologies.189 
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The Last Man has also been mentioned as an early work of science fiction.
190
 Critics often 
list scientific systems as among those contemporaneous ideologies (including the political, 
spiritual, and artistic) that Shelley is investigating or interrogating through The Last Man, but 
then elide their claims by not pursuing an inquiry into the book’s relationship to science of 
the day.
191
 
 When critics do approach the science of the book, what they’re really exploring is in 
most cases the medical underpinnings of the novel—the treatment of the pandemic plague, its 
causes, and the contemporaneous medical debates that undergird its presentation. The plague 
is sometimes discussed in terms of a “return of the repressed” female psyche, as one critic 
put it, which is unable to be contained as it emerges abstracted from human women into 
powerful natural forces.
192
 Audrey Fisch has famously read the plague in light of the modern 
AIDS pandemic,
193
 as other critics have read it in terms of the contemporaneous cholera 
epidemic.
194
 The most common—and influential—critical treatment of this book in terms of 
illness locates it within contagionism/anticontagionism debates of the early nineteenth 
century.
195
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
188 Cantor, “Apocalypse of Empire,” 198. 
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 Bradshaw, 173; Paley, 110; Taylor, 28; Wagner-Lawlor, 753. Stafford notes that  “while the arrival of the 
plague as a great leveler seems to satirize radical views of the ideal equality of man, it is Shelley’s 
intellectual belief rather than Shelley himself that is under scrutiny” (226). 
190 Hoffman, 25. 
 
191 See, for example, Lokke, 117.  
 
192 Aaron, 17, 19-20. Eberle-Sinatra adopts a similar view (see 102, for example), claiming that in this novel 
Mary Shelley reveals an “awareness of the strains of writing in a male-oriented society” (96). 
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 Fisch, 271. 
 
194 Bewell, 307-14; Wang, 245. Stafford notes that cholera was widely understood in a catastrophist framework 
as threatening mass extinction (Stafford, 219). 
 
195 Essentially, anticontagionism is a theory of disease transmission that attributes disease to the air—such as 
miasmas—whereas contagionism attributes disease transmission to bodily contact (McWhir, “Mary 
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A biographical approach has predominated studies of this novel, treating it as a more 
or less straightforward roman à clef, with Adrian representing Shelley, Raymond 
representing Byron, Lionel representing Mary Shelley herself,
196
 and Perdita representing 
Mary Shelley as well or perhaps Claire Claremont.
197
 From this perspective, the great 
catastrophe of the novel is read as the death of Adrian, as a reworking of Shelley’s 
drowning.
198
 A number of critics have pushed back against the “reductive” tendencies of 
such biographical approaches to the novel on the basis that they “den[y] Shelley artistic 
control over this text.”199 Though some critics have chosen to read the biographical 
attributions more loosely than others, few have altogether disposed with the roman à clef 
reading, even those who attack it as restrictive or distorting.
200
 
 It is indeed difficult not to read Mary Shelley’s biography into The Last Man, 
particularly her statements in the fourth volume of her journal, which she inscribed as her 
“Journal of Sorrow” and which she began after P.B. Shelley’s death in July 1822. The Last 
Man was begun in early 1824 after her return to England and was completed in November 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Shelley’s Anti-Contagionism,” par. 1). See especially Melville and McWhir (“Mary Shelley’s Anti-
Contagionism”), who both argue that Mary Shelley falls in the anticontagionist camp. 
196 And hence many critics identify him as a character of ambiguous gendering; see, for example, Johnson 
(262). 
 
197 Less common attributions include Ryland as William Cobbett and Evadne as Teresa Guiccoli, Byron’s lover 
(Canuel, 149). Idris is rarely discussed, but when she is it is as the ideal wife that Shelley wished she was. 
 
198 See Kilgour, 576, 577. Kilgour claims, “Mary rewrites her husband’s individual death as a symphonic and 
universal catastrophe that fulfills and ends all previous narratives—in grand Romantic terms, the loss of the 
beloved is the end of the world” (Kilgour, 567). Elmer likewise writes, that Mary Shelley renders “her 
terrible losses…[as] commensurate with global history itself” (Elmer, 356). 
 
199 Wells, 212; Bennett, 147; Kilgour, 572; Lew, 262; O’Dea, 284. 
 
200 Dawson makes this point on 247-48 and then goes on to suggest that “the various relations between the 
central protagonists should be read not ‘literally,’ but as different aspects of a single psychological dilemma 
pertinent to Mary Shelley at the time of writing” (250). Betty Bennett takes the somewhat ambiguous stance 
that the characters contain characteristics “synthesized” from people in Shelley’s life (Bennett, 147). Wells 
(216) and Hopkins (“Memory at the End,” par. 13) adopt a similar approach. 
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1825, to be published in January 1826.
201
 As biographer Emily Sunstein notes, “she meant to 
take her time to make The Last Man her best work yet,” and she had thought about her plan 
for beginning work on this project as early as November 1822.
202
 Shelley held high hopes for 
the therapeutic results of working on the novel, which seem not quite to have materialized.
203
 
Most famously, she wrote in her journal on 14 May 1824, after hearing of Byron’s death, 
“The last man! Yes I may well describe that solitary being’s feelings, feeling myself as the 
last relic of a beloved race, my companions, extinct before me.”204 Shelley went on to ask, 
“Why am I doomed to live on seeing all expire before me? God grant I may die young—A 
new race is springing about me.”205 In an entry from later that year, Shelley seems to 
continue her hints that The Last Man is a biographical sketch: “I inexpressibly long for some 
circumstance that may assure ↑me that↓ I am not utterly disjoined from my species.”206 But 
we need to be cautious in applying her journal statements to her broader life and work: 
Shelley herself noted that she tended to recur to her journal in fits of depression to record the 
negative thoughts that she couldn’t otherwise express, making the journal at best a partial 
record of her views and feelings.
207
   
Cuvier in The Last Man 
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 On 19 March 1823, Shelley notes that “I have generally ↑until now↓ recurred to this book to discharge into it 
the overflowings of a mind too full of the bitterest waters of life,” what she hyperbolically calls, “the most 
painful thoughts that ever filled a human heart even to distraction” (Journal, II, 459, 460). 
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 In the opening of the Discours, which popularized his notion of extinction proceeding 
from natural revolutions or geological catastrophes, Cuvier famously described himself as a 
new species of antiquarian, and supported that self-fashioning by describing fossils as 
“monument[s]” that he “had to learn to decipher and restore.”208 From the use of the word 
“catastrophe” in her author’s introduction (and its repeated use in the text: 7, 127, 179, 252, 
270), to the persistence of “monuments” in the novel,209 Shelley signals to the reader her 
engagement with Cuvier’s theory. Cuvier’s influence can be traced in The Last Man in a 
number of further instances. The novel presents England and France’s geological history as 
consistent with Cuvier’s description of continental splits in the Discours—“The eye easily 
discerns the sister land; they were united once; and the little path that runs between looks in a 
map but as a trodden footway through high grass”—a minor point in both books, but an 
interesting moment of congruence (180). When the British survivors in The Last Man attempt 
to reassure themselves that they can adapt to survive the plague (“It is a part of man’s nature 
to adapt itself through habit even to pain and sorrow” [195]) or to migrate to another 
geographical region to avoid extinction (“Let us go—the world is our country now, and we 
will choose for our residence its most fertile spot” [237]), their efforts are futile—just as 
Cuvier would predict for a species in the midst of a natural revolution leading to extinction. 
Shelley even goes so far as to present the leader of a religious cult in Paris as drawing 
inspiration from Cuvier’s idea from the Discours about the formation of mythologies: “he, by 
holding tight the reins of belief, might be remembered by the post-pestilential race as a 
patriarch, a prophet, nay a deity; such as of old among the post-diluvians were Jupiter the 
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209 McWhir, “Unconceiving Marble,” 169. 
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conquerer, Serapis the lawgiver, and Vishnou the preserver” (281).210 As mentioned earlier, 
Cuvier famously applied a historical comparative method in the Discours to consider the 
most recent revolution—a widespreadflood, identified with the Hebrew Biblical Flood 
though not in an exclusive or even privileged way—which he spends quite a bit of time 
tracing through a number of eastern historical traditions.
211
 Shelley’s adoption of Cuvier’s 
relativistic approach to near Eastern societies’ mythologies after the most recent geological 
catastrophe—a flood, in both instances—further signals to the reader her  interest in the 
social implications and fictional possibilities of Cuvier’s ideas. But she digs deeper in a 
number of instances, grappling in important ways with Cuvier’s topoi, as will be explored 
below. 
The “Author’s Introduction”: Historiography and Relativism 
 Cuvier  and Shelley rely on the shared topos of translating or deciphering historical 
fragments as a model for authorship. For Cuvier, the topos is metaphorical, but for Shelley it 
is literalized into the narrative. Cuvier’s work, in his mind, was primarily “the task of 
recovery and reconstruction” of fossils.212 Cuvier opens the Discours with some figurative 
language: to his mind, he is the first of “a new species of antiquarian” who has learned “to 
decipher and restore” fossils, which he calls “a kind of monument that is almost always 
neglected, although it is indispensable for the history of the globe.”213 In the 1813 translation, 
                                                          
 
210 Paley interprets this false prophet as demonstrating that “the religious paradigm is…irrelevant even when the 
conditions it prophesies are brought forth” (Paley, 118). 
211 Cuvier, 239-46. The flood account in Genesis is treated “as simply one among many of the traditional 
accounts of a great flood to be found amongst many other near-eastern peoples other than the Jews” that can 
help to cross-validate an estimated date for the most recent natural revolution (Outram, 148). 
 
212 Outram, 152. 
 
213 Cuvier, 183. Rudwick has produced a modern, scholarly translation of Discours, to which I refer unless 
otherwise noted. 
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Jameson concludes his appendix with a summary of the contents of the four volumes of 
Recherches in which he describes Cuvier’s fossil evidence as “imperfect documents.”214 
Furthermore, Cuvier was inspired by the work of French linguists, who worked to translate 
hieroglyphics on Egyptian artifacts procured by Napoleon in his conquerings and pillagings, 
to view his own task as that of an “antiquarian” rather than a “scientist” (a term that did not 
exist yet).
215
 He emphasized the historical work of a “natural historian” in deciphering, 
translating, recovering, reconstructing, and “us[ing] fossils as the historian uses 
documents.”216 He treated his geohistorical work as interpretive217: nature’s language, which 
Cuvier emphasizes in the Discours but Kerr downplayed, can be understood by him because 
he put in the time and effort to learn it.
218
 Shelley similarly models her authorship in the 
Introduction after recovery and reconstruction, or translation and interpretation, in her case of 
the writing on the scattered Sibyl’s leaves discovered on the cave floor; Shelley, like Cuvier, 
is transformed as an author into an antiquarian through her treatment of the leaves.
219
 
The Last Man begins with the “Author’s Introduction,” which serves as a preface of 
sorts for the main narrative. In it, Shelley employs a “found manuscript” trope, presenting a 
story of having discovered fragments
220
 of the narrative written on leaves in the Sibyl’s Cave 
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219 Ruppert, 147. The book, in some critics’ views, is a literary monument to the Romantic era, as Lionel’s book 
in Rome is a monument to his own age (Bewell, 297; Webb, 119, 121). Others read Lionel’s manuscript as 
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220 Although the argument could be made that the Shelley’s portrayal of fragments shows her embeddedness in 
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in Naples.
221
 In the story of the preface, Shelley was exploring the cave network with a 
“companion”—presumably Percy Bysshe Shelley222—and some Italians guides, but the two 
broke off from their guides to try to escape a clearly fraudulent, tourist-trap version of the 
Sibyl’s Cave to penetrate the hardly accessible, remote and more authentic one (2). After 
climbing, and nearly crawling at some points, through a labyrinth of caves, Shelley and her 
companion stumble onto a cave filled with leaves written on by the Sibyl, which contain the 
narrative presented in the novel. (The image of Buckland emerging into his hyena cave 
comes to mind here; see fig. 1.) Shelley describes the discovery of the text thus: “On 
examination, we found that all the leaves, bark, and other substances, were traced with 
written characters. What appeared to us more astonishing, was that these writings expressed 
in various languages: some unknown to my companion, ancient Chaldee, and Egyptian 
hieroglyphics, old as the Pyramids. Stranger still, some were in modern dialects, English and 
Italian” (3). After collecting “a hasty selection of such of the leaves, whose writing one at 
least of us could understand,” Shelley and her companion leave, only to return multiple times 
during their stay at Naples to collect more leaves (3). The “thin scant pages” are “scattered 
and unconnected,” “unintelligible in their pristine condition” (3, 4) and so Shelley, like 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Romantic discourse, in which images of fragmentation were common (Thomas, 23), I argue that Shelley 
here is departing from the typical Romantic fragment, which generally has to do with “the integrity of the 
poetic persona and its coherent production” (Thomas, 23) to focus on a broader, species-wide subject. 
 
221 In her unpublished dissertation, McWhir explored the imagery of caves for the Romantics, focusing 
primarily on P. B. Shelley’s works, though touching upon The Last Man as well. In relation to The Last Man 
specifically, McWhir notes that P. B. Shelley’s interest in the image of the cave might be behind Mary 
Shelley’s choice to locate the origin of her story in a cave setting, though she does note that Mary Shelley 
used the image independently in a journal entry to describe explorations of her own mind on 25 February 
1822 (McWhir, Portals of Expression, 250, 255). Wells (216) adopts a similar view of the Sibyl’s Cave in 
the narrative. Moreover, McWhir sees the cave in The Last Man as a place where the oppositions of 
“timelessness and the experience of chronological time are brought together” (McWhir, Portals of 
Expression, 254). 
 
222 Though Claire Claremont was also present when the Shelleys actually visited a Sibyl’s Cave in Naples in 
December of 1818 (Wang, 238). 
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Cuvier with his fragments of fossils, has to “add links, and model the work into a consistent 
form” (3-4).223 The process of “deciphering” the “remains” (the word that Kerr and Jameson 
substituted for “monument” in the Discours’s opening; see note 183) has impressed Shelley, 
she tells us, “through the immensity of nature” (3). Shelley describes her translation of the 
leaves as long and effortful, but rewarding: “Their meaning, wondrous and eloquent, has 
often repaid my toil, soothing me in sorrow, and exciting my imagination to daring flights” 
(3). And yet, she says, “Sometimes I have thought, that, obscure and chaotic as they are, they 
owe their present form to me, their decipherer. As if we should give to another artist, the 
painted fragments which form the mosaic copy of Raphael’s Transfiguration in St. Peter’s; he 
would put them together in a form, whose mode would be fashioned by his own peculiar 
mind and talent” (4). This kind of relativism for translation of fossils is not a possibility 
Cuvier opens up in his work, despite the comparative and relative method he applies to 
multicultural myths.
224
 
Shelley is at once using a Cuvierian topos and critiquing it: her fragments are woman-
made, not natural, and her use of the antiquarian model is as a consequence more justifiable. 
Humanity and the natural world don’t “speak” in the novel as they do in Cuvier’s writing. In 
a modern scholarly translation of Cuvier’s Discours, Cuvier says, “We see sufficiently that 
nature everywhere maintains the same language; that everywhere she tells us that the present 
                                                          
 
223 Webb notes that Shelley is here manipulating the trope of the “found manuscript,” a device that became 
“more symbolically loaded” in the Romantic era and was used “most elaborate[ly]” by Walter Scott, another 
author who presented himself as an antiquarian of sorts: “The framing editor frequently represents a specific 
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224 Cuvier was aware of the relativism that was influencing the study of history in the early nineteenth century, 
which was particularly influenced by the translation work of scholars on Eastern languages, but he chose not 
to view his comparative anatomical methods as historical in that sense (Outram 150-51). 
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order of things does not reach back very far”; Kerr’s less sensitive nineteenth-century 
translation gives us “From all that has been said, it may be seen that nature every where 
distinctly informs us that the commencement of the present order of things cannot be dated at 
a very remote period.”225 Kerr’s stilted diction eliminates the interesting implications about 
nature as a female speaking agent communicating willingly and helpfully with 
paleontologists. Nonetheless, Cuvier here claims that “nature’s language” can be heard and 
interpreted by him and others who learn to listen to it. When we step back from the 
metaphor, we can recognize that geological strata and fossils aren’t really “speaking” to 
him—he’s imposing his linguistic system on non-signifying natural objects. In Language as 
Symbolic Action, Kenneth Burke reflects on this issue: “Man,” Burke writes, is “the word-
using animal” who views nature not as just itself—just what it is—but rather “as emblematic 
of the spirit imposed upon it by man’s linguistic genius.”226 This is the way that Cuvier 
makes his name, after all, by demonstrating that fossilized bones can fit into the explanatory 
system that he constructs for them; the Genesis myth of Adam fulfilling the divinely 
appointed task of naming a nature that is physically full but linguistically blank fits into this 
paradigm. And so, Burke argues, humans project the sociopolitical order onto the natural 
order and necessarily approach nature through their cultural, verbal systems.
227
 Burke 
concludes that although people often don’t recognize it, they approach the natural world and 
its “immediate sensory aspects,” which seem so unmediated, through the “analogical, 
figurative, and the metaphorical”; Cuvier’s metaphor may be more or less consciously 
constructed, but he nonetheless is presenting his approach to nature through a figurative 
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lens.
228
 Shelley resists the temptation of Cuvier to personify nature and then to treat these 
personifications as accurately representing humanity’s actual encounters with the natural 
world. In The Last Man, human explanatory systems are shown to be arbitrary linguistic and 
cultural constructs that do not map onto nature’s actions, as will be discussed in relation to 
the plague and natural disasters. And, as one critic notes, “Part of Mary Shelley’s critique…is 
of those who would organize the social realm around the sign of their own authorship—
those, in other words, who would become the ultimate agents of culture, the 
‘unacknowledged legislators of the world’,”229 like Cuvier. In literalizing and relativizing the 
topos of deciphering fragments, then, Shelley deprivileges and delimits Cuvier’s explanatory 
mode even while working within it. 
The Many Forms of Disaster: Disease, Sun, Wind, and Water 
 Shelley and Cuvier both rely on the topos of disaster, considering its effects on 
species—previously extinct species like the mammoth in Cuvier’s case, but the British 
subpopulation of the human species in Shelley’s. Cuvier’s Discours presents an argument for 
the reality of extinction as a natural process, one that occurs because of “revolutions” or 
geological catastrophes such as floods.
230
 Cuvier’s use of the term “revolution” had 
inevitable political overtones in light of the French Revolution, which was not quite twenty-
five years in the past at the time that the Discours was written, a resonance of which he was 
aware.
231
 Revolutions in nature had to be sudden and violent to wipe out entire species that 
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230 Landslides, volcanoes, and astronomical causes are all considered and rejected as insufficient to cause the 
kinds of changes that Cuvier finds evidence for in the fossil record (193-98). 
 
231 Cuvier nonetheless viewed his use of the word “revolutions” as accurately reflecting his intensive and 
detailed scientific study (Rudwick, Meaning of Fossils, 109). 
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were otherwise, based on the idea of correlation of parts, fitted to their conditions of 
existence.
232
 So abrupt, in fact, had been a previous revolution that rendered mammoths 
extinct that specimens frozen in ice could still be found with “their meal of spring 
flowers…preserved intact.”233 These sudden and inescapable revolutions were not global 
phenomena, but rather were limited to geographical regions (as large as that stretching from 
Israel to China);
234
 once the region had been cleared of its former inhabitants, new species 
migrated into the area to replace them.
235
 Evidence for revolutions, or “traces of revolutions,” 
of the earth’s surface is apparent in geological formations all over the world, Cuvier claims, 
but these revolutions have become less widespread and violent over time.
236
 Prior geologists 
failed to fully recognize the nature of geological evidence for these revolutions or 
catastrophes, or to order it into a meaningful system that accounted for all of the evidence at 
hand.
237
 Cuvier’s theory of natural revolutions became widely known, though generally 
under the title of “catastrophism”; Cuvier did use the word “catastrophe” to refer to the 
regular and natural geological upheavals that his theory centered on—most often when 
considering such occurrences’ effects on species made extinct by them—but more frequently 
and consistently he thought (and wrote) of his theory as centering on “revolutions.”238 
In volumes 2 and 3 of The Last Man, Lionel attributes humanity’s impending 
extinction to the plague that appears to be sweeping the globe, supposedly caused by “the 
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contagion from the East” (162), even though the plague is reported to be appearing 
spontaneously in many parts of the world, and Britons blithely overlook its severity :  
This enemy to the human race had begun early in June to raise its serpent-head on the 
shore of the Nile; parts of Asia, not usually subject to this evil were infected. It was in 
Constantinople; but as each year that city experienced a like visitation, small attention 
was paid to those accounts which declared more people to have died there already, 
than usually made up the accustomed prey of the whole of the hotter months. (127) 
 
Similarly, the first victim of the plague described in any detail is a sailor from Philadelphia, 
found dead after struggling ashore near Portsmouth, England (157-58). In fact, people die 
from a variety of other causes throughout the book: Lionel’s wife from nervous and physical 
exhaustion, his mother-in-law from old age, his youngest son from typhus, Merrival from 
exposure to the elements, Juliet from a stab wound, and any number of people from other 
violence. Lionel himself recovers from the plague after everyone thinks that he has died, and 
he attributes his miraculous convalescence to his wife’s devoted care; his story opens the 
question of how many other people might have recovered had they not been given over as 
lost causes. Critics have generally overlooked these other causes of death and focused on the 
book solely as a plague narrative.
239
 Those critics who relinquish the attempt to make sense 
of the plague ironically make the strongest case for the nature of the plague: it is ultimately 
and irreducibly inexplicable.
240
 The signs of the plague are “fundamentally contradictory and 
uncertain,” evading human’s attempts to explain and thereby contain it in any linguistic or 
meaning system.
241
 The effects of the plague are often conflated with its causes when critics 
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240 An, 585; Johnson, 264; Paley, 110; Snyder, 440; Webb, 127.  
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seek an explanatory ideological framework for the pandemic.
242
 But The Last Man also 
details the consequences of natural disasters on the human species, and this Cuvierian take on 
extinction has previously gone unremarked.
243
  
 A number of sudden changes in nature’s seemingly “antique laws” (223) occur 
throughout the book. The capital city of Ecuador, Quito, is reported to have been destroyed 
by an earthquake (168). Thunder sounds across a clear sky (288). Three meteors, like three 
“mock suns” “whirl” through the sky and set the sea alight “like…Vesuvius…with flowing 
lava beneath” (269-70).244 A black sun appears on the summer solstice in eastern Europe, 
Asia, and Africa (162-63), increasing the fears of the healthy and the dying alike, and 
sparking a mass immigration of English expats: “The plague was forgotten, in this new fear 
which the black sun had spread; and, though the dead multiplied, and the streets of Ispahan, 
of Pekin, and of Delhi were strewed with pestilence-struck corpses, men passed on, gazing 
on the ominous sky, regardless of the death beneath their feet” (163). The British, on their 
“cloudy isle” believe themselves to be “far removed from danger” from the sun, but soon 
grow to fear “the unseasonable heat…the balmy air…[and] the cloudless sky” because of the 
resulting decrease in crops and increase in disease the sun brings  (194): “crowned, with the 
sun’s potent rays, plague shot her unerring shafts over the earth. The nations beneath their 
influence bowed their heads, and died” (199). The sun continues to rise irregularly as the 
book progresses (298).  
                                                          
 
242 Webb, 127. To illustrate, the effects that Webb lists include “the return to England of repressed cultures, the 
leveling of class structures, the erection of false prophets, anarchy,” which she claims are often confused for 
causes of the plague, which are, in her view, “mysterious and unexplained.” 
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The wind seems as if it should be a blessing to the British, on their “island, whose sea 
breezes…[give] some promise of health” (273), but soon becomes threatening as notions 
about airborne diseases rise to dominance: “If infection depended upon the air, the air was 
subject to infection” (167).245 The real threat from the wind, though, stems from its influence 
over other natural forces: 
mighty art thou, O wind, to be throned above all other viceregents of nature’s power; 
whether thou comest destroying from the east, or pregnant with elementary life from 
the west; thee the clouds obey; the sun is subservient to thee; the shoreless ocean is 
thy slave! Thou sweepest over the earth, and oaks, the growth of centuries, submit to 
thy viewless axe; the snow-drift is scattered on the pinnacles of the Alps, the 
avalanche thunders down their vallies…. the clouds, deluge the land with rain; rivers 
forsake their banks; the wild torrent tears up the mountain path; plain and wood, and 
verdant dell are despoiled of their loveliness; our very cities are wasted by thee. Alas, 
what will become of us? It seems as if the giant waves of ocean, and vast arms of the 
sea, were about to wrench the deep-rooted island from its centre; and cast it, a ruin 
and a wreck, upon the fields of the Atlantic. (166-67) 
 
The deepest threat, the one that Lionel ends his address to the wind on, is the wind’s power 
over water; wind repeatedly leads to watery destruction (166, 321). Cuvier’s attribution of 
the most recent natural revolution to a flood, and Jameson’s Neptunism, echo here. In fact, 
water can be seen as the source for most of the troubles in the book, including the plague 
itself, which is first described as arising “on the shore of the Nile,” a watery origin for a 
diffuse disease (127).
246
 
                                                          
245 McWhir notes of this anticontagionist treatment of disease as spread by the wind: “Mary Shelley’s emphasis 
on airborne transmission of plague is metaphorically as well as medically significant, especially given her 
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246 Other associations with this location are offered by González: “first of all, there is the Biblical connotation of 
the Ten Plagues of Egypt as described in Exodus. Of significance, too, is the classical tradition which 
described the ‘spontaneous generation’ of life on the banks of the Nile, as in Alexander Pope’s Essay on 
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 Even before the plague hits, Shelley demonstrates the failure of visionary poet-
politicians to adequately address the importance of water to human fate. Raymond hopes to 
see “England [become] a Paradise” (78) under his governance as Lord Protector and to that 
end, plans to improve “canals, aqueducts, bridges, stately buildings, and various edifices for 
public utility” to achieve his ends (76). It is of note that managing humans’ relationship with 
water occupies at least three of his five project plans, and the end to be achieved by doing so 
is so lofty. But Raymond gets distracted by designs for an art museum, and the woman from 
his past who reenters his life as the architect, and so he accomplishes nothing and England is 
left vulnerable. As the natural processes of water act upon Britain and the rest of the world in 
the great natural Cuvierian revolution that Shelley is portraying, however, it becomes 
increasingly doubtful that any prevention was possible on the part of humankind or its 
governments. Early into the seven-year visitation of the catastrophe,
247
 Lionel remarks: 
Before Christmas half England was under water. The storms of the last winter were 
renewed; but the diminished shipping of this year caused us to feel less the tempests 
of the sea. The flood and storms did more harm to continental Europe than to us—
giving, as it were, the last blow to the calamities which destroyed it. In Italy….Whole 
villages were carried away. Rome, and Florence, and Pisa were overflowed, and their 
marble palaces, late mirrored in tranquil streams, had their foundations shaken by 
their winter-gifted power. In Germany and Russia the injury was still more 
momentous. (194) 
 
For Shelley, as for Cuvier and Jameson, water is the all-deciding natural force. England is hit 
by “alternate frosts and thaws succeeding to floods….[and] heavy falls of snow [that] gave 
an arctic appearance to the scenery” (222). Later, Dover is hit by tidal waves that erode the 
famous cliffs and threaten to engulf the survivors attempting to flee their sinking island (268-
70). The image of a survivor on a boat on the threatening seas ends Lionel’s narrative, as he 
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notes that “Verney becomes a kind of anti-Adam: not a powerful namer but a passive witness to global 
unnaming” (295). 
69 
 
declares his intentions to “with a few books, provisions, and my dog, embark in one of these 
and float down the current of the stream into the sea” (341). This notion of humanity, culture, 
and animal life seeking survival on a sea that has wreaked havoc so recently demonstrates the 
vulnerability of all terrestrial life in the Cuvierian Neptunist model of oceanic catastrophes. 
The terms Shelley uses to describe the seas is particularly telling of this Cuvierian insecurity: 
it is a “tempestuous” (268) “ocean of death” (300), replete with “strangling waves” (338), 
that has “robbed” (328) Lionel of his family and humanity of its hope (341).  
 Shelley is not alone in using the Cuvierian topos of destruction: Shelley’s third novel 
can be situated in a contemporaneous vogue for “last man” narratives, including the novels 
The Last Man: or, Omergarius and Syderia, A Romance in Futurity (1806) by Cousin de 
Grainville, The Last of the Lairds (1826) by John Galt, and The Last of the Mohicans (1826) 
by James Fennimore Cooper; the unfinished play The Last Man by Thomas Lovell Beddoes 
(1822); the poems “Darkness” (1816) by Lord Byron, “The Last Man” (1823) by Thomas 
Campbell, and “The Last Man” (1826) by Thomas Hood; as well as a series of paintings in 
the 1820s by John Martin. Fiona J. Stafford comments on this trend that the 1820s was a 
decade in which writers who “felt they had outlived their cultural milieu and were left 
stranded in an uncongenial age” turned to this “elegiac form.”248 Paul A. Cantor, in contrast, 
notes that the sense of lastness was symptomatic of broader cultural trends in the nineteenth 
century, with the widespread feeling of having arrived “at the end of a long cultural 
development” giving rise to a retrospective perspective on human history.249 But what is so 
interesting about Shelley’s The Last Man is that it is more than just a text of despair: its 
presentation of catastrophe provides deep and enduring insights into what it would mean for 
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humans to be aware of their subjection to natural processes, like any other animal species. 
Like Cuvier, she relies on vivid depictions of place (topographia), but she goes beyond that: 
utilizing the rhetorical devices of ethopoeia (description of a character), pramatographia 
(description of action), chronographia (description of a historical time), and especially 
chorographia (description of a particular nation) to achieve peristasis—a description of 
circumstances, a broad but deep picture of the possible setting, characters, and events of the 
next natural revolution. These rhetorical figures of description function within the topos of 
disaster to humanize and complicate it: we watch the British nation treat itself as a new 
chosen people, believing that Britons alone will survive the natural revolution, but coming to 
see that British characters in treating themselves as the world forget that the rest of the world 
still persists, whether as nonhuman animals, flora, or other human nations.  
Humans are not mammoths, even when facing extinction—they can process and 
record their experiences in symbolic form—and of course Shelley’s and Cuvier’s readership 
is human and their written communications take symbolic form. Cuvier treated geological 
catastrophes as localized events,
250
 but Shelley posits that if humankind were to face 
extinction, as Cuvier had established so many other species had, the accomplishing processes 
would have to be global, because humans are one of the few species that exist in almost 
every terrestrial habitat.
251
 (Such a presentation of natural revolutions could also reflect her 
sense of the increasingly globalized reach of the British Empire
252
; to dislodge such a system 
might require shaking the very foundations of the species.) Nonetheless, Shelley seems to 
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suggest, humans and mammoths are subject to the same processes, no matter how much more 
complicated humans believe themselves to be.  
 
 
The Breakdown of Anthropocentrism 
 “Man is a strange animal,” Shelley writes in The Last Man, signaling the breakdown 
of anthropocentrism and, more generally, the human/animal divide in the philosophical world 
constructed in the novel (114). Both Shelley and Cuvier deprivilege humans, sharing a topos 
of humans as animals; this is an undercurrent in Cuvier’s work (which is understandable 
given the theme’s controversial nature), but prominent in Shelley’s novel. Although Cuvier 
presented humans as somewhat unique in not having any discovered fossil remains, he did 
not privilege the human species throughout the Discours or the rest of Recherches, often 
placing human anatomy side by side on the page with that of other species.
253
 For example, 
in his famous Leçons d’Anatomie Comparée (Comparative Anatomy Lessons, 1800-5), 
Cuvier included five charts in the first volume alone that compare the vertebra, spine, 
sternum, pectoral muscles, and abdominal muscles of humans with a number of other 
species, including orangutans, moles, fish, elephants, and horses (see fig. 2). He thus 
develops the topos through a rhetorical and visual figure of repetition. Humans appear as 
biologically equivalent to animals in Cuvier’s discussion of fossil discoveries: the lack of 
human fossil bones is attributed to humans’ recent expansion from limited geographical 
areas, not a specialized history such as a recent creation.
254
 Importantly, Cuvier saw 
humanity as a singular species—with races as varieties—which demonstrated that the same 
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laws of nature and scientific study that applied to all other species applied to humankind as 
well.
255
 The Descartian mind/body divide is not something that Cuvier seems to have 
concerned himself with writing about, nor were the spiritual ascriptions given to humans’ 
uniqueness or place in nature—he explicitly rejected the idea of a “chain of being.”256 
Shelley combines Cuvier’s deprivileging of humans as a species with his argument that 
extinction is a blind process that affects species without a larger purpose, and the effect is 
psychologically devastating for The Last Man’s characters. 
 For Shelley, the 
human body is an 
animal mechanism (18, 
51, 53, 324).
257
 While 
she contrasts the human 
mind with the animal 
nature of the body (18, 
20, 51, 52) as the 
“boundary which divides the intellectual and moral nature 
of man from that which characterizes animals” (20), she still 
values the body and “animal part of our nature”; the Countess of Windsor, described as 
having nearly conquered her body and so being almost entirely of mind, is presented as 
“frightening” and plays the villainess for much of the first volume (52). In his early life, 
Lionel describes himself as essentially being an animal, roaming the hills as a shepherd and 
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Figure 2: Leçons d’Anatomie Comparée, vol. 1, p. 159 
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poacher (9, 12) and when (toward the end of the novel) he believes himself to be the last 
human on earth, he soliloquizes to some mountain sheep: “Live on, ye innocents, nature’s 
selected darlings; I am not much unlike to you. Nerves, pulse, brain, joint, and flesh, of such 
am I composed, and ye are organized by the same laws. I have something beyond this, but I 
will call it a defect, not an endowment, if it leads me to misery, while ye are happy” (334).258 
While the plague makes it seem as though “death fell on man alone” (200), clearly the 
natural upheavals must have harmed untold other animals through disruptions and 
destruction of their habitats. Nonetheless, the human species appears to be the only one 
facing extinction. 
 Lionel, in a couple of despairing moments, tries to make sense of the dissipation of 
the anthropocentric vision of humanity as a privileged species that formerly undergirded his 
worldview:
259
  
Nature was the same, as when she was the kind mother of the human race; now, 
childless and forlorn, her fertility was a mockery; her loveliness a mask for deformity. 
Why should the breeze gently stir the trees, man felt not its refreshment? Why did 
dark night adorn herself with stars—man saw them not? Why are there fruits, or 
flowers, or streams, man is not here to enjoy them? (239) 
 
Some pages later, he goes on to lament: 
A sense of degradation came over me. Did God create man, merely in the end to 
become dead earth in the midst of healthful vegetating nature? Was he of no more 
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 Hutchings points out that Lionel Verney’s name contains tensions between pastoral idealism and animalistic 
prowess: “His surname, Verney, conjures up words like ‘vernal,’ ‘verdure,’ and perhaps even ‘verity,’ the 
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259 Bannet notes that this despair tends to be limited to the male characters; the female characters focus their 
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loss of an anthropocentric universe. She suggests that while male characters in the novel cling to the 
“insistence that man has the power to choose and control his future”—and the male pronoun there 
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subjugation to natural laws; it is “absurd” but telling, in Bannet’s view, that it takes the extinction of the 
human species to make men acknowledge their own limited powers and mortality (Bannet, 356, 362, 364). 
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account to his Maker, than a field of corn blighted in the ear? Were our proud dreams 
thus to fade? Our name was written ‘a little lower than the angels;’ and, behold, we 
were no better than ephemera. We had called ourselves the ‘paragon of animals,’ and, 
lo! we were a ‘quint-essence of dust’….How reconcile this sad change to our past 
aspirations, to our apparent powers!” (290) 
 
Humans have had to come to see themselves as simply part of nature, subject to nature’s 
laws. No longer “the heaven-climber,” humankind are now equivalent to “the crawling 
reptiles” (141). People are forced as a consequence to face their own “arrogance” and 
ultimate insignificance in the global environment, “losing our identity” as “the lords of 
creation,” and instead viewing themselves as “least among the many [species] that people 
infinite space” (167). The topos of humans as animals is tied to despair and the devastation of 
traditional anthropocentric views. 
Relinquishing the anthropocentric worldview in The Last Man is inevitably tied up 
with relinquishing traditional religious views.
260
 As mentioned earlier, Cuvier had no interest 
to speak of in considering the role of religion in natural processes like extinction: he 
attributes agency to organisms or to larger geological phenomena, like floods, although Kerr 
in the 1813 translation relocates agency by suggesting an external, higher power intentionally 
controlling natural processes, be it God or fate.
261
 While early in The Last Man, God is 
venerated for creating Earth as “a stately palace” for humankind and providing England 
alone “the means for our preservation” (53, 178), such visions are replaced by visions of an 
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261 Much of the reattribution of agency in Kerr’s translation has to do with tense and passive voice: islands 
“were raised up” rather than “emerge,” blocks “have been derived” rather than “come” from their source 
rock, vapors “are condensed” rather than “condense,” snow “is melted” rather than “melts,” elements “are 
impregnated” with carbonic acid rather than “contain” it, continents “have been subjected” to revolutions 
rather than “affected” by them, and the universal fluid “gave existence to” animals rather than “generated” 
them (Essay, 18, 23, 26, 26, 33, 58, 43). Kerr also labels animals as “destined” to live in their habitats or 
populate the earth, “in places fitted” rather than “allowed” to them; he even at one point adds a phrase to the 
end of a sentence describing the reduction of sea level to suggest that the land was thus “left it to be 
occupied by its own proper inhabitants” (Essay, 91, 131, 134, 14).  
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incomprehensibly vengeful God (269) and, eventually, a loss of the religious script where 
judgment and salvation make sense: Rome, the seat of Christianity, holds no hope that 
humans might “awaken again to our affections, our happiness, and our faith” (205).262 The 
image of a fierce Mother Nature, “a harsh step-mother” (80), who “could take our globe, 
fringed with mountains, girded by the atmosphere, containing the condition of our being, and 
all that man’s mind could invent or his force achieve…and cast it into space, where life 
would be drunk up, and man and all his efforts for ever annihilated” (168), comes to replace 
the patriarchal God of Judeo-Christian tradition as the arbiter of human fate. Nature, rather 
than God, is described as revoking “her” own “laws” (188).263 In The Last Man, morality 
eventually boils down to the simplistic dictum that there is “but one good and one evil in the 
world—life and death” (212). The end vision is a simple and even bleak one: a man with a 
dog on a boat, moving onward without a clear destination, just to preserve some semblance 
of hope.  
 Notably, Lionel ends the narrative with a canine companion.
264
 Cuvier presents 
domesticated animals in the Discours as “conquered” and “enslaved” to humans, who 
unjustifiably infringe on these other species’ lives and behavior.265 Cuvier sees dogs in 
particular in Rudwick’s scholarly translation as the animal that humans have “conquered 
most completely”; Kerr presents them as the species “reduced most completely under 
                                                          
 
262 Sunstein records that around the time of publication of The Last Man, Shelley “turned misanthropic, 
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263 González notes that “Mary Shelley may be seen here as a forerunner of the contemporary scientific theories 
about the earth as Gaia, that living organism always in flux in a very Heraclitean fashion, a dynamic ‘being’ 
which was there before man appeared, and will perhaps remain after the human race is extinguished” (58). 
 
264 Lionel in fact uses the term “companion,” which interestingly speaks back to the beginning of the narrative, 
in the Author’s Introduction, when Shelley refers to her fellow explorer (perhaps her husband) by the same 
term (340). 
 
265 Discours, 227, 233. 
76 
 
subjection.”266 If humans are a species like any other, their “empire” (or “power” in Kerr’s 
translation) over other animals is neither rational nor just, not to mention sufficiently 
regulated.
267
 Adrian views himself as a part of the integrity of nature, having an “affinity not 
only with mankind, but all nature…[as he] felt his life mingle with the universe of existence” 
(31); Raymond, on the other hand, views a human as “a microcosm of nature, and find[s] a 
reflection in the internal mind for all this machinery visibly at work around us” (46). 
Fittingly, then, Raymond’s horse and dog die for and with him as he charges recklessly into 
Constantinople, regardless of their lives, despite their attempts to deter him: “His very horse 
seemed to back from the fatal entrance; his dog, his faithful dog, lay moaning and 
supplicating in his path—in a moment more, he had plunged the rowels into the sides of the 
stung animal, who bounded forward, and he, the gateway passed, was galloping up the broad 
and desart [sic] street” (144). The dog’s death scene is far more lamentable than Raymond’s, 
as Lionel relates it: “In that part of town where the fire had most raged the night before, and 
which now lay quenched, black and cold, the dying dog of Raymond crouched beside the 
mutilated form of its lord. At such a time sorrow has no voice; affliction, tamed by its very 
vehemence, is mute. The poor animal recognised me, licked my hand, crept close to its lord, 
and died” (149). Raymond’s vision loses hold on Lionel after he views a “cor[p]se-strewn” 
battlefield, a glorious site to Raymond but one that leaves Lionel “ashamed of my species” 
(131). Adrian’s influence over Lionel, meanwhile, turns him from someone who recklessly 
kills animals to one who is able to view pets as friends.
268
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268 Adrian is described as taking “great delight in his park and preserves. He never sported, but spent hours in 
watching the tribes of lovely and almost tame animals with which it was stocked, and ordered that greater 
care should be taken of them than ever” (16). When they plan to leave England for the continent toward the 
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Humanity’s exploitation of animals and the latter’s enjoyment of their freedom when 
the social structure collapses is repeatedly presented throughout The Last Man. Some animals 
fail to thrive after humankind dies off en masse from the plague, leaving a few horses, for 
example, “standing shivering in the bleak fields ready to surrender their liberty in exchange 
for offered corn” (266); on the whole, though, horses are not voluntarily of service to humans 
once they get a taste of freedom: Lionel describes the “hours [that] were wasted, while we 
exhausted our artifices to allure some of these enfranchised slaves of man to resume the 
yoke” (276). The use of the term “slave” here to refer to a horse is particularly striking in the 
Cuvierian context. Most formerly domesticated animals are shown as happy to be free of the 
tyranny of humans, or “empire of man” in Cuvier’s phrase, with political and colonial 
overtones:
269
  
Troops of dogs, deserted of their masters, passed us; and now and then a horse, 
unbridled and unsaddled, trotted towards us, and tried to attract the attention of those 
which we rode, as if to allure them to seek like liberty. An unwieldy ox, who had fed 
in an abandoned granary, suddenly lowed, and shewed his shapeless form in a narrow 
door-way; every thing was desert; but nothing was in ruin. (241-42) 
 
The last line of the preceding passage is telling: a desert to humanity is not a ruin to the rest 
of nature. The unnamed shepherd dog that takes up with Lionel at the end of the narrative 
does so of his own accord, not from any force or enticements, and when Lionel enters St. 
Peter’s to mark the dawn of a new century—New Year’s Day, 2100—the dog’s “pattering 
steps” were heard alongside his own in equality (340). Shelley here seems to be in concert 
with Cuvier’s use of the anti-anthropocentric topos: humans are animals and should 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
end of the narrative, Lionel comments, “There were many dear friends whom we must not leave behind, 
humble though they were. There was the spirited and obedient steed which Lord Raymond had given his 
daughter; there was Alfred’s dog and a pet eagle, whose sight was dimmed through age” (238). 
269 Discours, 233. 
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recognize their equal (and unprivileged) place in nature, and their consequent vulnerability to 
natural processes like extinction. 
The Nature of Time: Global vs. Human 
 Traditional notions of temporality are challenged by both Shelley’s The Last Man and 
Cuvier’s Discours.; both writers share a sense of time as divided between the human and the 
global. As mentioned earlier, Cuvier presented his work as a natural historian as that of a 
more traditional notion of a historian—the antiquarian. His comparative historical methods 
included not just examining cultural forms, such as near-Eastern mythologies of a 
catastrophic flood, but also biological forms, particularly fossils and mummies. In comparing 
current species to images and mummies from ancient societies, such as Egypt, Cuvier 
concludes that species have remained more or less unchanged over the past 2,000 to 3,000 
years.
270
 Geohistorical processes remained constant for a time—most recently, since the 
major flood—but natural revolutions then occur, causing dramatic geological changes and 
often leading to mass extinctions. The notion of time that develops out of this pattern is a 
“punctuated” one: long, steady states interrupted by sudden and violent breaks.271 His vision 
of punctuated evolutionary time went out of fashion in light of Charles Darwin’s later 
theories of constant adaptation, or phyletic gradualism, but twentieth-century evolutionary 
studies have reestablished support for Cuvier’s geohistorical theory.272 Cuvier’s theory of 
geohistory served to establish the directional (rather than cyclical) history of the world, 
however extended, as well as the possibility of studying this history in a verifiable way (i.e. 
                                                          
270 Cuvier, 226-232. 
 
271 Rudwick, Worlds before Adam, 14. 
 
272 Gould, for example, mentions the “the extraterrestrial impact theory of mass extinction,” i.e. the idea that a 
meteor hit the earth and caused a mass extinction of dinosaurs (Gould, x). Gould and Elredge’s own 1972 
paper on punctuated equilibria fits Cuvier’s revolutionary or catastrophist model as well. 
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through paleontology and stratigraphy)
273
; he concludes the Discours by saying that the 
human species “to whom has been accorded only an instant on earth” has been gifted with 
“the glory of reconstructing the history of the thousands of centuries that preceded [its] 
existence, and of the thousands of beings that have not been [its] contemporaries!”274 
Enthusiastically, Cuvier observes that human effort can reconstruct non-human time. Human 
time is not equateable with geological time in this paradigm, however, and both forms of 
time are fundamentally insecure because natural revolutions continue to occur. 
 Shelley draws on the topos of human and global time as being divided, post-Cuvier, 
to structure her narrative and de-structure human society. When Adrian recognizes that the 
plague is likely to render all Britons extinct, Lionel tells us, he “felt that the end of time was 
come ….the swift-approaching end of things” (237).275 Of course, what is approaching is the 
end of human history, not the end of natural or geological history, a point reinforced by the 
continuing health of the many animals and environments Lionel encounters. But 
anthropocentrism aside, there is a compelling point here about the relationship of time to 
human reckoning and natural catastrophes. The Last Man has been noted for its innovative 
approach to the apocalypse, traditionally a religious vision of the end of days in English 
writing, but set by Shelley in a secular and natural vision of the not-so-distant future, the last 
decade of the twenty-first century.
276
 Shelley’s Miltonian epigraph—“Let no man seek / 
Henceforth to be foretold what shall befall / Him or his children”—indicates from the start of 
                                                          
 
273 Gould, viii; Rudwick, Worlds before Adam, 13. 
 
274 Cuvier, 252. 
275
 Bewell notes that this is a remarkable development in literature, as “Colonial geography supports the idea 
that ecological catastrophes are a ‘natural’ occurrence elsewhere” (Bewell, 304). 
 
276 Although, as Sterrenberg notes, Shelley does draw on traditional, religious images of apocalypse, she 
eliminates their religious resonances (Sterrenberg, 340). 
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the work its consideration of breaks in cultural and natural continuity; post-Cuvier, the future 
cannot be predicted with any level of confidence. And so the comical astronomer, Merrival, 
is shown in The Last Man to be concerned with tracing from current observations the future 
of the planet.
277
 There will be no more natural or social turmoil “in a hundred thousand 
years,” he claims, when “the pole of the earth will coincide with the pole of the ecliptic…[to 
produce] a universal spring” and an earthly paradise (159). We are then told that “the joyful 
prospect of an earthly paradise after an hundred thousand years, was clouded to him by the 
knowledge that in a certain period of time after, an earthly hell or purgatory, would occur, 
when the ecliptic and equator would be at right angles” (160). This assumption of the 
predictability of natural processes is utterly shaken by the disasters that humankind has to 
face within a year of these predictions. The continuity assumed by humankind biologically 
(with the perpetuation of the species; 165, 167), culturally (with the persistent favor of 
classics like Shakespeare; 203), and naturally (with the planting of trees for future centuries; 
50) is revealed as illusory. Time, as understood by humans, is meaningless in the face of 
species-wide extinction and the incomprehensible time-scale that nature partakes of; Adrian 
remarks, “Time is no more, for I have stepped within the threshold of eternity,” reflecting the 
vast geohistorical timescale that Cuvier popularized (135). For twenty-five days after he 
loses Adrian and Clara to a storm at sea, Lionel keeps track of the days that pass on a willow 
branch—in the model of Robinson Crusoe—but eventually he breaks his makeshift calendar 
and throws it away, recognizing the evacuation of meaning from human timescales.
278
 
Perhaps the most poignant  portrayal of the influence of such a time-scale on humanity’s 
                                                          
 
277 Paley notes that the “speculations of the astronomer Merrival…seem ironically compounded of the most 
perfectibilian aspects of William Godwin’s and Percy Bysshe Shelley’s” (Paley, 116). 
278 Albright, par. 18; Bradshaw, 174. 
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vision of itself (and the most Cuvierian, given the watery imagery) comes as the last 
remaining Britons are leaving Dover: “We who, like flies that congregate upon a dry rock at 
the ebbing of the tide, had played wantonly with time, allowing our passions, our hopes, and 
our mad desires to rule us, now heard the approaching roar of the ocean of destruction, and 
would have fled to some sheltered crevice, before the first wave broke over us” (287). If 
there were no humans before the last geological catastrophe (a flood), there may be none left 
after the next catastrophe, either. 
 Critics have frequently commented on the temporal structure of the novel, holding a 
number of different views about the shape of time. Some see it, like Frankenstein (1818), as 
a set of nested narratives (Lionel’s in the Sibyl’s in the Author’s) with different temporal 
schemes for each (2100 CE in Ancient Greece in 1818 CE).
279
 Some argue for the linearity
280
 
of the time scheme presented in The Last Man, and some for the circularity or cyclicality;
281
 
one critic even described the novel’s presentation of time as “a spiraling, indeterminate 
sequence that turns back upon itself and never ends,”282 while another sees time in the novel 
as collapsing in on itself.
283
 Some see time in the novel as gendered,
284
 some as 
nationalistic,
285
 and some as species-bound. But the one inarguable accomplishment of 
plague is to introduce a break in time, to divide the present from the past and the future.
286
 As 
                                                          
279 Albright, par. 1, 3, 4, 24. 
 
280 Albright, par. 20; Stafford, 230; Thomas, 30; Wright, 244-45.  
 
281 Bannet, 366; Bradshaw, 163. 
 
282 Lomax, 8. 
 
283 Ruppert, 144, 145, 151. O’Dea makes a similar point (291). 
 
284 Bannet. 
 
285 Ruppert, 153. 
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one critic commented, “the only way the plague participates in…history is to end it,” 
destabilizing readers’ sense of time.287 Any other treatment of time in a Cuvierian framework 
is inconceivable. 
CONCLUSION 
 Mary Shelley fictionalizes some of the most prominent topoi from Cuvier’s famous 
Discours préliminaire in order to explore their social and human consequences. The proleptic 
nature of the novel, which makes it stand out from other plague and “last man” narratives, is 
a means to accomplish a thought experiment about such consequences. In so doing, Shelley 
critically engages with it in such a way as to maintain her place in the Romantic 
intelligentsia, even as the Romantic Era was coming to an end. She also follows in the 
tradition of Romantic thinkers, such as her parents, who saw literature as a means of actively 
participating in the social realm. Cuvier similarly sought a popular venue for his ideas, 
demonstrating the porous nature of science writing across genres and audience in the early 
nineteenth century.  
Although Shelley is writing The Last Man in a Cuvierian framework, she is by no 
means simply popularizing or translating his work. A number of divergences are evident, 
moments where Shelley discards Cuvier’s ideas or critiques his methodological principles. 
So, for instance, while Cuvier views natural revolutions as potentially multicausal, but finally 
reducing to the actions of oceans, Shelley treats natural catastrophes as irreducible, 
overdetermined, and beyond human understanding—a seeming denial of scientific 
parsimony. Cuvier discusses, famously, the “thread of operations” of natural processes, 
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 Bannet, 364-65. 
 
287 Hopkins, “Memory at the End,” par. 11. Qtn. from Elmer, 357. 
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which is limited to a single “operation” in Kerr’s translation.288 Either way—“thread” or 
“operation”—the reduction is refuted by Shelley. Likewise, while Egypt—possibly the 
birthplace for the plague, and a recent site of conquest and pillaging by France—is a source 
of concrete evidence for Cuvier, of fossils that validate his theories, it is a source of 
indeterminacy for Shelley. This ‘other’ location is not so easily comprehended or contained, 
despite a number of (failed) attempts by the characters in The Last Man to articulate a 
systematic explanation. Nature, likewise, is demonstrated as being more powerful and 
unknowable than human explanatory modes can encompass. 
The plea for greater awareness of natural and societal systems in The Last Man, 
combined with its punctuated temporal structure, suggests an implicit prosocial message as 
well: society should not need a natural revolution for human society to change its 
nonadaptive ways. Why should women be limited to the domestic sphere, British imperialism 
be the primary force of globalization, the poor and otherwise disempowered suffer unseen, 
powerful politicians overlook their responsibilities for personal (and sexual) indulgences, and 
the value of each human life not be appreciated until the end of human society as we know 
it? Why should such value systems persist into the twenty-first century? If life is 
fundamentally uncertain, why should quality of living not be maximized? All of these 
questions point to the ways that a Cuvierian vision of humanity and temporality can help 
promote reform. Byron might have modeled despair in the face of Cuvier’s topoi, but Shelley 
explores such rhetorical themes more thoroughly and accomplishes a more interesting and 
perhaps unsettling vision, though one that received less attention over time. 
 From the time Cuvier’s Discours was published and translated until Charles Lyell 
shifted the scientific conversation in Britain with his 1830 Principles of Geology, a number 
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of prominent thinkers worked—sometimes in synchrony, as with P. B. Shelley and Byron, 
and sometimes in conflict, as with Buckland and Mary Shelley—to situate Cuvier’s work and 
popularize its implications. Shelley’s The Last Man establishes her place in this tumultuous 
discourse. 
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Chapter 2: 
“Politics and Metaphysics: Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s Opposition to The Vestiges of the 
Natural History of Creation in Aurora Leigh” 
 
Often overlooked in scientific and cultural histories, but wildly popular and widely 
influential, Robert Chambers’s Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844) has 
seldom been analyzed systematically in accounts of nineteenth-century British literary 
treatments of evolutionary theory. Vestiges was a book that intentionally crossed disciplinary 
boundaries, affirming “the status of common observation in competition with the 
experimental methods of experts” both to establish generalists’ place in the newly important 
scientific disciplines (and thereby prevent the formation of a dogmatic scientific clerisy) and 
to establish scientists as the heralds of and leaders in the progressive society envisioned by 
Vestiges.
289
 Victorians widely responded to Vestiges and coopted its ideas for a number of 
religious, political, and ideological ends. The work went through ten editions in ten years, 
continuing to outsell Darwin’s Origin even when professionals and intellectuals felt that 
Darwin’s ideas had clearly proven themselves superior; every copy printed in nineteenth-
century was sold.
290
 (For Darwin, Vestiges was the one book, besides the Bible, that he could 
assume all his readers were familiar with.
291
) Vestiges was unavoidably debated and 
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incorporated—it provided a grand theory of the age that underlay a number of arguments 
even if the arguers were not always aware of the origin of such ideas. Literature was one part 
of this conversation—and perhaps the most interesting, because the most synthetic and 
systematic. 
Benjamin Disraeli, George Henry Lewes, George Eliot, Robert Browning, and 
Alfred, Lord Tennyson all voiced their interpretations of this controversial natural history 
work that claimed humans had evolved from apes (not to mention fish and plants), and that 
the universe developed materialistically, with no repeated interventions from God. This 
chapter seeks to reconstruct this critical conversation, looking at literary and non-literary 
figures’ debates over the meaning and value of Vestiges’s theories in the decade and a half 
following its publication, and focusing on how Elizabeth Barrett Browning took part in this 
evaluative process in her verse-novel Aurora Leigh (1856). Aurora Leigh was famously 
composed by EBB in part to represent her age—even those components not typically 
considered appropriate poetical material—and in part to register her “highest convictions 
upon Life and Art,” many of which conflicted with the worldview presented by Vestiges. As 
I will explore in this chapter, EBB contrasts her poetic and philosophical convictions with the 
gender, religious, political, and developmental ideologies of Vestiges through a number of 
rhetorical strategies. 
ROBERT CHAMBERS 
 Robert Chambers (1802–71) was an Edinburgh publisher and journalist, who along 
with his brother William ran the successful and well-respected Chambers’s Edinburgh 
Journal, as well as “the largest mass-circulation publishing house in Britain.”292 Chambers’s 
Edinburgh Journal advocated “improvement, secular education, political economy, and the 
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interests of the middle class” despite being “ostensibly apolitical.”293 In middle age, feeling 
the stress of his editing and publishing work, Chambers moved for several years to St. 
Andrews to recuperate. While there, he began to deepen his knowledge of the science of the 
day, reading widely. Chambers was sufficiently well versed in natural sciences to be elected 
to the Royal Society of Edinburgh and the Geological Society (in 1840 and 1844, 
respectively) and to publish a widely read geological treatise in 1848, despite a lack of 
university education or status as a professional scientist.
294
 In 1844, after six years of 
research and four years of writing,
295
 Chambers anonymously published The Vestiges of the 
Natural History of Creation (hereafter Vestiges) through a number of intermediaries, 
including his wife, who copied his final manuscript in her own handwriting, and a journalist 
friend, Alexander Ireland, who communicated and negotiated with the publisher. This 
anonymity, though relatively frequent in literary publications, was extremely unusual for 
scientific authorship and both excited and annoyed the reading public.
296
 One of the most 
common parlor games of 1844-45 was guessing the authorship of the wildly popular 
Vestiges, the origin of which was considered the most intriguing literary mystery since Sir 
Walter Scott published Waverly anonymously.
297
 The anonymous authorship made it hard for 
Victorian readers to trust the work, but also hesitant to dismiss it.
298
 It was not until the 
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twelfth edition of the work, published in 1884 by Chambers’s own printing house, and well 
after the death of Chambers, his wife, and his brother, that the content of the work was 
considered no longer scandalous enough to warrant the author’s name being suppressed—
totaling forty years of silence.
299
  
 Vestiges covered a wide swath of material, from disciplines including “astronomy,  
natural history, geology, chemistry, physics, phrenology, political economy, and 
anthropology” to create “the first full-length presentation of an evolutionary theory of 
species, in English.”300 It proclaims itself “the first attempt to connect the natural sciences 
into a history of creation,” or, as another critic has put it, “the first complete history of the 
world from its beginnings to the present according to an evolutionary principle.”301 
Vestiges’s ambitious goal was “to explain the origin and development of the natural world by 
reference to general laws of nature,” to write a history ranging from the creation of the 
universe “to the origin and future destiny of human beings,” “all in one grand story of 
progressive change.”302 Constant development and progress—core Victorian, industrial, 
liberal values—fueled Chambers’s vision. Vestiges was scandalous less because of its 
originality (many reviewers noted that it would make a good general introduction to 
contemporaneous British science) or even its scope (he sought to do with organic life what 
Newton had done with gravity—identify a single, unifying principle or law) than because of 
its usefulness for supporting radical politics, materialism, and skeptical secularism.
303
 The 
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book “was at once a novelty and a portent, and the scientific world was almost literally 
unanimous in condemning it.”304 Popularly, however, Vestiges was a best seller, with 
fourteen British editions, eleven in the author’s lifetime (Oct. 1844, Dec. 1844, Feb. 1845, 
Apr. 1845, Jan. 1846, Mar. 1847, May 1847, July 1850, June 1851, June 1853, Dec. 1860), 
and forty thousand copies sold. A conservative estimate of its contemporaneous British 
readership would come to at least a hundred thousand. Beginning in 1847, “Vestiges was 
available in a cheap ‘people’s edition’ targeted at a wide range of readers in the artisanal and 
middle classes.”305 Students continued to read it widely into the 1850s.306  
 In 1853, Chambers released his tenth edition, described as “an elaborate revision, 
quite widely reviewed and discussed,” which differed from previous editions of Vestiges in a 
number of ways.
307
 By the 1850s, scientific debates were generally more tolerant than they 
had been in the 1840s, and reviews of the 1853 edition “other than those in the religious 
press, were generally positive.”308 Most importantly for the general public, it was a people’s 
edition, inexpensive and widely available in circulating and mechanics’ institute libraries. 
For the scientific community, on the other hand, the 1853 edition contained an extensive 
appendix with images and quotations from scientific authorities that bolstered the claims 
made in the book—often Chambers chose to quote from the very scientists who had attacked 
his book for contradicting accepted scientific theory.
309
 Intriguingly for the educated 
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populace who played the game of guessing the author’s identity—and for those who sought 
to dismiss the book on religious grounds—Chambers included an autobiographical preface in 
the 1853 edition. In this preface, the author (who remains anonymous and writes about 
himself in the third person) briefly sketches the inspiration behind his work, both religious 
and scientific. He—using the masculine pronoun as if to emphasize his gender—opens the 
preface with an explanation of how, 
Having previously been convinced that the Divine Governor of the world conducts its 
passing affairs by a fixed rule, to which we apply the term natural law, he was much 
impressed on finding reason to believe that the physical arrangements of the universe 
had been originated in the same manner, as it seemed to him to favour the idea of a 
perfect unity in the action of the One Eternal and Infinite. (204) 
 
His conclusions thus are presented as the culmination of rational observation and faith in 
traditional Christian notions of God, as opposed to vague religious terms “in vogue amongst 
geologists” such as “fiats,” “special miracles,” and “inferences” that explained “the 
commencement of life and organization…very unsatisfactorily” (204). Like divine 
inspiration, then, he “therefore embraced the doctrine of Progressive Development as a 
hypothetic history of organic creation,” as he observed the “gradual evolution of high from 
low, of complicated from simple, of special from general, all in unvarying order, and 
therefore all natural” that others note in reproduction, but that he alone was capable of 
systematizing (206). 
Chambers’s Vestiges 
 Vestiges essentially presents a Bildungsroman of the Earth. James A. Secord has 
noted that Chambers was inspired by the historical fiction of Sir Walter Scott and drew on his 
novelistic strategies in writing Vestiges; equally so, Chambers seems to draw on the novel of 
character growth and coming of age, as “the trajectory of…evolution in the Vestiges is…a 
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narrative of progress.”310 The book opens, with no real introduction, in medias res, 
discussing of the formation of solar systems. The development of stars and planets from an 
undifferentiated mass to discrete forms is likened to the growth of a child into a man (8). 
Chambers spends much of the book, then, focusing on the geological record, particularly that 
located near England, and how changes in the Earth’s environment are reflected in changes 
in forms of life found in various geological strata.
311
 From plants to zoophytes (like sea 
anemones) to mammals, Chambers argues that all species perfectly correspond to their 
environmental conditions (147, 240, 377). The Earth has improved so as to allow more 
perfect species to develop over time (148-50). But, Chambers speculates, the Earth is in no 
way a special circumstance—there are innumerable planets in the universe, many of which 
are older or situated better than our own, and so the Earth is in the midst of a development 
process that a great number of other planets’ biospheres have completed (20-22, 160-61). In 
theory, the progressivist arguments of Vestiges are not terribly heterodox, but they do run up 
against tenets of Victorian religion and social theory in multiple ways. 
 The religious positioning of Vestiges is carefully designed, in Chambers’s own 
concluding words, to proceed “with as little disturbance as possible to existing beliefs,” but 
one gets the sense while reading the book that the lip-service paid to orthodoxy is thin cover 
for some very questionable visions of the role of God and Christian doctrine in this self-
proclaimed “true view of the history of nature” (388). Vestiges’s God designed the natural 
laws of development that power the universe and has not been directly involved since. There 
are no special, separate acts of creation each time a new species comes into being—there are 
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too many planets and planetary systems for that to be reasonable, the book argues (154).
312
 
When the Bible talks about God “creating” or “forming” the world and its inhabitants, 
Chambers claims, the language is sufficiently vague to support the interpretation that 
everything was developing according to natural laws “from commands and expressions of 
will, not from direct acts” (155; original emphasis). Though he says that in freeing God from 
direct involvement in the world, he is freeing Him from anthropomorphizing and reductionist 
trains of thought, Chambers instead seems to be arguing for the limitations of a deity. Where 
does evil arise from, if everything proceeds according to God’s laws? Chambers tackles this 
issue at the end of Vestiges, arguing in short that suffering comes from bad luck: conditions 
are perfect for the species, not the individual, who “is left, as it were, to take his chance 
amidst the mêlée of the various laws affecting him”; “the system has the fairness of a lottery, 
in which every one has the like chance of drawing the prize” or of being run down by 
“contingencies” (377). And what about humans being made by God on a special day by a 
special act? The Bible’s account of creation is presented as that of a flawed “text, formed at a 
time when man’s ignorance prevented him from drawing therefrom a just conclusion” (156). 
Humans are no more made in “God’s image” than any other species (348). How do species 
come into being, if not through special creations? Where Cuvier tiptoed (see chapter 1), 
Chambers rushes in: species are born from other, lower species. Life can arise spontaneously, 
even through purely chemical processes (173). Once life has been initiated, the normal 
processes of reproduction are such as to allow current species to reproduce other members of 
their species reliably (206). Occasionally, however, when conditions change, reproduction 
takes a little longer and the resulting birth is one of a more perfect animal—a new species 
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(234). Chambers points to intermediate fossils—those that contain combinations of 
characteristics we now see belonging to entirely distinct species—as evidence of this process 
(71). He goes so far as to argue that the various races of humankind are produced by different 
gestation periods: shorter pregnancies among the “lower” races make them less developed, 
and longer ones among Indo-Europeans make them the most advanced (309). 
 Vestiges might at first glance seem to reinforce the traditional notion of a Great Chain 
of Being, but in fact Chambers troubles the notion of humans being one step away from 
angels. Chambers argues that humans are the most developed species on Earth, but that 
developmental (or evolutionary) processes are still ongoing; humans are best adapted to 
current conditions, but when conditions inevitably change, a new and more perfect species 
will arise (276). Humans themselves came from other primates or “quadrumana/simiadae,” 
since (Chambers states) monkeys and apes represent the highest form of physical 
development and mental capacity among animal species other than humans. In fact, in a 
passage reminiscent of Cuvier’s comparative anatomy work, Chambers says “in our teeth, 
hands, and other features grounded on by naturalists as characteristic, we do not differ more 
from the simiadae than the bats do from the lemurs” (266). Rather than being a privileged 
species, humanity is presented as a kind of stopgap—no different from any other animal, 
even in mental capacity: “The difference between mind in the lower animals and in man is a 
difference in degree only; it is not a specific difference” (335-36). Chambers takes issue with 
the traditional distinctions drawn between humans and other animals, such as that between 
instinct and mind, as well as the idea that only the human soul is immortal: 
There is, also, in this prejudice, an element of unkindliness towards the lower 
animals, which is utterly out of place. These creatures are all of them part products of 
the Almighty Conception, as well as ourselves. All of them display wondrous 
evidences of his wisdom and benevolence. All of them have had assigned to them by 
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their Great Father a part in the drama of the organic world, as well as ourselves. Why 
should they be held in such contempt? (235) 
 
Certainly, humans have some unique mental attributes: veneration, hope, reason, 
conscientiousness, and benevolence (348). But other animals have love, fidelity, dreams, 
language, and creativity, among other seemingly human traits (325). As one would imagine, 
Victorian religious orthodoxy did not readily embrace such suggestions. 
Current Critical Assessment 
 Modern historians of science seem to be divided about what to make of the Vestiges. 
It has been seen as an inherently religious book, “demonstrat[ing] the all-pervasiveness of 
natural Law as the expression of God in the world,” as well as the work that dealt the first 
serious blow to Victorian hopes of “raising religion on the back of science.”313 Its science has 
been considered “for its time and place, surprisingly sound,” as well as an inadequate 
contribution to evolutionary theory.
314
 But the consensus from those who have closely 
studied Vestiges and its reception seems to be that it was massively influential: “something of 
a mid-Victorian institution” that made evolutionary theory (or “developmentalism”) “a cause 
célèbre in mid-century Victorian Britain,” “not as a mere prelude to the Darwinian episode 
but as the defining factor in shaping the Victorian public’s attitude toward evolution.”315 One 
historian noted that at the time “virtually everyone who read any non-fiction, from Victoria 
and Albert down to literate members of the working class, read Chambers’s work.”316 
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Unsurprisingly, Victorian thinkers had a much more contentious debate over the implications 
of the still-anonymous Vestiges. 
THE EARLY VICTORIAN RESPONSE TO VESTIGES 
 Contemporaneous debate over Vestiges was heated and extensive—an amount of 
attention entirely unprecedented for a science book—and reactions were quite mixed. Secord, 
who published the most recent and most extensive reception study of Vestiges, concludes that 
it not only made “evolutionary theories…a common currency of conversation” but also made 
images from the book “ubiquitous in contemporary table talk.”317 Its accessibility was the 
source of both praise and alarm as it brought a familiarity with the developmental hypothesis 
into polite and domestic settings. Its popularity was often used against it by the scientific and 
religious orthodoxy, as evidence of the public’s inability to evaluate the scientific merits of a 
book.
318
  
 Milton Millhauser, author of one of the two book-length historical studies devoted to 
Chambers’s Vestiges, has observed that those who praised the work found “something that 
the book offered and that the critics did not like”: this was especially true of those frustrated 
with class relations and dominant religious institutions in Victorian Britain.
319
 Vestiges’s 
legitimating of evolutionary theory—alternately known as the development hypothesis, 
progressive development, transmutationism, or transformism—failed to disassociate such 
ideas from French and working-class radicals and revolutionaries.
320
 Socialists, who wanted 
to draw on science to overturn current social structures in order to achieve “a secular, 
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scientifically constrained cooperative society,” found the idea of constant and inevitable 
progression compatible with their goals.
321
 Even those with less radical religious views 
welcomed Vestiges’s loosening of religious ties to science. Some liberal Whigs, Unitarians, 
and other Dissenting freethinkers, particularly among the London intelligentsia, felt that 
Vestiges’s vision of progressive development cohered with their faith in human-driven 
improvement of conditions in this world.
322
 
 Counter to these positive receptions of Vestiges were the overwhelming number of 
negative reviews. Its anonymous author was attacked on methodological grounds by the 
scientific orthodoxy, particularly the Cambridge scriptural geologists for “lack of practical 
research, second-hand knowledge, and disregard of proper scientific methods.”323 Few 
scientific thinkers felt that Chambers’s natural laws were sufficient to account for the 
progressive development of all lifeforms, “from monad to man.”324 Embarrassingly, it was 
revealed through the publication of private letters in the Liverpool Journal in 1846 that 
Charles Lyell “condemned the book on the basis of reports from other geologists without 
even reading the copy the author had sent him.”325 Particularly offensive to religious 
sensibilities was Chambers’s presentation of humankind as descended from animals rather 
than specially and directly created by God.
326
 But while Vestiges was taking what can only be 
described as “a merciless critical pounding,” most heatedly from October 1844 to June 1846, 
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the book “was dissected at public scientific meetings, condemned from pulpits and lecture 
platforms, borrowed from circulating libraries, and read.”327 Criticism of the work only 
publicized it and increased its popularity.
328
 
The Literary Response  
 Literary authors were not behind in evaluating Vestiges and discussing its 
implications in serious, considered ways. In doing so, they used fiction as a forum for 
expressing ideas like those of the reviewers, but in perhaps more popular and accessible—or, 
at times, more sophisticated and nuanced—ways.329 The leap from Chambers to literature 
was never a great one: he used narratives and images not unlike those that appeared in 
popular fiction of the time.
330
 Chambers’s major project before beginning research for 
Vestiges was the History of English Language and Literature (1836), in which he concluded 
that Sir Walter Scott’s work represented the pinnacle of British literary tradition; from Scott, 
Chambers learned how an author could construct a history that also looked to the future, a 
story of progress and development that incorporated instability with hopefulness.
331
 
 Benjamin Disraeli, no longer much studied as a fiction writer, but one whose novels 
were widely read in his time, responded strongly to the Vestiges controversy. Disraeli’s 
Tancred, or The New Crusade (1847) used a discussion of Vestiges—thinly veiled by the 
fictionalized title “The Revelations of Chaos”—to free the eponymous character from an 
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intellectually limited love interest. In Chapter 9, appropriately entitled “Disenchantment,” 
Disraeli skewers Vestiges and its readership: 
'To judge from the title, the subject is rather obscure,' said Tancred.  
'No longer so,' said Lady Constance. 'It is treated scientifically; everything is 
explained by geology and astronomy, and in that way. It shows you exactly how a 
star is formed; nothing can be so pretty! A cluster of vapour, the cream of the Milky 
Way, a sort of celestial cheese, churned into light, you must read it, 'tis charming.'  
'Nobody ever saw a star formed,' said Tancred.  
'Perhaps not. You must read the "Revelations;" it is all explained. But what is 
most interesting, is the way in which man has been developed. You know, all is 
development. The principle is perpetually going on. First, there was nothing, then 
there was something; then, I forget the next, I think there were shells, then fishes; 
then we came, let me see, did we come next? Never mind that; we came at last. And 
the next change there will be something very superior to us, something with wings. 
Ah! that's it: we were fishes, and I believe we shall be crows. But you must read it.'  
'I do not believe I ever was a fish,' said Tancred.  
'Oh! but it is all proved; you must not argue on my rapid sketch; read the 
book. It is impossible to contradict anything in it. You understand, it is all science; it 
is not like those books in which one says one thing and another the contrary, and both 
may be wrong. Everything is proved: by geology, you know. You see exactly how 
everything is made; how many worlds there have been; how long they lasted; what 
went before, what comes next. We are a link in the chain, as inferior animals were 
that preceded us: we in turn shall be inferior; all that will remain of us will be some 
relics in a new red sandstone. This is development. We had fins; we may have 
wings.'
332
 
 
A particularly telling line in this satirical passage is Lady Constance’s claim that “It is 
impossible to contradict anything in [Vestiges]. You understand, it is all science.” Of course, 
Vestiges was roundly critiqued and contradicted, but the notion that science could propose 
poetic and fanciful theories lacking empirical evidence (such as how nebular clusters are 
“churned into light”) and then use the mantle of science to claim inarguability is ludicrous to 
Tancred, and presumably to Disraeli as well. Lady Constance appears to be an unusual 
devotee of Vestiges, claiming for the work a specificity that it does not contain, such as the 
exact number of other worlds, but as the only such character in Tancred, she is to be taken as 
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representative of all that Disraeli finds wrong with Chambers’s book: a lack of realism, rigor, 
and focus. Tancred goes on to explore issues of progressive social and species development; 
a philosophical conversation on civilization in Chapter 14, argues that “the progressive 
development of the faculties of man” is an illusion: it is not progressive development that is 
the most prominent natural law, but rather decay which “is an inevitable necessity.”333 The 
evidence for progress is lacking, when one looks out of the geological record, which is 
presented as a questionable source upon which to base grand conclusions, to socio-political 
history. Vestiges does not explain everything, contra Lady Constance, and those phenomena 
it fails to explain are perhaps most important for humans to understand, such as the narrative 
arc and causes of changes in human social history.  
 A number of other prominent writers were less critical of Vestiges. Leigh Hunt 
apparently spoke very positively of the work to Chambers in confidence, although he 
moderated his praise in public, and so we have no firsthand account of his evaluation of the 
work.
334
 Charles Kingsley references it occasionally—though not always positively—in 
Water Babies (1863).
335
 George Henry Lewes, an intellectual both in the literary and natural 
history arenas, wrote of Vestiges in 1851, “There are faults in that delightful work, errors 
both in fact and philosophy, but compared with the answers it provoked, we cannot help 
regarding it as a masterpiece.”336 George Eliot “continued to speak favorably about Vestiges 
and its pioneering role in spurring debate, well after the appearance of the Origin of 
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Species”;337 Vestiges influenced her thinking on evolution so much that she first read Origin, 
she wrote in her diary that when she viewed it as derivative, a rephrasing of Chambers’s 
ideas.
338
  
Tennyson’s In Memoriam, A. H. H. and The Princess 
 In November of 1844, Alfred, Lord Tennyson wrote to Edward Moxon, his publisher, 
requesting that he acquire a copy of a book he saw enthusiastically reviewed in the 
Examiner—Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation.339 Explaining his interest, Tennyson 
said, “it seems to contain many speculations with which I have been familiar for years, and 
on which I have written more than one poem.”340 He had a longstanding interest in science341 
(especially the evolutionary implications of geology) and was drawn to Vestiges for “its 
graphic style [and] its vivid picturesqueness”342; the elements of the book that so distressed 
other readers were largely familiar to him already through his reading of Charles Lyell’s 
Principles of Geology (1830) in 1837. Lyell had read and incorporated the ideas of Lamarck 
and Cuvier into his geological tome, specifically their notions that humanity is a biological 
species subject to extinction like any other.
343
 In fact, Tennyson might have been comforted 
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by Vestiges’s confirmation of how up-to-date with scientific debates his own reading was, 
not to mention by Vestiges’s suggestion that there is a plan and purpose behind the seemingly 
ruthless processes of nature that Lyell presented.
344
 Although many contemporaneous readers 
were troubled by the religious system of Vestiges, Tennyson found in the work a means to 
reconcile a nonorthodox but still sincere Christian faith with modern scientific discoveries.
345
 
 Tennyson’s The Princess (1847) was his first major poem composed and published 
after his reading of Vestiges, and references to its version of evolutionary theory abound—in 
the prologue alone, we can identify the setting on Sir Walter Vivian’s lawn (EBB, among 
others, thought that Sir Richard Vyvyan, MP and FRS, was the author of Vestiges for a 
number of years) and the ammonites and other fossils lying about.
346
 The eponymous 
princess in this work has rejected her betrothal to a prince and founded a university solely for 
women; the lessons taught in this institution express and apply many of the central tenets of 
Vestiges. The princess speaks of creation as a single, nebular event, “All creation is one act at 
once, / The birth of light” (III.308-9); Lady Psyche, one of the instructors at the university, 
also endorses the nebular hypothesis made culturally prominent by Vestiges: 
 This world was once a fluid haze of light,  
 Till toward the center set the starry tides, 
 And eddied into suns, that whirling cast 
 The planets; then the monster; then the man. (II.101-4)
347
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Tennyson’s “fluid haze of light” closely resembles Chambers’s description of the primal 
nebulae as a “universal Fire-Mist.”348 Interestingly, this passage obscures any role of God in 
creation with the movement of “starry tides,” tides of course being associated with lunar 
cycles and hence with women’s menstrual cycles. An androcentric vision of history is thus 
replaced with a gynocentric one, in keeping with the university’s strict gendering, and with 
Chambers’s vision of female reproduction as central to evolution, a theme that I will discuss 
more extensively in relation to Aurora Leigh.
349
 The vision of the Academy—and of Princess 
Ida—is consistently developmental: life in the universe and in human societies has 
progressed to the point that women are becoming the dominant species, the evolutionary type 
of the future; the work concludes, however, that it is not women who epitomize evolutionary 
development, but rather domesticity, as it is the site that brings men and women together and 
helps them to progress toward a better society.
350
 Women’s education has led to this state, as 
“Princess Ida recognizes her own sexual attraction to the Prince through a literary experience 
assisted by images of flowers, insects, birds, and stars,” subjects long associated with the 
natural sciences.
351
 And yet, the Princess’s persona is a means for Tennyson to distance 
himself from the Vestiges’s arguments and implications, “holding [each evolutionary] idea at 
arm’s length, displaying commitment but not quite confessing it.”352 
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 Tennyson wrote In Memoriam (1850) over the course of seventeen years (1833-49) as 
an act of grieving for his friend, Arthur Henry Hallam. The poem works through personal 
and cultural anxieties caused by developments in science, especially evolutionary theory, 
eventually reconciling with faith the seemingly irreconcilable notion of the insignificance 
and impermanence of humankind.
353
 Welcomed by scientists and religious figures alike, In 
Memoriam impressed its age with its sincere and informed approach to timely scientific 
crises.
354
 
 Sections LIV-LVI of In Memoriam are typically referred to as the “evolutionary 
doubt” epicenter of the poem. These famous sections deal with Tennyson’s hopes “that 
somehow good / Will be the final goal of ill,” “That nothing walks with aimless feet,” “That 
not a worm is cloven in vain” (LIV.1-2, 5, 9) but fade into fears that “God and Nature [are] at 
strife,” causing nature to preserve neither the species nor the individual (LV.5), not even 
humans.
355
 This is where the famous line about “Nature, red in tooth and claw” (LVI.25)—
probably a reference to Lyell’s Principles, not Chambers’s Vestiges—appears.356 These 
“evolutionary” sections, then, are really geological (or Lyellian) sections.357 Tennyson 
integrated Vestiges, instead, into his “evolutionary resolution” sections of CXVIII-CXXIII.358 
In CXVIII, Tennyson draws on Chambers’s notion of humankind as “but the initial of the 
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grand crowning type” to think of our species not as a future fossil as in LVI but as “The 
herald of a higher race” (CXVIII.14). Tennyson by CXXIII has reached a comfortable 
compromise, accepting geological visions of time and biological visions of animal descent 
without being dragged down by them, which is made possible through the mediation of 
Vestiges. Chambers, after all, had addressed Tennyson’s early fear that the stars “blindly run” 
(III.5) by showing that the stars, instead, demonstrate progress. 
 The Epilogue, most likely written in 1845, relies more than the other sections of the 
poem on Chambers’s Vestiges to synthesize the movement of In Memoriam.359 The Epilogue 
celebrates the marriage of Tennyson’s sister Cecilia and the future birth of a child, who shall 
recapitulate the previous evolutionary states to progress one step closer to “the crowning 
race” (line 128); Chambers’s theory of progressive development (Tennyson’s “one law” 
[142]) enables this optimistic vision of the future.
360
 Marriage, in this vision, becomes an 
evolutionary step because it is the socially and religiously legitimated means of reproduction, 
gestation of course being central to Chambers’s vision of progress.361 The final lines, 
referring to the “far-off divine event, / To which the whole creation moves” (143-44), 
“suggest both the biblical idea of the Kingdom of God and the nineteenth century’s dearly 
cherished belief that perfection lay ahead and the whole world was progressing toward it, a 
belief for which Chambers found scientific evidence in organic development.”362 The key 
step for Tennyson in moving from a state “half-akin to brute” to the transcendent type is 
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literary, the coming of people able to read “Nature like an open book” (133, 132). Such a 
statement looks forward to a time when the scientists and the literati merge.
363
 
EBB’s Response to Tennyson  
Elizabeth Barrett Browning first met Tennyson and his wife Emily in July of 1851, 
when the Poet Laureate invited the Brownings to a visit in Paris.
364
 EBB had, however, 
sustained an interest in Tennyson’s writings and career for years before this initial meeting or 
the warm acquaintanceship that subsequently blossomed; in 1836, her brother George had 
given her Tennyson’s Poems Chiefly Lyrical (1830), and thereafter she followed his career 
closely.
365
 Tennyson was a respected contemporary but also a competitor for EBB. She was 
disappointed in The Princess, frustrated at reviewers who attributed her poetic ideas or style 
to his influence, and mostly admiring of In Memoriam after reading it in December 1850
366
:  
the book has gone to my heart & soul . . I think it full of deep pathos & beauty. All I 
wish away is the marriage hymn at the end….the effect of the book is artistic & true, I 
think—& indeed I do not wonder at the opinion that has reached us from various 
quarters that Tennyson stands higher through having written it….he appeals, heart to 
heart, directly as from his own to the universal heart, & we feel him nearer to us—I 
do . . & so do others.
367
 
 
Though she does not mention the geological sections of the poem in this letter, what she does 
take issue with is the Epilogue of In Memoriam, the section of the book that integrates 
Chambers’s universal vision into the human scale and that reconciles science and 
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Christianity. Her own poetic treatment of the social issues raised by Vestiges was to be quite 
different. 
ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING’S AURORA LEIGH 
 By the 1850s, Elizabeth Barrett Browning (1806-61) had built up a reputation as an 
educated, Christian, and gifted writer, often being ranked by her contemporaries as one of the 
greatest British female poets—if not the greatest.368 She very much wanted to be judged as a 
poet in her own right, not just as a poetess, however, and toward the end of her life wrote on 
political subjects that were often considered inappropriate for a woman by reviewers.
369
 
Though occasionally accused by biographers of using her chronic, mysterious pulmonary 
illness as an excuse to avoid social and domestic obligations that she found distasteful, she 
nonetheless received an excellent education at home and stayed well informed on current 
events.
370
 EBB in large part made her name through the publication of her August 1844 
Poems. This volume, “the fruit of some six years of intermittent poetical activity,” received 
such a positive critical reception that it “secured her reputation as a gifted writer and an 
unusually well-educated woman of feeling.”371 Despite the critical success, the sale of her 
1844 Poems (2 vols.) did not make much of a profit for EBB, perhaps in part because the 
1844-45 social season was alight with interest in Vestiges, which was “sharing the review 
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columns” with EBB’s volume.372 In fact, reviews even linked the two books by criticizing 
them for lacking sufficiently rigorous systems of inquiry.
373
 Though Vestiges and EBB’s 
poetry was considered by reviewers, readers, and the authors themselves in tandem, no 
previous scholarship examines how EBB’s poetry might have engaged with Chambers’s 
theory. 
Although her most authoritative recent biographer, Gardner Taplin, comments that 
the Vestiges scandal left EBB “untouched,” as he claims she remained “all her life by 
evolutionary thought,” it is hard to believe that an intellectual who read the sensational book 
at the height of its popularity, who discussed and corresponded about it with friends, who 
was deeply moved by Tennyson’s In Memoriam, and who shared one of her most prominent 
moments of public celebration with the evolutionary work could have been “untouched” by 
it.
374
 EBB frequently wrote about current events in her poetry, particularly prominent social 
issues like children’s factory work (in 1843’s “The Cry of the Children”) or sexual abuses in 
American slavery (in 1848’s “The Runaway Slave at Pilgrim’s Point”); in doing so, she acted 
on her long-held maxims that “there was no subject a poet should not touch” and that “poetry 
should be a form of action.”375 As a consequence, EBB drew on books to which she reacted 
negatively (like Vestiges), such as the Socialist French novelist Joseph Marie Eugène Sue’s 
Les Mystères de Paris, which influenced her treatment of the character Marian in Aurora 
Leigh, despite her confession that she found the novel “painful and repulsive.”376 Perhaps 
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most important, Vestiges influenced national discussions of controversial social questions 
such as class, religion, and gender that EBB had a long-standing interest in and claimed as 
legitimate subjects of natural history. 
 Evidence of EBB’s familiarity with Vestiges comes from her letters. In early January 
of 1845, she wrote to John Kenyon, a distant cousin, returning his copy of the book: 
Thank you, dearest M
r
. Kenyon—I send back your ‘Vestiges of Creation’. The writer 
has a certain power in tying a knot– –(in mating a system)—but it is not a love-
knot,—&  it appears to me that I have read in my life few more melancholy books– 
Did the thought ever strike you of the possibility of M
r
.Crosse having anything to do 
with the writing? I understand that Sir Richard Vivian denies it determinedly.
377
  
 
In this letter EBB engages in the popular social game of guessing the Vestiges’s author’s 
identity, showing how in tune she was with the spirit of the moment.
378
 More important, 
however, she expresses her sense of the book’s shortcomings. Vestiges is powerful, 
particularly in its expression of a universal system, but rather than inspiring adherence to its 
system, the work inspires sadness. Secord interprets this response as indicating EBB’s sense 
of the mechanistic, materialistic implications of Chambers’s work, saying that for her, in the 
theory, “everything had been joined and fitted, but without feeling.”379 Later that month, 
EBB wrote again to Kenyon and to another correspondent, Julia Martin, about Vestiges, in 
the context of a visit with the writer, Anna Jameson. To Kenyon, she comments: 
M
rs
. Jameson sate with  me nearly an hour yesterday—& a pleasant hour it was,—
considering that it was not one of your’s. She tried to persuade me that the ‘Vestiges 
of Creation’ was the most comfortable of books, & that we shd. think ourselves happy 
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in our condition of fully developped monkeyhood—but I was too proud & 
discontented to be found persuadable in these things.
380
  
 
Although perhaps overstating the influence of her mood on her evaluation of the book, this 
letter records that EBB has made her mind up about Vestiges—and not positively. She 
objects to the notion of the primate descent of humankind, and of herself in particular. It is 
hard to say whether or not her point about the monkey is a joke, but she repeated her 
witticism in a letter to Julia Martin about the same visit: 
M
rs
. Jameson came again yesterday, & was very agreeable—but tried vainly to 
convince me that the ‘Vestiges of Creation’ which I take to be one of the most 
melancholy books in the world, is the most comforting, . . & that Lady Byron was an 
angel of a wife. I persisted (in relation to the former clause) in a ‘determinate counsel’ 
not to be a fully developped monkey if I could help it—but when Mrs. Jameson 
assured me that she knew all the circumstances of the separation, though she c
d
. not 
betray a confidence, & entreated me ‘to keep my mind open’ on a subject which 
would one day be set in the light, . . I stroked down my feathers as well as I could, & 
listened to reason….But there was, . . yes, & is . . a strong adverse feeling to work 
upon--& it is not worked away.
381
  
 
Here, EBB counters Jameson’s pro-Vestiges argument with a Biblical phrase (“determinate 
counsel” from Acts 2:23). More interestingly, she links her dislike of the book so closely to 
her dislike of one of the reputed authors, Lady Byron, and alternates back and forth between 
discussing Vestiges and discussing Lady Byron, so much that by the end of the letter, it is 
hard to distinguish which subject her “strong adverse feeling” refers to.382 Though this is the 
last letter in the Brownings’ Correspondence in which EBB initiates the subject of Vestiges, 
she was receiving letters speculating on the book’s authorship as late as 1850.383 
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 Begun in 1853, though mentioned as a planned work as early as 1844, Aurora Leigh 
has been variously called a “novel in verse” and a “verse-novel.”384 The novel, many critics 
have noted, was considered a female form, whereas the poetic epic was gendered masculine; 
her adoption of a hybrid form, then, allowed her to draw on precedents in both generic 
traditions while escaping either one’s restrictions.385 It is both a Bildungsroman and a 
Künstlerroman, and many biographers and critics have identified the life and ideas of the 
eponymous female poet with those of EBB herself, despite EBB’s protestations that it was 
not a personal story.
386
 Though out of favor and out of print for much of the early twentieth 
century, Aurora Leigh was reclaimed in the 1970s and 80s as “a feminist epic.”387 In writing 
an epic—a typically masculinist form by and about men as a means to achieve self-definition 
through battle and quest narratives—about a woman who is at once an individual and a 
symbol and who writes her way to agency and identity, EBB achieved a radical 
endproduct.
388
 Among the concerns that EBB saw herself addressing were “the growing 
secularization and materialism of the age,” especially via Socialism.389 Contemporaries 
widely recognized that in Aurora Leigh, EBB “seemed to speak for her age,”390 and modern 
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critics have continued, in the vein of Cora Kaplan, to think of the book as “an elaborate 
collage” of contemporary “textual and cultural reference, offering telling reinterpretations of 
familiar tropes, archetypes, myths, and literary texts.” 391 To this list, I will add the debates 
raised by Vestiges. 
 Aurora Leigh is a first-person narrative told from the perspective of the eponymous 
character. Born in Italy to an English father and Italian mother, Aurora is orphaned at a 
young age. She travels to England to live with an aunt, who raises her in restrictive ways 
until Aurora’s twentieth birthday, when Aurora turns down a proposal from her cousin, 
Romney Leigh. After her aunt’s death, Aurora moves to London to become a professional 
poet. A few years later, she is visited by Lady Waldemar, who wants her to stop Romney’s 
marriage to a working-class woman, Marian Erle, which is driven by his Christian Socialist 
principles. Aurora visits Marian and finds her not terribly pretty but sincere and good 
hearted; Marian has been helped by Romney and has demonstrated her own desire to help 
others in distress. On the wedding day, Marian does not show up to the church. Shortly 
thereafter, Aurora rediscovers her in France and learns that she was sold to a brothel, 
drugged, raped, and impregnated. Aurora takes Marian and her baby to Italy, where Romney 
eventually finds them after the failure of his Socialist plans. Romney and Aurora finally 
reconcile and the work ends with Aurora describing to the now-blind Romney a vision of 
New Jerusalem, presumably the transfigured dawn. 
Gender: The Limitations of Authorship and the Empowerment of Motherhood 
 Gender and genre are two issues that have to be considered together in any critical 
analysis of Aurora Leigh’s intervention in the Vestiges debate. Both Aurora Leigh (as a 
verse-novel and an epic-Bildungsroman) and Vestiges (as a novelized science book, a 
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planetary Bildungsroman) are hybrid works, drawing on and exceeding the conventions of 
multiple genres. The reception of each book was also vexed by gender expectations, both of 
authors and of genres. Rhetoricians have observed that genre structures can both empowering 
and limiting. As Charles Bazerman notes, “genres allow us to create highly consequential 
meanings in highly articulated and developed systems.”392 Carolyn Miller expands on a 
similar point by writing that “Form shapes the response of the reader or listener to substance 
by providing instruction, so to speak, about how to perceive and interpret; this guidance 
disposes the audience to anticipate, to be gratified, to respond in a certain way. Seen thus, 
form becomes a kind of meta-information, with both semantic value (as information) and 
syntactic (or formal) value.”393 Because genre is so culturally embedded, though, it also 
perpetuates cultural values and so is “one of the structures of power that institutions 
wield.”394 Narrative is able to mediate this conflict by at once revealing, critiquing, and 
reconciling the social values that underlie genre, which is why the narrative of gender in the 
Vestiges debate can be illuminated through a study of the fictional Aurora Leigh, both of 
them genre- and gender-defying works.
395
 
Vestiges raised two specters of gender, one much discussed and one little noted. The 
former deals with the issue of authorship and the latter with the empowerment of maternity. 
As mentioned earlier, guessing the authorship of Vestiges was a popular parlor game in 1844-
45, but also a serious concern for those trying to evaluate the merits of the work. Alleged 
authors included Charles Lyell, William Thackeray, and even Prince Albert, but for much of 
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the 1840s, some of the chief suspects were women, including Harriet Martineau, Catherine 
Crowe, Lady Byron, and Ada Lovelace, Lord Byron’s daughter.396 Lovelace was suggested 
more often than other possible authors because she was known to be well educated and 
deeply interested in scientific topics.
397
 Anna Jameson might have been such a proponent of 
Vestiges because, as a proto-feminist, she was excited by the prospect of women finally 
claiming a place among prominent scientific theorizers.
398
 Less progressive critics, however, 
used the purported female authorship to undermine the work’s scientific authority and social 
reception.
399
 Identifying a woman as the writer of Vestiges was the easiest way to dismiss the 
work, and such supposedly feminine qualities as limited reasoning powers and lack of 
discipline were widely attributed to it.
400
 
 For EBB, “a woman poet fiercely determined not to be dismissed with more 
conventionally feminine ‘poetesses’,” the Vestiges debate must have seemed a step backward 
for herself and others attempting to make their names more as writers than as women.
401
 The 
fictional Aurora faces repeated instances of social prejudice for her desire to become a poet 
throughout EBB’s verse-novel. Lady Waldemar and Romney both accuse Aurora of being 
unwomanly because of her vocation. Lady Waldemar reproaches Aurora by saying,  
…You stand outside,  
You artist women, of the common sex;  
You share not with us, and exceed us so  
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Perhaps by what you’re mulcted in, your hearts 
Being starved to make your heads. (3.406-10) 
Trying to persuade Aurora to intervene in Romney’s upcoming wedding, Lady Waldemar 
here is kinder than Romney is at the end of the narrative, when he tells Aurora in a fit of 
frustration, “You stand so less than woman, through being more / And lost your natural 
instinct (like a beast) / Through intellectual culture” (8.1229-31). Women who write are seen 
through the eyes of these characters, and by implication through those of the educated 
population of the time, as diminished and unnatural because of their pursuit of literary 
careers. Such a stereotype was widely drawn upon and reinforced by the Vestiges debate. As 
Romney says dismissively, but EBB perhaps believed seriously, women writers never  
…can be satisfied with praise  
Which men give women when they judge a book  
Not as mere work but as mere woman’s work,  
Expressing the comparative respect  
Which means the absolute scorn. (2.232-36) 
But even more harmful, perhaps, is the idea that women are incapable of composing a 
reasonable and reasoned explanatory system, especially when it comes to science. In an 
embittered moment in Book 2’s proposal scene, Romney indicts women’s capacities for 
Aurora’s disinterest in his Socialist schemes. He claims that women are incapable of 
comprehending the world accurately, which for him means impersonally (2.192-98)
402
:  
You weep for what you know. A red-haired child  
Sick in a fever, if you touch him once,  
Though but so little as with a finger-tip,  
Will set you weeping; but a million sick . .  
You could as soon weep for the rule of three  
Or compound fractions. (213-18)  
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Such a critique could be as easily (and more fairly) directed at Chambers for being “…hard / 
To general suffering” at the end of Vestiges when he dismisses pain as arising from 
contingencies rather than laws: if misery is not recognized as a widespread problem in this 
world, conditions “Uncomprehended by you, must remain, / Uninfluenced by you” (2.198-
99, 218-20). 
 Although critics and reviewers seem not to have made this point explicit or examined 
it in any depth, Vestiges attributes species evolution to maternity. One race is differentiated 
from another by longer gestation periods, and it is through the vagaries of fetal development 
and birth that more developed species arise. This is not a purely empowering process for 
women, for Chambers also attributes birth defects to a failure “in the power of development 
in a mother,” but in his theory it is nonetheless only mothers who possess this “power of 
development”—other than an implicit role for insemination, males play no part in species 
progress or in the progress of the world (377). Chambers’s vision of the power of maternity, 
though different from EBB’s, is nonetheless complementary to hers and opens a number of 
possibilities for women. When EBB successfully gave birth to her only child, Pen, she “was 
immensely proud of her achievement. What thrilled her most was to have performed a 
natural function, ‘the highest function of a woman’ as she had once described it, 
perfectly.”403  
 Motherhood, though not something the title character experiences herself, is 
nonetheless a central concern in Aurora Leigh. Like Socialism, maternity is an atypical 
subject for poetry, at least in the personal, embodied, and vexed way that EBB approaches 
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it.
404
 Aurora struggles with the loss of her mother at a young age; in Book I she extensively 
she describes her experience of studying her dead mother, concluding that all of the roles that 
she imagined for her  
Concentrated on the picture, glassed themselves  
Before my meditative childhood, as  
The incoherencies of change and death  
Are represented fully, mixed and merged,  
In the smooth fair mystery of perpetual Life. (1.169-73) 
The mother is not just the literal gateway to life, but also the key to unlocking life’s greatest 
mysteries, the point at which all existential issues crystallize. Beverly Taylor has written 
about EBB’s vision of motherhood in such poems as her “Romance of the Ganges” (1838) 
and “Lord Walter’s Wife” (posthumously published in 1862) as imbued with “immensely 
transgressive potential,” with mothers able to challenge the politics of gender by educating 
their children about social and legal inequalities: a mother can be, in this view, “a catalyst for 
a new order, as materfamilias of future generations of boys and girls whom she imagines as 
confident and equal citizens of the world.”405 Such a progressive stance on motherhood could 
clearly be seen as consistent with Chambers’s empowerment of maternity. It must be noted, 
however, that Chambers sees women’s role as somewhat passive, as a capacity to physically 
develop their offspring adequately in utero according to the natural laws of progressive 
development, whereas EBB locates motherhood’s potential primarily in the nurturing 
decisions a woman makes well after the process of pregnancy and delivery. These two 
visions are brought into alignment in Aurora Leigh through the character of Marian Erle. 
After being told she was emigrating to Australia, but then is actually sold to a brothel in 
France, Marian temporarily goes insane; she is not just restored to sanity, but is transformed 
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into a near-angelic being through discovering her pregnancy and caring for  her child.
406
 
When Aurora first suspects Marian of being an unwed mother, she likens her to a thief: “A 
child’s too costly for so mere a wretch; / She filched it somewhere, and it means, with her, / 
Instead of honour, blessing, merely shame” (6.3453-55). She finds instead, from watching 
Marian with her child, that the fallen woman is a Virgin Mary rather than a Mary Magdalene, 
“impl[ying] the theological force she wants to impute to this ‘maiden’ mother’s female 
energy.”407 Marian’s child, despite being illegitimate and the product of sexual violence, 
comes to fulfill Aurora’s ideals of a child’s spiritual power: 
I thought a child was given to sanctify 
A woman, – set her in the sight of all  
The clear-eyed Heavens, a chosen minister  
To do their business and lead spirits up  
The difficult blue heights. A woman lives,  
Not bettered, quickened toward the truth and good  
Through being a mother? . . then she’s none. (6.728-34)408 
Here it is the individual woman, not the child or the species as in Chambers, who is made 
more perfect through the process of maternity. As in Chambers, though, Marian’s child 
seems to be an improvement on Marian and the class from which she comes; almost 
preternaturally beautiful and good tempered, he “is hardly ever characterized as a real child 
might be.”409 Moreover, he is described as “fatherless” and “unfathered” (6.646, 7.327). He 
has a father, of course, in the technical sense, but other than one unremembered sexual 
encounter with his mother, the text makes it seem that the father has contributed nothing to 
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this child’s existence. This lack of a father’s presence makes the experience of maternity 
even more “regenerative” for Marian (as well as for Aurora, who seems to take on the role of 
adoptive or surrogate mother to both Marian and her son) and more in line with Vestiges’s 
vision of empowering maternity.
410
 
Upending Religious Doubt 
 If EBB’s attitude toward motherhood aligns with Chambers’s emphasis on the 
centrality of the mother’s role in species advancement, her attitudes on God and religion 
differed greatly. Because Vestiges was published anonymously, this section will focus not on 
Robert Chambers’s personal views on religion, but rather on the religious system presented 
in Vestiges. In essence, Chambers argues in Vestiges that God designed the laws and created 
the matter that make up the universe as we currently know it, not through a direct act of 
creation but “by the simple establishment of a natural principle flowing from his mind” 
(154). After that point, God was not involved in maintaining of any portion of the universe. 
For Chambers, this cosmic vision was the only way to avoid envisioning an anthropomorphic 
(and hence reduced) God: the idea that He would “interfere personally and specially on every 
occasion into existence on one of these [countless] worlds” “lowers him towards the level of 
our own humble intellects” (154, 156). Chambers does try to write reverently and non-
offensively about God throughout the work, and it is important to note that his development 
hypothesis is not atheistic—at most, agnostic—but critics widely perceived Vestiges as 
“lacking the enthusiasm of a strong personal faith.”411 Vestiges made God unnecessary for 
human and scientific pursuit of knowledge, particularly about the origins and development of 
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Earth. More radically, however, it presents humanity as no more in God’s image, and 
occupying no more of a privileged position to commune with God, than any other species.
412
  
 EBB held broadminded views about religion, but still had deeply Christian beliefs. 
She was known in her lifetime as a “deeply religious poet,” so much so that John Kenyon 
was worried early in her career that her religiosity would harm her popularity, but in fact the 
religious earnestness that came across in her writing only broadened her appeal to her 
readership.
413
 Her faith grew and changed with her, particularly during a crisis of faith after 
her favorite brother, Edward, but affectionately called Bro, drowned in 1840.
414
 A year later, 
she wrote that she was “drawn by all sorts of spiritual manifestation,” a claim that she upheld 
as she “agreed to marry Robert Browning in an Anglican church…and they baptized their 
only child in the French Lutheran Church; she records sharing Communion with the 
Presbyterians; and when in Rome on Christmas Day, the Brownings attended mass at St. 
Peter’s.”415 EBB’s personal faith inevitably bled into her poetry, but her religion in her poetry 
can be described more as intellectually engaged than devotional.
416
 Deeply interested in the 
connection between religion and politics, EBB saw that “religion is central to any thinking 
about the social order and the ways in which dominant power systems maintain their 
authority”; she found that her interest in religious multiplicity translated into a distaste for 
“religious doctrine which sought to close down freedom and the right of choice.”417 Religion 
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and the practice of writing poetry were also intertwined for EBB, as she saw Christianity as 
containing “unspeakable poetry.”418  
 Despite EBB’s broadmindedness, humanism, and analytical approach to religious 
subjects, she seems to have held dear some religious doctrines that she could not reconcile 
with the religious schema presented in Vestiges. Throughout, Aurora Leigh persistently 
associates atheism with false and foolish ideas, such as Wolf’s views on the Iliad and the 
nebular hypothesis that suggests the universe just “fell out” “fortuitous[ly]” (5.1254-57). 
Aurora and Romney are both religious, if not orthodox. In a sense, Aurora has her origins in 
religion, as her father first noticed her mother when the latter took part in a religious parade 
(1.78-91); over the course of the narrative, she develops a deeply held Christian vision 
(7.1027-39), even though she continues to practice her “prayers without the vicar” (1.700). 
Aurora passionately declares to Lady Waldemar, “Apologise for atheism, not love! / For me, 
I do believe in love, and God” (3.477-78), and the book ends with her religious vision of the 
New Jerusalem. Romney, despite being a Socialist, is no atheist: he attempts to help Marian 
“to snatch her soul from atheism” (3.1229), consistently endorses the Genesis narrative when 
discussing the origins of humankind (2.167, 4.109-16), and preaches the omnipotence, 
omnibenevolence, and omnipresence of God (3.1206-9). Aurora likewise agrees that “God is 
not too great for little cares,” unlike the God in Vestiges who is too powerful to have any 
kind of direct involvement in human life—or any life, for that matter (5.561). Romney and 
Aurora both implicitly oppose the uniformitarian geological vision made prominent by 
Cuvier, Lyell, and Chambers: Romney claims for Earth the Ussherian age of “six thousand 
years” (2.167) and Aurora meditates on the creation of humanity as the culmination of God’s 
Creative process: 
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…Six days’ work;  
The last day shutting ‘twixt its dawn and eve  
The whole work bettered of the previous five!  
Since God collected and resumed in man  
The firmaments, the strata, and the lights,  
Fish, fowl, beast, and insect, – all their trains  
Of various life caught back upon His arm,  
Reorganised, and constituted MAN,  
The microcosm, the adding up of works, –  
Within whose fluttering nostrils, then at last  
Consummating Himself the Maker sighed,  
As some strong winner at the foot-race sighs  
Touching the goal. (6.149-61) 
Not only are humans more than just an evolutionary stage like any other, as Vestiges would 
have it, but they are clearly made in God’s image and complete Creation. Aurora laments the 
notion that her contemporaries, as they “define a man,” “…want the beast’s part now, / And 
tire of the angel’s,” an accusation that seems directed at the author and supporters of Vestiges 
(7.1007, 1005-6). She goes on to critique those thinkers “who waste their souls in working 
out / Life’s problem on these sands betwixt two tides / Concluding, – ‘Give us the oyster’s 
part, in death’,” the oyster frequently being considered the lowest form of animal life in 
natural history systems (7.1024-26).
419
 At no point in Aurora Leigh does EBB raise the 
argument that humans are not biological creatures; rather, her characters consistently 
subscribe to a Cartesian dualist vision of the human body, with the real person being “the 
conscious and eternal soul / With all its ends, and not the outside life, / The parcel-man, the 
doublet of the flesh” (3.284-86). And so, Aurora concludes, “’Tis impossible / To get at men 
excepting through their souls, / However open their carnivorous jaws” (8.537-39). The 
carnivore exists, but it is subservient to the spirit. The idea of the spirit being divorced from 
the flesh is abhorrent to both Romney and Aurora, as is the notion of a natural law that is not 
divinely guided; Romney says that there  
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Subsist no rules of life outside of life,  
No perfect manners, without Christian souls:  
The Christ himself had been no Lawgiver  
Unless He had given the life, too, with the law. (9.870-73) 
The passage reinforces the notion of the divinity of Christ, a religious tenet that EBB 
personally saw as non-negotiable.
420
 Aurora firmly takes a stance against Vestiges, as 
represented in books that provoke religious crisis, which she here describes in the language 
of drowning, language that EBB could not have taken lightly, given Bro’s fate:  
…with some struggle, indeed,  
Among the breakers, some hard swimming through  
The deeps – I lost breath in my soul sometimes  
And cried, ‘God save me if there’s any God,’  
But, even so, God saved me; and, being dashed  
From error on to error, every turn  
Still brought me nearer to the central truth. (1.794-800) 
This passage of struggling with overwhelming doubt recalls EBB’s estimation of Vestiges in 
her January 1845 letter to Kenyon: Vestiges tied a knot—it was powerful and persuasive—
but not a “love-knot”—it bound without inspiring positivity or admiration, threatened 
without enticing.  
 Perhaps the most significant passage in Aurora Leigh’s rejection of Vestiges’s 
religious schema comes toward the end of Book 5. Aurora reflects on contemporaneous 
philosophies by contrasting their unsatisfying rationalism with the earnest beliefs of pagans 
A pagan, kissing for a step of Pan  
The wild-goat’s hoof-print on the loamy down,  
Exceeds our modern thinker who turns back  
The strata . . granite, limestone, coal, and clay,  
Concluding coldly with, “Here’s law! where's God?” (5.1115-19) 
 
Although the pagan might have been deluded in taking natural phenomena as signs of 
divinity, this kind of belief system is preferable to modern scientific inquiry, which has gone 
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too far in looking for law on Earth instead—and then construing natural signs as a denial of 
God’s presence. “Pan” is a particularly charged figure here, representative of the classical 
dispensation as a whole as Triton is for Wordsworth in “The World Is Too Much with Us” 
(1807), in part because “pan” also means “all.” Pan is a figure with which EBB demonstrates 
discomfort over the course of her poetic career, perhaps because of the lascivious goat-god’s 
association with male poets’ inspiration and creation, regardless of the appropriation of 
nature and deprivileging of the feminine that are endorsed by the Pan myth.
421
 In EBB’s 
Poems of 1844, she insisted “The Dead Pan” be placed last in volume two for emphasis; in 
that poem, the refrain “Pan is dead” changes from a lament for the deaths of multiple Greek 
gods to a celebration of the ascent of Christ—into Heaven and into Western culture.422 Note 
that in the above passage from Aurora Leigh Christianity is not presented as a stage in the 
inquiry between the classical and the modern or between the natural and the divine; it is 
almost as though modern thinkers have skipped a step, the most important step for Aurora 
and for EBB in moving beyond an early form of natural theology. Geology is targeted for 
epitomizing the failings in modern inquiry, and the strata that such explorations expose are 
quotidian, a sharp contrast to the progression of precious stones at the end of the verse-novel 
that also compose the foundations of New Jerusalem in Revelation 21:18-20: jasper, 
sapphire, chalcedony, and amethyst (9. 962-64). 
 If classical and modern thinkers are antithetical but both short-sighted, largely 
because of misplaced religious loyalties, Aurora the poet represents the way out of the 
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conundrum. When she first came to England, she felt abandoned by God (1.659-60) but 
learns to find Him in nature; gesturing to the beauty of the English countryside as evidence, 
she declares to Romney, “And see! Is God not with us on the earth? / And shall we put Him 
down by aught we do?” (1.1135-36). Nature must be appreciated as evidence of God, and 
God must be found there by the poet—not denied by the scientist.423  
The Politics of Socialism, Secular and Christian 
Closely related to the issue of religion in Vestiges and Aurora Leigh is that of politics. 
In Aurora Leigh, EBB takes issue with the imposition of a Socialist sociopolitical 
interpretative schema on areas traditionally reserved for religion, and positions the poet as the 
figure of interpretative authority over the scientist. Vestiges was taken up by Socialists as 
evidence that human beings are naturally biologically equal, a conclusion that could readily 
transfer from the natural to the social world. The leap from natural laws of development to 
social structures is not great; even much of the language is the same (think of the taxonomic 
categories of kingdom, class, order, family, etc.). Chambers writes about the undifferentiated 
universal mass in which all bodies in the universe originated: “The nebular hypothesis almost 
necessarily supposes matter to have originally formed one mass. We have seen that the same 
physical laws preside over the whole….the constitution of the whole was uniform” (27). 
Originally, everyone and everything is equal—even uniform—and unseparated. Chambers 
includes passages in Vestiges that say in a scientific context what radicals were saying in a 
social one: “No individual being is integral or independent; he is only part of an extensive 
piece of social mechanism” (353). He directly undercuts justifications for social hierarchy: 
“The inferior mind, full of rude energy and unregulated impulse, does not more require a 
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superior nature to act as its master and its mentor, than does the superior nature require to be 
surrounded by such rough elements on which to exercise its high endowments as a ruling and 
tutelary power” (353). Despite all his statements that seem to support radical political 
agendas, however, Chambers’s solution for social ills is deeply unsatisfactory: “Thinking of 
all the contingencies of this world as to be in time melted into or lost in the greater system, to 
which the present is only subsidiary, let us wait the end with patience, and be of good cheer” 
(386). Personally, Chambers believed that development in nature provided evidence for 
inevitable political progress as well, though he did not go so far as to endorse Socialist 
agendas.
424
 
 Mid-century Socialists saw science in general, and Vestiges in particular, as a means 
to deprivilege those in power, as progressivist evolutionary theory could discredit the 
traditional idea that God created a hierarchal universe and that all individuals should stay in 
their divinely-appointed roles; in Vestiges, change is inherent to the progress of the 
universe.
425
 In the 1820s and 30s, London working-class districts were Socialist strongholds; 
by the 1840s, frustrated and disillusioned working-class Socialists increasingly turned to 
atheism.
426
 As Desmond observes, “The confrontationist policy of the atheists led them to 
place science (‘systematized facts’) in opposition to religion (‘systematized folly’) for 
strategic reasons.”427 At this point, English Christian Socialism, of which Charles Kingsley 
was a prominent proponent, increasingly garnered public interest. Christian Socialists 
intended “not to destroy the present social system and build anew but rather to eliminate 
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some of its inequalities and harsh features…considered inconsistent with Christian 
principles,” in contrast to French atheist Socialists, such as Charles Fourier, who critiqued 
harm done to workers by laissez-faire policies
428
: 
In place of competition he proposed to substitute cooperation and advocated a new 
system which, he thought, would allow a fuller expression of human impulses. 
According to his plan, society was to be divided into self-sufficient economic units 
called phalanges, each having about sixteen hundred persons, who were to be allowed 
to devote themselves to any occupations they found congenial.
429
 
 
Aurora Leigh is persistently hard on Fourier, and demonstrates the impossibility of 
implementing Socialist doctrines, no matter how small the scale or Christian the intent. 
EBB was a Whig in sympathy with the dominant liberal ideology of her age, 
believing that the suffering of the oppressed and disenfranchised needed to be ameliorated 
politically.
430
 Her more specific political positions tend to be nuanced: she saw herself as a 
democrat and egalitarian and she was invested in Italian revolution, but she also supported 
the restoration of French monarchy (because she focused on the overwhelmingly popular 
vote that supported Louis Napoleon’s coup d’état). Consistently throughout her life, in spite 
of her political broadmindedness, she has nothing good to say about Socialism or Socialists. 
Her vehemence about the subject, and frequency discussing it, increased in the early 1850s, 
when she was planning Aurora Leigh at the same time that Socialists were using people’s 
editions of Vestiges to forward their causes. Socialism, she writes in letters to family and 
friends, interferes with the progress of republicanism
431
; she is impatient with Socialism 
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because she believes it to be impossible to institute or realize “out of a dream.”432 EBB was 
disturbed by Socialists’ goal of altering “the elemental conditions of humanity” by 
eliminating competition among groups and individuals, “none of them seeing that 
antagonism is necessary to all progress”; because of her Christian faith, she could not believe 
“in <purification> without suffering, in progress without struggle, in virtue without 
temptation.”433 Perhaps her most eloquent denouncement of Socialism follows: “I love 
liberty so intensely that I hate Socialism. I hold it to be the most desecrating & dishonoring to 
Humanity, of all creeds. I would rather (for me) live under the absolutism of Nicolas of 
Russia, than in a Fourier-machine, with my individuality sucked out of me by a social air-
pump.”434 Her fear here has to do with the way that Socialist ideology leaves no place for 
individuality. For EBB, Socialism is a quieting of the poetic voice, even of the ability to 
recognize the value of the individual poetic dialect. She had kind things to say about 
individual Socialists, however, such as Margaret Fuller and Charles Kingsley (perhaps the 
model for the character of Romney), even writing of the latter “few men have pleased me 
more.”435  
 Romney Leigh is presented from early in Aurora Leigh as being plagued by guilt at 
his class privilege. His inheritance is described as a “nightmare [that] sate upon his youth” 
and tormented him “with a ghastly sense / Of universal hideous want and wrong / To 
                                                          
 
432 Qtn. from EBB to Isa Blagden [10 November 1850] (BC, XVI, 228-29). See also BC, XVI, 228-29 and  XV, 
105. 
 
433 EBB to Julia Martin [27 February 1852] (BC, XVIII, 42-43); EBB to Isa Blagden [10 November 1850] (BC, 
XVI, 228-29). 
 
434 EBB to Mary Russell Mitford [June 14-15 1850] (BC, XVI, 138); original emphasis. 
 
435
 EBB to Eliza Anne Ogilvy [3 September 1852] (BC, XVIII, 208). See also BC, XVIII, 42-43 and XVI, 143. 
On Kingsley as Romney, see Kaplan, 30-31; Laird, 355. 
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incriminate possession” (1.517, 519-21). As discussed earlier in this chapter, Romney is 
clearly no atheist; he works to turn his ancestral home into a phalanstery “christianised from 
Fourier’s own,” mainly, it seems, by rejecting the notion of free love in these communes (5. 
784, 735-38). His project soon fails, as the Shropshire locals and imported phalansterians 
alike participate in burning Leigh Hall to the ground (8. 917-18, 961-63). His Socialist 
projects’ failure arises in part from his inability to adequately judge the needs and capacities 
of those he brings into his commune, as he acknowledges afterwards:  
My vain phalanstery dissolved itself;  
My men and women of disordered lives,  
I brought in orderly to dine and sleep,  
Broke up those waxen masks I made them wear,  
With fierce contortions of the natural face, –  
And cursed me for my tyrannous constraint  
In forcing crooked creatures to live straight. (8.888-94) 
Romney here finds that it is futile to alter appearances rather than nature; nature inexorably 
asserts itself in the end. The fault does not lie solely with the poor’s character, however; 
Romney also fails because his heart is not truly in the projects he commits himself to. Both 
Aurora and Lady Waldemar critique Romney for his hyperrationality. Aurora describes him 
as  
Liv[ing] by diagrams,  
And cross[ing] out the spontaneities  
Of all his individual, personal life  
With formal universals. (3.744-47) 
He may be a writer, but as a precise bookkeeper rather than an inspired poet, like Aurora. 
Before marrying Marian to achieve an ideological end, Lady Waldemar wants him to “take 
heed, / This virtuous act must have a patent weight, / Or loses half its virtue” (3.635-42). In 
his Christian Socialist mode, Romney is cold and calculating rather than the passionate man 
of Books 8 and 9, which we are led to believe is his authentic self. In trying to love everyone, 
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making “an almshouse of his heart, / Which ever since is loose upon the latch / For those 
who pull the string,” he ends up truly loving and helping no one (5.576-78). His Socialist 
passions are described as a kind of mania, taking him away from the more devotional 
passions of nature and God that Aurora endorses (3.584-99); commenting on Romney’s 
proposal of Book 2, Aurora notes the disjunction between her cousin who is “overfull / Of 
what is,” while she is “haply, overbold / For what might be” (1.1108-10). One would assume 
that a social activist would be focused on “what might be,” on the change and progress, but it 
seems that Romney never looks for grander achievements than immediate “practical stuff of 
partial good” (2.1225). As Kenneth Burke would put it, the “social motives implicit” in 
verbal systems always need to be interrogated, as they form the bond between intentions and 
effects, between words and behaviors.
436
 
By the end, blind, homeless, and publicly humiliated, Romney acknowledges 
“Fourier’s void” (9.868), the same conclusion that Aurora had come to years before when she 
told him “your Fouriers failed, / Because not poets enough to understand / That life develops 
from within” (2.483-85). Too pragmatic, too focused on the conditions of physical life, 
Socialism overlooks the importance of the mind and spirit. Interestingly, the home that 
Aurora builds in Italy resembles a phalanstery built on the Fourier model: a heterogeneous 
group of people, all coming together to seek shelter from the overly harsh society outside its 
walls, cooperating while pursuing their own interests and sharing resources. It is perhaps the 
way that these ends are achieved in Aurora’s home that makes the difference: Aurora, 
Romney, Marian, and her son are not fitted into a system, but remain distinct individuals 
seeking their commune of sorts naturally and spontaneously.
437
 At times the critique of 
                                                          
436 Burke, 378. 
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Socialism in Aurora Leigh does treat Romney and Aurora as “not living characters but 
mouthpieces for the expression of many of the author’s ideas,” but it is inarguable that EBB’s 
message is clear and decisive: no Socialism, springing from either Vestigian secularism or 
Christian motives, can be realized successfully.
438
  
Progressive Development: The Individual vs. Species, the Scientist vs. Poet 
Chambers’s Vestiges, as previously mentioned in this chapter, can be seen as a 
scientific Bildungsroman, presenting a narrative history that tracks the growth of Earth from 
its nebular origins “through the various stages which we see in…rudimental” life, developing 
with increasing “degrees of perfectness” (20, 240). Chambers’s vision reflects the period’s 
Whig faith in constant, linear progress. Immensely optimistic in a time marked by vast and 
unprecedented social changes, Whigs tended to view history as at a high point at the current 
moment, the culmination and apex of time’s movement onward and upward.439 Chambers’s 
system is one that treats the current moment on Earth as the most perfect and humans as the 
highest form of life, that “best adapted to the present state of things in the world” (276). But 
Chambers concludes that natural processes “are still and at present in progress” on the Earth 
(21; original emphasis). Humanity is not the end type of nature, “but the initial of the grand 
crowning type,” to be followed by “species superior to us in organization, purer in feeling, 
more powerful in device and act, and who shall take a rule over us….There may then be 
occasion for a nobler type of humanity, which shall complete the zoological circle on this 
planet, and realize some of the dreams of the purest spirits of the present race” (276).440 It is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
437 The importance of means versus ends in the Socialist debate is suggested by Donaldson, 300 n1. 
438 Taplin, 333. 
 
439
 Millhauser, Just Before Darwin, 78. 
 
440 Chambers’s ideas here have pronounced echoes in the Epilogue of In Memoriam. 
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easy here to see the influence of the rhetorical figure of incrementum (a progressive or 
ordered list) in Whig ideology and Vestiges’s developmental system: both have a positive 
linear trajectory. 
 Simon Avery has noted that in the 1820s and 30s, particularly leading up to the 
passage of the First Reform Bill, EBB’s writing demonstrates Whig ideology; in the 1840s 
and 50s, however, “she became more cautious and wary about the power of history as a 
political tool as time went on. Indeed, this is particularly true of her post-1844 writings when 
her initial optimism about the idea of progress became much more tempered and 
qualified.”441 Her poetry of the 1840s in particular demonstrates her questioning of whether 
the impact on individuals of such nineteenth-century institutions as industrialization and 
slavery really upheld Whig notions of development and progress.
442
 Aurora Leigh epitomizes 
EBB’s mixed feelings about progress: Aurora develops intellectually and morally, and the 
poem holds out hope for individuals such as Marian who are oppressed by society’s ills, but 
the work also critiques both Whig notions of social progress and Chambers’s particular 
vision of development. 
 It seems that by Book 2, the proposal scene, Romney Leigh has read Vestiges, a 
reasonable assumption given that current events listed in Book 4 (lines 398-406) date the 
narrative events to 1846-48, which Aurora tells us in Book 3 was three years after the 
proposal (line 161). Evolution is not a positive process, Romney argues, and the idea of the 
human species developing into a higher form is not reassuring: 
…Observe, – it had not much  
Consoled the race of mastodons to know,  
Before they went to fossil, that anon  
                                                          
441 Avery, “Mapping Political History,” 18-20, qtn. from 18. 
 
442 Avery, “Mapping Political History,” 26. 
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Their place would quicken with the elephant;  
They were not elephants but mastodons;  
And I, a man, as men are now and not  
As men may be hereafter, feel with men  
In the agonising present. (2.294-304) 
 
The mastodon, a new symbol for Cuvier and Byron (as discussed in chapter 1) has here 
become a broadly accepted figure for extinction.
443
 A better state in the future is not 
comforting for those who live and suffer in the present, particularly when it leaves modern 
humans behind. EBB’s strategic use of antitheses is clear in this passage. The mastodon and 
elephant are paired without a moderating, intermediate form; mammoths are not even 
mentioned as a third species that would make the antithesis more closely resemble an 
incrementum. Moreover, the present and future are presented as oppositional states, without a 
progressive vision that proceeds by stages. The contrast highlights Romney’s extreme 
thinking, but also his failure to imagine transitions. Romney is punished, in the end, by the 
loss of his home and sight for his chosen method of instituting his social vision, but not 
necessarily for the mission itself. Romney aspires to improve society through sheer force of 
will, “to take the world upon [his] back” in order to “make earth over again” (4.1076-80, 
3.118-20). In trying to skip ahead in the evolutionary schema, he has failed to realize that 
progress comes by discrete steps rather than by leaps. The poor—represented so negatively in 
groups throughout the book, as resurrected corpses (4.547-50), snakes (4.556-73), “crooked 
creatures” (8.894), and the stuff of nightmares (4.598)—are the products of such terrible 
conditions that they cannot be improved as a group suddenly.
444
 Time is required to achieve 
                                                          
443 The mastodon also appears as a symbol of lost times in Tennyson’s “The Epic,” which frames “Morte 
d’Arthur” (1842). 
 
444
 EBB has been taken to task for her presentation of the working class in Aurora Leigh. Shannon and Stone 
note that EBB uses the language of contemporaneous social reformers and anxious middle-class Victorians 
in the work, which may or may not reflect her personal views (42-49; Elizabeth Barrett Browning, 163). 
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such ends; “seven generations,” in Romney’s final estimation (8.742). In the meantime, 
however, Marian and others like her are capable of improvement as individuals. Lady 
Waldemar, in a conversation with Marian later recounted to Aurora, denies the possibility of 
social change by denying the possibility of species change: 
You take a pink,  
You dig about its roots and water it  
And so improve it to a garden-pink,  
But will not change it to a heliotrope,  
The kind remains. (6.1044-48) 
But Lady Waldemar is proved wrong by the end of the book, as Marian, transformed by her 
maternity, is in fact improved and evolved.
445
 Evolution is possible, but only through 
individuals, not through species, and the steps are distinct rather than inherently gradated. 
 Aurora defines her take on evolutionary progress differently than Romney does, 
focusing on the role of poets in creating a more useful worldview than scientists and 
philosophers.
446
 Like Romney, Aurora uses the mastodon as a symbol; in her case, it 
represents her father’s books, the collected wisdom and knowledge of past generations, as 
she describes herself  
…creeping in and out  
Among the giant fossils of my past,  
Like some small nimble mouse between the ribs  
Of a mastodon. (1.835-38) 
Romney and Aurora share a paleontological vocabulary, but use it to different ends: Romney 
for a social vision, Aurora for a personal and intellectual one. Here the mastodon contrasts 
not with the exotic elephant but with the quotidian mouse; the mouse, in turn, has a fluid 
movement, crawling in and out of the fossil bones, unlike the elephant, which called up in 
                                                          
445 Such spiritual evolution, Ridenour argues, has resonances both with Browning’s Paracelsus and Tennyson’s 
“Locksley Hall” (27). See also Thorne-Murphy (242) on Aurora’s vision of spiritual development. 
 
446
 Giles notes that the narrative serves as a marker of Aurora’s awareness that she will evolve (125). 
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abstraction by Romney, seems to stand stiffly beside the mastodon like a museum display. 
Aurora finds the idea that her own time is just a step in the development in the world to be 
unproductive because it suggests that the current moment is meaningless from the 
perspective of the future: 
An age of mere transition, meaning nought  
Except that what succeeds must shame it quite  
If God please. That’s wrong thinking, to my mind,  
And wrong thoughts make poor poems. (5.163-66) 
Transition is unimaginable because it necessarily means contrast—the present with the 
future—as a human can live in only one moment at a time, not in a blur of moments building 
seamlessly to the future. The current moment is exactly what poets and philosophers should 
be focused on, both in EBB’s and Aurora’s opinions, “to represent” “this live, throbbing age” 
(5.200, 203). Aurora argues that poets rather than scientific thinkers like Chambers are most 
capable of representing humankind and its place in the world accurately. She asserts that 
poets are “The only speakers of essential truth, / Opposed to relative, comparative, / And 
temporal truths,” 
The only teachers who instruct mankind  
From just a shadow on the charnel-wall  
To find man’s veritable stature out  
Erect, sublime, – the measure of a man,  
And that’s the measure of an angel, says  
The apostle. Ay. (1.859-62, 64-69) 
 
Chambers ridiculed the view that humans were one step below angels and so more like them 
than orangutans, to which they bear a closer “resemblance of analogy” and so a clear “certain 
relation” (266).447 As the foregoing passage indicates, poetry not only exceeds the relativistic 
and time-bound perspective of Vestiges, but poets, unlike Chambers, treat humanity as 
                                                          
447 The angel was an image that EBB engaged with repeatedly over her career (Riede, 91). 
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divine.
448
 The mechanistic world presented in Vestiges was, as Millhauser describes it, one 
“in which man was an animal and an animal was a chemical machine—a world in which 
statistics took the place of miracle, and probability of an immortal soul.”449 Such a world and 
such a vision of humanity are repugnant to Aurora, who criticizes Romney for trying to “feel 
by millions” (3.750).450 After all, Aurora Leigh is the story of the development of the 
narrator, not of the mass of Italian émigrés, female poets, or Victorians in general. The poet 
addresses more than physical forms, like those Chambers relies on for his argument about the 
relatedness of all animal life, and realizes that “…Without the spiritual, observe, / The 
natural’s impossible, – no form, / No motion: without sensuous, spiritual / Is inappreciable” 
(7.773-76). As problematic as Aurora’s renunciation of direct, personal intervention in social 
problems like poverty might be, as she claims that she is “incapable to loose the knot / Of 
social questions,” (2.339-40), her turn to poetry is a turn to individualism.451 And with this 
turn to individualism, comes a turn to the individual’s relationship with God and nature, 
which are necessary for Aurora “to be a complete artist and…a complete person.”452 She 
comes to claim—and Romney to agree with her—that  
’Tis impossible  
To get at men excepting through their souls,  
However open their carnivorous jaws;  
And poets get directlier at the soul,  
Than any of your economists: – for which  
                                                          
 
448 EBB sees poets as prophets for the age; see Reynolds, 13; Thorne-Murphy, 242. 
 
449 Millhauser, Just Before Darwin, 164. 
 
450
  “EBB often criticized the socialists’ focus on people mainly as members of groups” (Donaldson, 277 n27). 
Schatz further notes that Romney’s failure is that “he does not understand that the personal is political, that 
an individual’s actions towards other individuals are the basis for social change” (96). 
 
451 Reynolds comments that “In Aurora Leigh the woman question and the discussion concerning socialism are 
both made subservient to the reiterated arguments for individual liberty and self-recognition” (18). 
 
452 Camp, 62. 
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You must not overlook the poet’s work  
When scheming for the world’s necessities. (8.537-43) 
A poet’s place is to address the soul of an individual reader and enlighten him or her; 
combined with Romney’s social mindedness in their union at the end of the narrative, such a 
human-driven and individual-centered vision presents EBB’s alternative to Vestiges’s system 
of development. 
And so it might be appropriate to conclude a discussion of EBB’s position regarding 
Vestiges, as she took her place in the cultural and literary conversation so much dominated by 
male voices, with words of Aurora’s girlhood, as she works through her anxiety caused by 
reading particularly troublesome books: 
…All this anguish in the thick of men’s opinions . . press and counterpress,  
Now up, now down, now underfoot, and now  
Emergent . . all the best of it, perhaps,  
But throws you back upon a noble trust  
And use of your own instinct, – merely proves  
Pure reason stronger than bare inference  
At strongest. (1.801-8) 
EBB seems to be demonstrating in Aurora Leigh that she thoroughly understands the system 
that Chambers builds in Vestiges, as well as its implications on a number of social, natural, 
and philosophical levels; unlike Tennyson, however, she finds Vestiges’s “ bare inference[s]” 
(a phrase used by Chambers in the 1853 preface to critique the unsatisfying generalities of 
scriptural geologists, and now turned on him) unconvincing and ultimately irreconcilable 
with what her “own instinct” and “pure reason” tell her about the world in which she found 
herself. 
CONTINUING INFLUENCE: ROBERT BROWNING AND CHARLES DARWIN 
 The obvious question to be asked of a study of EBB’s contribution to a literary 
cultural conversation about Chambers’s Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation would 
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be, what about Robert Browning? What was his response to Vestiges, the ideological issues 
that it raised, the cultural viewpoints that it shifted, and the epistemological claims that it 
made? As scholarship on nineteenth-century science and literature has been so dominated by 
studies of Darwin’s influence, most scholarship on Browning and evolutionary theory has 
similarly focused on Darwinian theory, mostly arguing that it had at best extremely limited 
influence on Browning’s poetry. A handful of critics, however, have focused particularly on 
the role Chambers’s ideas might have played in Browning’s literary productions. Of 
particular note are Browning’s Luria (1846), in which a tangential passage (V.235-42) 
directly denies Chambers’s claim that God engaged in one act of creation, leaving 
development to proceed according to natural laws; and Christmas Eve and Easter Day 
(1850), in which Browning’s portrayal of the German professor demonstrates his rejection of 
scientific claims to religious authority.
453
  
By far, though, the Browning poem most frequently discussed in relation to 
evolutionary theory is “Caliban upon Setebos: Natural Theology in the Island” (1864, three 
years after EBB’s death). In this dramatic monologue, Caliban, the character from 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest, muses on the vindictiveness of the god Setebos. The subtitle and 
the epigraph, “Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such a one as thyself” (Psalm 50.21)—
which stands as a critique in His voice of an anthropomorphic vision of God—have long 
been taken to indicate Browning’s rejection of the project of natural theology as limited and 
limiting, solipsistic even in its attempts to know the Almighty through scientific study.
454
 
Chambers, as the anonymous author of Vestiges, had in 1846 had expressed his belief that 
introspection and examination of nature could offer insight into God’s workings and 
                                                          
453 Millhauser, “Robert Browning,” 16; Stevenson, 149-50. 
 
454 Erickson, 218; Peterfruend, 323, 326.  
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characteristics, making him the figure most associated with the natural theological project in 
the early 1860s, when the taint of atheism had faded from his work and Darwin surpassed his 
theory in technical expertise.
455
 Browning was never convinced that the study of nature could 
provide insights into the human condition or God’s nature, and by his personal belief in an 
inherently loving God, Caliban’s theology and cosmogony (and by extension that of natural 
theologians and Chambers) must be found lacking.
456
 Browning’s Caliban has often been 
thought of as a Darwinian missing link, the evolutionary step between an ape and a primate, 
but it must be remembered that at the time Browning wrote the monologue, Darwin had not 
yet published his endorsement of the theory of humanity’s primate descent—that would 
come in 1871 with The Descent of Man.
457
 Chambers’s earlier Vestiges, in addition to 
offering the theory of primate descent to popular audiences, also frequently recurred to the 
notion of intermediate fossil species, containing the characteristics of multiple modern 
species. Caliban for both Shakespeare and Browning is not just a primitive human or racial 
Other, but a man-fish, an evolutionary intermediary.
458
 Stuart Peterfruend has offered the 
most persuasive interpretation of “Caliban upon Setebos” as critiquing Vestiges in this vein, 
calling Caliban himself a vestige of the natural history of creation—a living fossil.459 So if 
Caliban is a Vestigian vestige, the island of the subtitle can be read as Victorian Britain, 
                                                          
455 Campbell, 206; Peterfruend, 318-19. 
 
456 Loesberg, 871.Browning believed that the divine was accessible only beyond, not through, nature (Poston 
429). 
 
457 See, for example, Howard and Timko.  
 
458 See Trinculo’s speech in The Tempest II.ii.24-36. The man-fish was an evolutionary symbol for Hopkins and 
Arnold as well; see Chambers, “Spiritual Incompleteness,” 123. See also Millhauser, “Literary Impact,” 226. 
 
459 Peterfruend, 319. 
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wracked by natural theology and history debates in Browning’s age.460 Thus in Caliban 
Browning turns to an Early Modern literary work to make his own literary intervention in 
nineteenth-century cultural debates about science, obliquely voicing his ideas through that of 
a dramatic persona who bears the weight of Browning’s message. In this strategy, he is 
apparently sharing a vision of literary intervention with Aurora Leigh, published nine years 
earlier. 
 Scholars of nineteenth-century literary, scientific, and cultural history still struggle to 
consider Chambers’s contribution outside of the Darwinian context. Vestiges is often 
described by scholars as “anticipating” On the Origin of Species, “absorb[ing] a number of 
the roughest blows that might otherwise have fallen on Darwin’s shoulders,” and “open[ing] 
the way for Darwin’s decidedly not anonymous, more respectable, and therefore more 
acceptable version of evolution.”461 These views of Vestiges are understandable, if 
Darwinism is acknowledged as the lens through which history is being viewed. But without 
such acknowledgement, the bias in this version of history is made invisible. As Secord has 
demonstrated persuasively, Vestiges may have been a more important influence on public 
debate about and understanding of evolutionary theory than Origin. Victorian contemporaries 
did not necessarily see Darwin as the pinnacle of scientific achievement of the century, but 
rather a respected scientific theorizer who was rephrasing Chambers’s ideas.462 Darwin was 
well aware of the importance of Vestiges, carefully following reviews through at least the 
sixth edition, strategizing about how to prevent the same critiques being leveled at his own 
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work.
463
 Darwin particularly tried to avoid progressivist phrasing because of his close study 
of Chambers’s critical reception, making notes to use a term like “more complicated” instead 
of describing an organism as “higher” in its development.464 Darwin’s major success with 
Origin was not in convincing scientific or general readers of natural selection (it signally 
failed to do so), or in familiarizing readers with the notion of law-bound biological evolution 
(Chambers’s Vestiges had accomplished that), but rather in restructuring public and 
professional discussion about evolution under the respectable umbrella of “Darwinism.”465 It 
is to such discussion that we turn in the next chapter, focusing particularly on Elizabeth 
Gaskell’s Sylvia’s Lovers (1863). 
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Chapter 3: 
“Working through Darwin’s Origin: Elizabeth Gaskell’s Sylvia’s Lovers as a Novel of 
Evolutionary Despair” 
 
 In November 1859, Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural 
Selection was first published; in that same month, Elizabeth Gaskell traveled to the Yorkshire 
coast to find inspiration for the novel project that ended up becoming Sylvia’s Lovers (1863). 
Gaskell’s Wives and Daughters (1864-65) is often discussed as partially inspired by Darwin, 
mostly because she remarked that the character of the heroic adventurer Roger Hamley was 
partly based on Charles Darwin, to whom she was related by marriage.
466
 No scholars have 
more than mentioned the possibility that Sylvia’s Lovers might consider the implications of 
Darwinian theory. This omission could, in part, be due to Wives and Daughters’s generally 
positive take on natural history and those who practice it, whereas Sylvia’s Lovers is 
frequently described as “the saddest story [she] ever wrote.”467 I argue that by the time that 
Gaskell worked through the doubts and depression inspired by Darwin’s Origin, she was able 
to write a novel of evolutionary triumph in Wives and Daughters; Sylvia’s Lovers, on the 
other hand, is the record of Gaskell’s own struggle with evolutionary theory.
                                                          
466 See, for example, Corbett, 144-73; and Dewitt. 
 
467 This saying is attributed to Gaskell. See, for example, Foster, 161; and Gérin, 214. Foster does note, 
however, that the source of this quotation has never been firmly established (192 n63). For some examples 
of scholarship focusing on Gaskell’s positive attitudes towards naturalist practices in Mary Barton (1848), 
see King, “Taxonomical Cures”; and Coriale.  
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 Recovering Gaskell’s pessimism about Darwinian theory—and by that term I mean 
not only the words that Darwin published but also the cultural perceptions of his text and 
ideas—reveals complications in her supposedly confident theological views and links her 
writing with that of the likes of Mary Shelley (as discussed in chapter 1) and Thomas Hardy 
(as will be discussed). Sylvia’s Lovers, Gaskell’s most overlooked novel, contains her 
realizations that the human is diminished in a vision of deep geological time and that 
Darwin’s vision of repetition with minor variations that may or may not successfully adapt to 
environmental pressures means that people are fated to suffer a repetition of tragedies 
premised on social and gender inequalities. Darwinian theory offers a number of examples to 
avoid simple antitheses that Jeanne Fahnestock notes can operate to push concepts apart to 
poles of opposition
468; Darwin’s vision of evolution is one that cannot allow large divisions 
in organisms or environments and instead presents a nearly infinitely gradated population. 
Gaskell resolves the seeming antitheses of the human world, such as the masculine and 
feminine, land and sea, commercial and rural, by thrusting her characters in the middle and 
forcing them to breach the gap through individual and communal identities, neither of which 
allow for simple irreconcilable oppositions.
469
 Both Darwin and Gaskell, however, avoid 
giving direction or incrementum to their terms and so avoid any promise of development or 
dramatic change.
470
  
 Leo J. Henkin argues in Darwinism in the English Novel (1963) that it took until at 
least 1869—ten years after Origin was published—for British novelists to begin to “make 
use of Darwin’s scientific doctrine,” once the controversy had died down, leading to what he 
                                                          
468 Fahnestock, 87. 
 
469 On overcoming antitheses in scientific arguments, see Fahnestock, 89-90. 
 
470 On the function of incrementum in scientific writing, see Fahnestock, 90-95. 
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sees as the height of the Darwinian novel from 1870 to 1890.
471
 Henkin further argues that 
novels that made use of evolution and natural selection tended to be novels of religious 
disbelief that highlighted “the pitiless waste that marks the struggle for existence, and 
nature’s lack of concern for individuals”; this pessimism transitioned into the more optimistic 
scientific romances of the 1890s by H. G. Wells and others.
472
 Although Darwin did try to 
emphasize a more positive view of evolutionary processes in Origin, natural selection can be 
interpreted pessimistically by focusing on the violence inherent in the theory.
473
 As Gillian 
Beer points out, Darwinian evolution depends on “hyperproductivity, upon a fertility beyond 
use or number,” and selection of only a handful of those organisms to survive and 
reproduce—hardly an uplifting vision of nature.474 Although Henkin points out some readers 
“have been led to attend more to the element of chance and conflict,” George Levine notes 
that “not all Victorians saw his world as so bleakly competitive or individualistic.”475 This 
push and pull in critical interpretation of Origin’s impact suggests that any generalizations 
about Darwinian theory’s impact on Victorian society or on contemporaneous readers are 
neither useful nor accurate. Natural selection’s implications are so wide reaching, and Origin 
is such a substantial text, that processing the theory could be lengthy and difficult for an 
individual, and dramatically oppositional interpretations could arise quite easily. 
Consequently, the arguments that Elizabeth Gaskell was not engaging in the lively debates 
                                                          
471 Qtn. from Henkin, 9. See also Henkin, 113. 
 
472 Henkin, 113-14, 260. 
 
473
 Beer, Darwin’s Plots, xix; Henkin, 197.  
 
474 Beer, Darwin’s Plots, 13. 
 
475 Henkin, 221; Levine, Darwin and the Novelists, 10-11. Tennyson’s In Memoriam (1850) is instructive here, 
as the poem displays a tension about evolution’s implications, especially in the contrast between the despair 
in LX that Nature often only brings one out of fifty seeds to fruition and the optimistic conclusion focusing 
on humans’ spiritual progression. 
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that followed the publication of Darwin’s Origin, or that her writing did not consider the 
implications of Darwinian theory until the more positive vision of Wives and Daughters, 
seem tenuous at best. A careful consideration of Sylvia’s Lovers shows Gaskell applying 
some of the bleakest implications of Darwinian tropes to human society.  
Darwinian tropes that have been discussed by literary critics in the past include 
chance, change and history, ecological and genealogical connections, abundance, and the 
denial of design and teleology.
476
 Tina Young Choi notes that Darwinian contingency 
generated narrative structures with “multiple diverging trajectories and arrays of alternatives” 
that highlighted speculation and encouraged the productions of other writers.
477
 Although it 
has become somewhat fashionable to deny or to minimize Darwin’s influence, Darwin’s 
assimilation of Victorian ideologies with respected scientific theory in language that any 
educated reader could understand facilitated his work’s incorporation into literature.478 As 
such, George Levine argues, Darwin “can be taken as the figure through whom the full 
implications of the developing authority of scientific thought began to be felt by modern 
nonscientific culture.”479 For Gaskell, a Dissenter immersed in intellectual life in the 
scientific hub of Manchester, Darwin’s Origin offered generative, if disheartening, narrative 
possibilities. 
In particular, I argue, Gaskell engaged with the logical, if nihilistic, conclusions of 
such Darwinian tropes as sexual division and competition, the adaptation of organisms to 
                                                          
476 Campbell, “Scientific Discovery,” 59; Choi; Levine, Darwin and the Novelists, 14-20.  
 
477 Choi, 276. Levine lists such, at times contradictory, narratives, as including “progress, competition, 
individualism, eugenics, and the whole assortment of social developments associated with the rise of 
industrial and monopoly capitalism” (Darwin and the Novelists, 10). 
 
478 Beer, “Lineal Descendants,” 280-81; Levine, Darwin and the Novelists, 3 
 
479 Levine, Darwin and the Novelists, 1. 
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their often harsh and destructive landscapes, and the nature and shape of time. In these cases, 
Gaskell demonstrates the bleakness of a Darwinian worldview and the despair Darwin’s 
Origin could invoke in its readers. Her note of resistance to Origin-induced depression 
emerges when Gaskell tackles the issue of death and remembrance in considering what kind 
of narrative best serves humankind’s needs, especially in the face of the contentiousness of 
natural selection. Darwin’s Origin endorses evolutionary narratives in which humans are no 
longer privileged, a single generation’s experiences are essentially meaningless, and very few 
organisms leave any records of their existence behind them. Gaskell, on the other hand, 
upholds oral tradition and the power of historical, fictional narratives to recover and 
recognize the value in human experience. Sylvia’s Lovers, then, ultimately demonstrates the 
value of imaginative literature in working through evolutionary despair. 
CHARLES DARWIN’S ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 
Preceding chapters in this dissertation demonstrate that Darwin’s On the Origin of 
Species was not the first nineteenth-century presentation of evolutionary theory, or even the 
first popular version of the theory.
480
 Charles Darwin was familiar with prior evolutionary 
theories from having read his grandfather’s (Erasmus Darwin’s) Zoonomia; or, the Laws of 
Organic Life (1794-96), Charles Lyell’s discussion of Lamarckian theory in Principles of 
Geology (1830-33), and Thomas Malthus’s theories of population dynamics in An Essay on 
the Principle of Population (1798, ed. 1826).
481
 His theory differed from those that came 
before, Ernst Mayr observes, in that “his concept of evolution required a real genetic change 
                                                          
480 Campbell, “Why Was Darwin Believed?,” 205. 
 
481 Richards, 49; Ruse, “Origin of the Origin,” 2-3. Herbert and Norman note that Lyell’s Principles of Geology 
was the most influential on Darwin’s thought (130-31). 
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from generation to generation, a complete break” with the transformist theories of Lamarck, 
Chambers, and others.
482
 
Darwin wrote up his famous voyage on the H.M.S. Beagle in what became one of the 
most popular travel books of the early Victorian era, making him a household name.
483
 He 
further cemented his science credentials with work on barnacles.
484
 After nearly twenty years 
of mulling over his observations and collecting information from correspondents around the 
world, Darwin published an “abstract” of his theory, On the Origin of Species by Means of 
Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, on 24 
November 1859.
485
 Famously, Darwin was pushed into publishing earlier than he had 
anticipated because a young naturalist, Alfred Russel Wallace, sent him a manuscript in 1858 
that outlined a theory of natural selection extremely similar to Darwin’s; rather than 
suppressing Wallace’s theory, Darwin had Wallace’s work and his own letters to scientific 
correspondents (which established his precedent for the theory) read to the Linnaean 
Society.
486
 Darwin was anxious to get his ideas in print before Wallace could do so, and 
published Origin the following year. The first edition sold out on the day of its release, and 
“a second printing was issued a month later.”487 By 1884, the year of his death, 24,000 copies 
                                                          
482 Mayr, xi. 
 
483
 Ruse, “Origin of the Origin,” 6. 
 
484 See Stott for a description of the importance of Darwin’s study of barnacles in establishing his professional 
reputation. 
 
485 Cited hereafter parenthetically in the text as Origin. Mayr notes that this delay in publishing was caused by 
Darwin’s fear about receiving treatment similar to “the ridicule heaped on Chambers’s” Vestiges (xiv). 
 
486
 Greene, 294. Depew suggests that Darwin had “to intervene in the delicate rhetorical situation created by 
receipt of Wallace’s paper that made the Origin a rhetorical performance on a public stage” (243). 
 
487 Mayr, vii. 
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of six editions of the Origin had been printed in England.
488
 Today, most critics study the 
first edition of Origin (because of its historical interest; because it reads better, not being 
weighted down with revisions; and because revisions often pushed Darwin further down the 
path of Lamarckianism), even though the sixth and final edition (1872) was considered 
definitive at the end of the nineteenth century.
489
 
Rhetorical and Historical Scholarship on Origin 
To come to terms with the body of criticism written on Darwin’s Origin of Species is 
no easy task. Darwin himself is not just among the most written-about figures in history, but 
is probably discussed more than any other scientist.
490
 Those scientists, historians, and 
rhetoricians who take Darwin for their subject are rarely immoderate in their praise for his 
accomplishment: Origin has been called “the most important book of science ever written,” 
one that “continues to gain relevance to the things that matter most to humanity—from our 
own origins and behavior to every detail in the living environment on which our lives 
depend,” “a triumph of scientific thought,” and “a work of sustained genius.”491 A veritable 
Darwin industry exists in the field of rhetoric, and rhetorical analysis has in many ways come 
to dominate Darwin studies. While rhetoricians make a point of not losing sight of the 
Origin’s primary identity as an expository work of science, they nonetheless point out that it 
is clearly intended to persuade and employs a number of strategies to achieve that end.
492
 For 
                                                          
488 Browne, 407. 
 
489
 Qtn. from Ruse, “The Darwin Industry,” 218. See also Ruse, “Origin of the Origin,” 1. I follow current 
critical habit by referring to the first edition in my own analysis contained in this chapter. 
 
490
 Wilson, xvi. Levine claims, “It is arguable that with the exception of Shakespeare, no figure in English 
culture has attracted more attention than Darwin,” and that Darwin is “perhaps the most documented figure 
in world history” (“Reflections on Darwin,” 223; Darwin the Writer, vi).  
 
491 Wilson, xv; Campbell, “Scientific Discovery,” 58, 85. 
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these scholars, the language of the book is of equal importance to the ideas it contains.
493
 In 
his autobiography, Darwin referred to Origin as “one long argument.”494 James Wynn claims 
that chapters one through four of Darwin’s Origin are characterized by “mathematical 
argumentation,” which he identifies as a rhetorical strategy for establishing the theory’s 
“precision, rigor, and correctness” and warding off critiques495; chapters five through 
fourteen, however, are characterized by qualitative evidence.
496
 John Angus Campbell, on the 
other hand, argues that the first five chapters are characterized by “a distinctively domestic 
and familiar air” to make general readers more open to be persuaded by Darwin’s more 
extreme ideas.
497
 This authority, along with the clarity of writing, are the attributes of Origin 
that E. O. Wilson argues were responsible for turning the cultural tide in support of 
evolutionary theory.
498
 The historical context in which Darwin wrote the Origin and in which 
it was received by the public is equally important to those trying to understand Darwin’s 
rhetorical strategies.
499
 Several critics have also pointed out the literary elements of Origin.
500
 
As George Levine claims, Darwin accomplished his ends in Origin “by telling a story—an 
act of imagination that we would now call more tamely a thought experiment—built out of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
492 Bergmann, 79-81; Olby, 31; Schillingsburg, 223. 
493
 Beer, Darwin’s Plots, 34, 46; Mistichelli, 265; Scheick, 271. 
 
494 Qtd. in Lewens, 317. 
 
495 Mayr notes that Darwin felt that “his forerunners had failed miserably to convince their readers because they 
minimized the difficulties” (xv). 
 
496 Wynn, qtn. from 82 (original emphasis), 96; see also 83. 
 
497
 Campbell, “Why Was Darwin Believed?,” 219. Bergmann (83) makes a similar argument. 
 
498 Wilson, xv. 
 
499
 Bergmann, 80; Campbell, “Scientific Discovery,” 59, and “Scientific Revolution,” 351-59; Dawson, 4; 
Levine, Darwin and the Novelists, 2; Schillingsburg, 225. 
 
500
 Beer, Darwin’s Plots, 33; Bergmann, 86; Campbell, “Scientific Discovery,” 85; Depew, 251; King, 
“Reorienting the Scientific Frontier,” 159; Scheick, 279; Levine, Darwin the Writer, 77-100 and Darwin and 
the Novelists, 12, 17, 101, 210. 
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combination of actualism, ignorance, analogy, and strikingly subtle reasoning.”501 Clearly 
this strategy is similar to the novelist’s project, as is his use of central metaphors to structure 
his narrative.  
Darwin’s two most influential metaphors from the Origin are natural selection and the 
entangled bank. Although much of Darwin’s Origin is no longer considered scientifically 
valid, his sustained contribution to evolutionary theory is the idea of natural selection, which 
is metaphorical in that nature is not an agent capable of selection in the same way that human 
breeders artificially select traits in animals.
502
 Darwin defines natural selection, in short, as 
the “preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious variations” (81). This 
process entails the production of variability within organisms, and both the survival and 
successful reproduction of organisms that have variations helpful for success in the struggle 
for existence, helpful for adapting to the ever-changing conditions of life that they face. 
Natural selection can operate on individuals and on groups, and is a very slow process.
503
 
The trouble with the phrase “natural selection,” which critics have been pointing out since 
the 1860s, is its metaphorical quality: it suggests a conscious agency on the part of nature, a 
personification of a force that Darwin contrasts overtly with human selection.
504
 As Levine 
observes, “If the Origin had been a novel, ‘Natural Selection’ would be the good woman, 
who is always helping others and usually gets to marry the hero. ‘Man’ the self-absorbed 
villain, exploits others for his own interests.”505 This is because nature—and natural 
                                                          
501 Levine, Darwin the Writer, 94. 
 
502 Bowler, 7; Mayr, viii. 
 
503 Richards, 60, 64-65. 
 
504 Beer, Darwin’s Plots, 48; Levine, Darwin the Writer, 84; Mistichelli, 264; Richards, 64. 
 
505 Levine, Darwin the Writer, 87. 
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selection—is consistently presented as “morally and intellectually” superior to humankind—
and domestic selection—because “she is not distracted by mere appearances.”506 In some 
ways, this impartiality and justness attributed to natural selection allows Darwin to use nature 
as a surrogate for God, whose intervention Darwin eliminates from his theory of evolution.
507
 
And yet many contemporaries read the natural selection chapter in the Origin as promoting 
brutal competition.
508
 Darwin’s famous concluding image of the “entangled bank” represents 
the interrelation of all living organisms; although the many plants and animals in any given 
ecosystem may seem to exist in a state of chaos, in fact they maintain a delicate balance 
shaped by the law of natural selection, acting over a vast period of time.
509
 This is, as Levine 
puts it, “the famous last extended metaphor of the Origin.”510 The closing passage of Origin 
“remain[ed] unchanged through the several editions of the Origin,” and the peaceful imagery 
of birds and insects flitting about the side of a river obscures the violence inherent in natural 
selection that the book is so explicit about earlier.
511
 
 Darwin’s Origin sparked a controversy that was “in large part carried on in reviews 
and articles in the press, or in lectures and discussions which were in their turn reported in 
the newspapers.”512 Darwin took the critiques of his theory, especially from those he counted 
                                                          
506 Levine, Darwin the Writer, 87. It should be noted that the gendering of nature here is of Darwin’s doing. 
 
507
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Darwin’s Plots, 62-65). 
 
508
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510 Levine, Darwin and the Novelists, 17-18. 
 
511
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as friends, very hard.
513
 The anti-Darwinian camp outnumbered pro-Darwinists, but Darwin’s 
supporters were more organized and, in many ways, more influential, than his opponents.
514
 
Most Victorians made up their minds about Darwin’s book based on their preexisting 
ideologies, rather than on a thorough understanding of the empirical foundation of his 
theory.
515
 The same issues that divided the public’s response to Origin also generated its 
interest in the work: the religious implications of the theory (especially the suggestion that 
there was no need for a Creator in natural history) and the seemingly official scientific 
endorsement of humankind’s animal origins.516 His theory of natural selection was not fully 
accepted by scientific orthodoxy until the twentieth century, although Darwin did succeed in 
gaining popular cultural acceptance of the general idea of evolution in the late nineteenth 
century.
517
 He became a popular icon in the latter part of his life.
518
 Because of the respect 
his accomplishment garnered from his fellow scientists, Darwin was buried in Westminster 
Abbey.
519
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Origin’s Literary Reception 
 Darwin’s Origin made an impact on the literati of the time, many of whom took 
clearly defined sides on the work. As Beer notes, the book “was widely and thoroughly read 
by [Darwin’s] contemporaries,” in part because he drew on “familiar narrative tropes (such 
as leaving the garden, or discovering your ancestry was not what you believed)” that literary 
writers already used in their stories and could reinterpret and redesign in light of his work.
520
 
This narrative resonance was accomplished in large part by Darwin’s use of non-technical 
language and what Beer calls “story-generating words” like “race,” “struggle,” “nature,” 
“fit,” and “family.”521 Origin’s wide-ranging influence can also in part be attributed to its 
distribution strategy: five hundred copies of the first run were sent by the publisher, John 
Murray, to Mudie’s Circulating Library, meaning that at least four times that many 
subscribers likely read the work through that venue.
522
 George Henry Lewes wrote in the 
Cornhill in 1860 “Darwin’s book is in everybody’s hands,” meaning, of course, “everybody” 
considered to be an educated reader at the time.
523
 The first run of Origin sold out on the day 
of publication despite its literary competition, including Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two 
Cities, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, George Eliot’s Adam Bede, William Makepeace 
Thackeray’s The Virginians, and Alfred, Lord Tennyson’s Idylls of the King.524 
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 Quite a few prominent fiction writers praised Origin, including Harriet Martineau and 
Charles Kingsley.
525
 J. S. Mill approved of the rigor of Origin’s philosophical framework.526 
Some of the early science fiction writers, such as Jules Verne and H. G. Wells, were also 
positively inspired by Darwin’s work.527 Eliot’s complicated response to Origin has been 
well documented.
528
 Many other writers were not so positive, including Marx and Engels, 
who called Darwin’s Origin “a ‘bitter satire’ on man and nature”.529 Benjamin Disraeli railed 
against Origin’s materialism in 1864 in a famous speech at Oxford that he later reprinted in 
the General Preface to his Novels (1870); George Gissing rejected the inhumanity of 
Darwin’s vision of the struggle for existence in New Grub Street (1891); and Leo Tolstoy 
used the character Levin in Anna Karenina (1873-77) to attack Darwin’s theory.530 Tennyson 
had ordered a copy of Origin in advance because of his long-standing interest in natural 
history; he was, however, disappointed by the darkness of the theory, characterized as it was 
by constant cruelty and death.
531
 
 Thomas Hardy’s bleak worldview has been widely recognized as informed by 
Darwinian theory, in a way that speaks to Gaskell’s Sylvia’s Lovers more than any of the 
preceding literary responses.
532
 Because of Darwin’s work, for Hardy, human life is ruled in 
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large part by chance and by character traits that prevent an individual from controlling his or 
her own destiny; human beings are fundamentally maladapted as well as insignificant in 
geohistorical timescapes.
533
 Human drives are not inherently evil, but they are consistently 
thwarted.
534
 When people put their faith in nature, they are constantly disappointed because 
nature is indifferent to human concerns and the personal tragedies that individuals blame on 
nature.
535
 Hardy struggles to find a place for the human in the natural order, despite his lack 
of anthropocentrism, but his resistance to the diminishment of humankind to the point of 
irrelevance can be located in his novels’ focus on the significance of the single life span, 
using it as the scale for his plots.
536
 Writing fiction is the site of his recuperation of 
humanism in the face of Darwinism, and this strategy is one shared by Gaskell in Sylvia’s 
Lovers especially.
537
 
ELIZABETH GASKELL 
 Elizabeth Cleghorn Gaskell, née Stevenson, born in 1810, died in 1865 without 
finishing her novel Wives and Daughters (1864-65). Her husband, William Gaskell, was a 
Unitarian minister in Manchester, and it was in Manchester that Elizabeth Gaskell devoted 
much of her life to the profound social need and engaging intellectual life of the city. Gaskell 
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is best known for her quasi-pastoral novel focused on a town largely populated by older 
women, Cranford (1851), or for her social-problem novels that tackle poverty and 
industrialization in Manchester, such as Mary Barton (1848) and North and South (1854-55).  
 Sylvia’s Lovers (1863), Gaskell’s second-to-last novel and her final completed one, is 
very different from her other major works. The novel receives the least critical attention of 
any in her oeuvre.
538
 This neglect might persist because much recent criticism of Gaskell’s 
work has tended to focus on her identities as a “social problem” novelist and as a woman 
writer, and neither of these categories seems useful at first glance for understanding Sylvia’s 
Lovers.
539
 A handful of critics have noted Darwinian elements in the novel, but none have 
devoted any extensive analysis to exploring this connection.
540
 In November of 1859 (the 
same month that Darwin’s Origin was published), Gaskell traveled to Whitby, a small port 
on the Yorkshire coast, both for the sake of her daughter Julia’s health and to accomplish 
research for her novel project.
541
 The idea for a Yorkshire novel, which some critics identify 
as Sylvia’s Lovers, might actually have predated Gaskell’s first published novel, Mary 
Barton.
542
 Other critics trace the genesis of the novel to Gaskell’s meetings in the mid-1850s 
with Rev. William Scoresby,
543
 or to her research for The Life of Charlotte Brontë, which 
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exposed her to Yorkshire landscape and customs.
544
 She was clearly planning the novel by 
October 1859, although she admitted in a letter that “Not a line of the book [was] written” by 
that point.
545
 The extended period of composition may well reflect Gaskell’s difficulties in 
grappling with Darwinian theory.
546
 Sylvia’s Lovers took three years to write, an unusually 
long period by Gaskell’s own standards, a process that can be attributed both to “the 
difficulties of the subject” and the personal problems that Gaskell faced during the three-year 
composition period, including illness and a daughter’s broken engagement.547 And yet there 
are many unexplained gaps in her work schedule: Gaskell told her publisher after her 
November 1859 trip to Whitby that she was inspired by her material and eager to get to work, 
but did not start steadily on the novel until April 1860
548
; the first half of 1861 was even 
more inexplicably unproductive for a writer who always liked to be immersed in a project.
549
 
This slow and jolting progress is one of the reasons cited by critics for the common 
complaint that Sylvia’s Lovers lacks coherence of style, quality, and theme.550  
 Sylvia’s Lovers tells the story of Sylvia Robson, who is being raised on a farm outside 
the Yorkshire whaling port, Monkshaven, by her aged mother and father, Bell and Daniel 
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Robson. Sylvia is a beautiful and vivacious, if strongheaded and illiterate, teenage girl who is 
loved (not so secretly) by her cousin, Philip Hepburn. Philip is a shopman in Monkshaven, 
who eventually inherits the business along with his partner, William Coulson, from the 
Quaker Foster brothers who established it. Philip boards with an older Quaker woman named 
Alice Rose, whose daughter Hester loves Philip silently and works with him in the shop. 
During the Napoleonic Wars, pressgangs take up residence in Monkshaven to impress sailors 
into naval service; one sailor, Charley Kinraid, is nearly fatally shot while trying to defend 
his fellow whalers from this impressment. At the funeral of a sailor who was killed resisting 
impressment, Charley and Sylvia are struck with one another and their courtship soon 
follows, progressing especially after a New Year’s party where Charley steals a kiss from 
Sylvia over a country game. While Bell is inland recuperating from an illness, Daniel 
approves of Charley and Sylvia’s betrothal. Charley is slated for a whaling venture, though, 
and is caught by the pressgang while on his way to meet his ship; Philip, who is himself on 
the way to London on an errand for the Foster brothers, witnesses Charley’s abduction but 
decides to not tell Sylvia that he pledged to be faithful and return to her. Philip’s omission 
happens in part because while Philip is gone in London, the townspeople discover evidence 
that leads them to believe Charley was drowned, and in part because Philip has heard that he 
has a habit of courting and then abandoning attractive young women. The pressgang then 
utterly betray the town’s trust by ringing the Monkshaven fire alarm and capturing the men 
who answer the call; Daniel Robson, who had cut off his own thumb to avoid impressment in 
the American Revolutionary War, leads a riot against the pressgang to free the tricked men. 
For this treason, Daniel is arrested, tried, and hanged. Sylvia and her psychologically 
devastated mother are consequently evicted from their farm, and Sylvia agrees to marry 
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Philip to gain them both a home. After having a daughter, Bella, with Philip, Sylvia is one 
day confronted by Charley, who has returned from naval service a decorated officer; 
overwhelmed with Philip’s betrayal, she swears never to live with Philip as his wife again. 
Philip flees town and enlists with the marines under an assumed name; deployed at the Siege 
of Acre some time later, he carries a wounded Charley off the battlefield, but is subsequently 
disfigured in an accidental explosion on his ship. He is discharged in England, where he 
makes his way back to Monkshaven to be near Sylvia and Bella; en route, he rejects the offer 
of perpetual care in an almshouse. Sylvia meanwhile learns that Charley married a southern 
heiress shortly after discovering her marriage to Philip, which makes her question her 
judgments of the two men. Back in Monkshaven, Philip one day sees Bella fall off a sidewalk 
overlooking the sea and leaps in to save her; although Bella is unharmed, Philip is caught in 
the waves and repeatedly crushed against the cliffside before he can be rescued. Sylvia and 
Philip are reconciled at his deathbed, though the novel ends in Gaskell’s own day, when 
Monkshaven has become largely a tourist town and the story of the book has been distorted 
into a legend of a wife who lived in luxury while her husband died of want nearby; the last 
note is that Bella emigrated to America and nothing is known of her fate. 
 At first glance, the plot of Sylvia’s Lovers might not seem to lend itself to analysis of 
scientific themes and concerns. On the other hand, many critics have discussed Gaskell’s 
final, unfinished novel, Wives and Daughters (1864-65), in terms of Darwinian theory and 
influence.
551
 This is a connection Gaskell indicated herself, as a letter from the time of 
writing identifies the career of the male protagonist, Roger Hamley, with Darwin’s: 
“Roger…works out for himself a certain name in Natural Science,--is tempted by a large 
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offer to go round the world (like Charles Darwin) as a naturalist.”552 Generally, Wives and 
Daughters is read as interpreting Darwinian or other evolutionary theory in optimistic, 
developmental, progressivist terms that are consistent with Gaskell’s previous approach to 
social change.
553
 In these cases, the fit adapt, survive, and pair up, but cooperation and 
compassion provide hope for society as a whole to progress.
554
 There is a countermovement 
in some of the criticism to attribute elements of Gaskell’s novel typically considered 
Darwinian to the intellectual atmosphere out of which both Darwin’s and Gaskell’s work 
arose, or to attribute Gaskell’s evolutionary ideas to other thinkers, like Geoffroy or 
Malthus.
555
 Louise Henson articulates the concern that “stress[ing] that Gaskell was 
responding directly to what Darwin had written” negates “her intellectual independence.”556 
Denying Gaskell’s engagement with the social implications of Darwinian theory at a time 
when it was one of the most pressing concerns of the day, however, seems to diminish her 
timeliness and immersion in a vibrant, scientific atmosphere. Moreover, viewing Gaskell as 
consistently optimistic in her handling of evolutionary ideas over the course of her twenty-
year career also seems to be an oversimplification. Even if she came back to an optimistic 
vision of development and progress in her final completed work, that does not mean that she 
never held a different view, or that her initial response to reading Darwin’s Origin and her 
engagement in the ensuing cultural discourse about it was purely positive. 
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 Whether Gaskell read Darwin’s work directly is debatable. The Darwins and the 
Stevensons were related by marriage through the Hollands and Wedgwoods.
557
 In 1856, 
Gaskell’s daughter Meta spent Easter at Charles Darwin’s home558 and in 1860 went on a 
continental tour with Darwin’s older sister, Catherine,559 whom Elizabeth Gaskell describes 
in a letter as “a distant relation,”560 a phrase that John Chapple says “accurately indicates 
Gaskell’s genteel but hardly intimate connexion with the Darwins.”561 Darwin and Gaskell 
dined together at the Wedgewoods’ in 1851,562 and Gaskell is listed in Francis Darwin’s 
Reminiscences of his father as one of the naturalist’s favorite novelists.563 Although Gaskell 
never refers in her surviving letters to having read Darwin’s Origin, most of her 
correspondence was destroyed during or after her life at her behest; she wanted to thwart 
intrusive biographers.
564
 Her existing letters do, however, reference periodical readings, such 
as the Westminster Review, in which synopses and evaluations of Darwin’s Origin were 
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published.
565
 When her family’s library was sold in 1913, the published record of the 
collection notes that seventeen of the four thousand books sold dealt with “science and 
medicine,” although specific titles (including any by Darwin) are not listed.566 One letter 
from Charles Eliot Norton to Gaskell, dated 26 December 1859 says, “You, I fancy, have not 
read” “the new book of Mr Darwin’s which is exciting the admiration and opposition of all 
our philosophers”; this is an assumption on his part, though, which Carol A. Martin notes 
might be attributable to the newness of the book at the time of writing.
567
 Martin also 
comments, “that Norton goes on to discuss the work suggests, however, that he thought 
Gaskell would be interested in it.”568 This interest could be due in part to Gaskell’s political 
leanings. Throughout the nineteenth century, Dissenters were generally drawn to the 
progressive implications of evolutionary theories, interpreting them as supporting reformist 
agendas that promoted individual self-improvement and general social change.
569
 Both 
Gaskell and Darwin came from prominent Dissenting, liberal families with deep connections 
to scientific endeavors. 
 Gaskell was exposed to scientific figures and ideas for the majority of her life. 
Henson notes that “Elizabeth Gaskell’s famous disclaimers, ‘I am not scientific nor 
mechanical’ and ‘I know nothing of Political Economy,’ are no longer taken at face value. 
Yet the extent to which she was familiar with and actively used scientific ideas in her writing 
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remains a matter of speculation and debate.”570 Throughout her life, Gaskell befriended a 
number of scientists, including a distant relative and scientific polymath, the Rev. William 
Turner; a professor of chemistry at Oxford, Benjamin Brodie; and a professor of natural 
history at Edinburgh, George Allman, who had married a family friend.
571
 Her husband, 
William, had studied science at Manchester New College, and his sister, Eliza Gaskell, was 
also well read and interested in natural history. Upon her move to Manchester after her 
marriage, Gaskell found herself in an atmosphere of “scientific fervor” that transcended class 
boundaries.
572
 In Manchester, William Gaskell was an active member and occasional speaker 
at the Literary and Philosophical Society and so followed scientific innovations closely, 
including discussions of Lyell’s and Chambers’s major works.573 As of 1860, William 
Gaskell was helping to plan a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science, and in September 1861 Elizabeth Gaskell hosted visitors for the British Association 
meeting, even though her husband was out of town.
574
 The Athenaeum, the journal of the 
British Association, was also regularly brought home by William from the local lending 
library.
575
 Moreover, the Gaskells’ circle was very invested in scientific discoveries through 
the 1860s and engaged in passionate debate over Darwin’s Origin “in journals, lecture-halls 
and drawing-rooms.”576 The Origin was so culturally important, that Beer argues “Everyone 
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found themselves living in a Darwinian world….So the question of who read Darwin, or 
whether a writer had read Darwin, becomes only a fraction of the answer” of influence.577 To 
think that Gaskell would have been unaware of, uninterested in, or not thinking about the 
implications of Darwin’s work shortly after its publication is to take a very narrow view of 
her intellectual engagement and timeliness, even if the evidence that she read the book 
firsthand is tentative at best.
578
 
DARWINIAN TROPES IN SYLVIA’S LOVERS 
 A number of particulars throughout Sylvia’s Lovers indicate that Gaskell is engaging 
in a very detailed way with Darwin’s Origin. From the opening page of the novel, fine points 
that might seem innocuous on their own add up to a clear Darwinian framework. For 
example, Gaskell writes on page 1 that the population of Monkshaven was “but half the 
number at the end of the last century.” (1)579 Darwin likewise mentions toward the beginning 
of chapter 3 (“Struggle for Existence”) that “Even slow-breeding man has doubled in twenty-
five years” (64). Darwin frequently uses the adjective “branching” to talk about the shape of 
affinities between living beings; Gaskell likewise describes the “principal street” of 
Monkshaven—its central artery, in a way—as “branched” and “straggl[ing]” (1). “Tangled” 
or “entangled”—another of Darwin’s favorite words, as in his attempts to “disentangle the 
inextricable web of affinities” (434) or the famous closing image of the “entangled bank” 
(489)—shows up in Sylvia’s Lovers, both to describe the surrounding landscape and the 
thoughts of Sylvia herself (4, 76). Darwin has an entire chapter (Chapter 7) on instinct, which 
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he defines as a non-human phenomenon: “An action, which we ourselves should require 
experience to enable us to perform, when performed by an animal, more especially by a very 
young one, without any experience, and when performed by many individuals in the same 
way, without their knowing for what purpose it is performed, is usually said to be instinctive” 
(207). In Sylvia’s Lovers, Philip finds himself guided by “the animal instinct which co-exists 
with the human soul, and sometimes takes strange charge of the human body” (153); instinct, 
in Gaskell’s novel, is imagined to be more essential to human nature than reason, as it is 
“quicker to act” (384), crucial for gaining a mate (329), and necessary for survival when the 
body is put under potentially fatal strain (389).
580
  
Perhaps most importantly, both Darwin’s Origin and Gaskell’s Sylvia’s Lovers tackle 
the issue of contingency. Darwin’s theory of natural selection is popularly understood as 
hinging upon chance—chance adaptations of organisms, chance changes in environment, and 
consequently chance survival.
581
 Herschel famously, and disparagingly, called Darwin’s 
ideas “the law of higgledy-piggledy.”582 Darwin recognizes the temptation to attribute 
complex systems to chance, but instead claims that the natural world is the result of intricate 
laws of interrelations acting beyond our comprehension (74); not knowing causes is not the 
same as chance, “but it serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause of each 
particular variation” (131). Such protestations were clearly not successful in making most 
readers disregard chance as fundamental to Darwin’s theory. As Tina Choi comments,  
[The Origin’s] emphasis on the role of unpredictable and seemingly random events—
the juxtapositions of competing species, for instance, or unforeseen changes in 
climate—in shaping selective pressures was, and still is, one of the most striking and 
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controversial aspects of his work…. [and] seemed to trouble the very condition of 
Victorian narrative itself.
583
 
 
Hardy’s Far from the Madding Crowd, for example, hinges in many ways on a coin toss and 
makes chance central in a Darwinian worldview, thereby minimizing or eliminating the 
consoling equivocation seen in Darwin’s Origin. Gaskell precedes Hardy in committing to 
the bleakness of such Darwinian randomness. Much of Sylvia’s Lovers hinges on chance and 
contingency, for better or for worse: Charley’s capture by the pressgang (218), Philip’s 
oversleeping that prevents him from posting a letter about Charley’s impressment before his 
ship leaves for London (225), Charley’s hat washing ashore and thereby leading Monkshaven 
to believe him drowned (234), Sylvia’s return to her farm after her marriage to gather herbs 
at the moment when Charley is there looking for her after his return from the navy (376), 
Bella’s cry when her mother is about to leave with Charley that persuades her to stay (382), 
Bella’s fascination with Jeremiah Foster’s watch that endears her to him (408), the sunbeam 
that falls on Charley on the battlefield and guides Philip to him (431), the explosion on the 
deck of Philip’s ship that permanently disfigures him (434), Bella’s fall off the cliffwalk into 
the ocean and Philip’s presence at that moment to save her (492). The list could go on and 
on. Moreover, most of these incidents are described in language that highlights the chance 
that underlies them. Gaskell’s insistence on the crucial importance of contingency to plot 
marks this novel as her most Darwinian. 
Landscape and Fossils 
 Critics have frequently noted that Sylvia’s Lovers is Gaskell’s only novel set in a 
landscape where she never lived. In fact, she visited Whitby (the town on which she closely 
based the fictional Monkshaven) only once for a fortnight. Critics have offered several 
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explanations for this uncharacteristic departure from the settings of Manchester or Knutsford, 
most often that Gaskell had become interested in Yorkshire while working on The Life of 
Charlotte Brontë.
584
 But there is more than just its setting in Yorkshire that is striking about 
Gaskell’s use of landscape in Sylvia’s Lovers: Gaskell strove to represent Whitby as exactly 
as possible, making corrections to later editions to be completely geographically accurate
585
; 
Gaskell presents human society as segmented along the lines of the sea, land, and town, 
which are constantly in conflict; and many of the crucial turning points in the plot take place 
in the littoral zone,
586
 which stretches from that part of the ocean that is constantly covered 
by water but where sunlight can still penetrate to the ocean floor to the point just above the 
high tide mark where spray can be felt (including many of the cliffs). These treatments of 
landscape—unique in her oeuvre—can best be understood in light of Darwin’s extensive and 
complicated discussion of the subject in Origin. Setting the novel in the littoral zone of a 
geographically isolated town magnifies the Darwinian principles at play. 
 Whitby is uniquely situated on the northeast English coast between the sea and the 
moors, so that a town historian writing in the 1990s observed that it is as difficult to get to as 
it was in the 1800s, if not more so.
587
 Geographical isolation is an important factor both in 
Darwin’s and in Gaskell’s narrative. For Darwin, isolation affects natural selection by 
maintaining relatively uniform conditions of life in the area, such that “natural selection will 
tend to modify all the individuals of a varying species throughout the area in the same 
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manner in relation to the same conditions” (104). Geographical isolation also impedes 
immigration and, consequently, competition pressures, thus allowing new and unique species 
to develop in the area in question (105). Such effective sequestration of species, however, 
means that “better adapted forms” are blocked from competing for resources there, slowing 
down the process of modification in hard-to-reach areas (108). Isolation is an interesting 
phenomenon, but one that ultimately weakens the local population and will likely come to an 
end when better evolved species finally access any given remote location. 
 Gaskell tells us of Monkshaven’s geographical isolation on the first page of the 
novel, describing “the wild bleak moors, that shut in Monkshaven almost as effectually on 
the land side as ever the waters did on the sea-board” (1).588 Gaskell spends most of the book, 
however, exploring the influence of the sea, not the moors. The narrator explains that “for 
twenty miles inland there was no forgetting the sea, nor the sea-trade” (4-5), giving the town 
“amphibious appearance, to a degree unusual even in a seaport” (2). It is not just 
Monkshaven itself that has an amphibious appearance, though; its inhabitants do as well. In a 
telling pun, boys and the tidal animals that they hunt share the same name and activities: 
“bare-legged urchins dabbling in the sea-pools” (213). The ocean constantly infiltrates the 
lives of the people in the area, invading the home space (97) and church rituals (70) alike. It 
also permeates the bodies of the locals. In cooler weather, the mist in the atmosphere at one 
point causes the people to inhale “more water than air” (45); in the dead of winter, “the sharp 
air was filled, as it were, with saline particles in a freezing state; little pungent crystals of sea 
salt burning lips and cheeks with their cold keenness” (166). When Philip leaves the town, he 
                                                          
588 D’Albertis notes that Whitby’s isolation was the most important factor in drawing Gaskell to the site (108). 
See also Sanders, “Introduction,” x. Foster notes that “Sylvia’s Lovers is a supreme example of a novel in 
which topographical location is of vital significance to the plot, not merely as background but as an active 
agent in determining events and shaping character” (155). 
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enlists with the marines (391); the amphibious nature of this branch of the armed forces is 
reinforced by Sylvia’s protest upon hearing the news, that “he wasn’t a sailor, nor yet a 
soldier,” and the new Mrs. Kinraid’s response, “Oh! but he was. I think somewhere the 
captain calls him a marine; that’s neither one nor the other, but a little of both” (450). The 
uniqueness of this isolated population—full of missing links between contrasting states—is 
clearly based on its conditions of life, dominated as they are by the sea. 
Because of its isolation, Monkshaven sees very little immigration to the area. Philip 
and his aunt (Sylvia’s mother, Bell Robson) are two of the very few immigrants to the town, 
originating from the inland region of Carlisle (83). Philip earns his inheritance of a thriving 
local business, and both Bell and Philip are successful in leaving a child behind them, but 
there are no other terms on which they could be considered “better adapted” or more “fit” for 
the isolated environment in which they find themselves—both are rather unpopular when in 
the prime of their lives because of their airs of superiority, and they die after enduring their 
fair shares of tragedy. Monkshaven natives, on the other hand, have adapted to their 
environment over a number of generations and their traditional ways of life are difficult, but 
well suited to the external pressures they face. Disruptions, such as the immigration and 
success of Philip, are absorbed into local culture within a generation or two, as his life is 
eventually made the stuff of local legend. Even more blatantly colonizing forces, like the 
pressgangs that capture unwitting sailors for forced service in the Napoleonic wars, fail to 
permanently alter the townspeople’s conditions of life, nor are they successful in settling in 
the area and replacing the natives. Monkshaven is not the center of the nation—politically, as 
with London; industrially, as with Manchester; or nostalgically, as with Knutsford—but 
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exists on the margins literally and figuratively.
589
 With Sylvia’s Lovers, Gaskell demonstrates 
that isolation does not equate to weakness or irrelevance, and instead can provide the 
material for an ethnographic study of human struggle and survival in the face of natural and 
social adversity. 
Darwin notes that “anomalous forms” can exist in geographically isolated areas when 
they would have been rendered extinct elsewhere; he calls such organisms “living fossils” 
(107). Whitby, the real-life version of Monkshaven, is a renowned fossil-hunting location.
590
 
Oddly, fossils never make an appearance in Sylvia’s Lovers. Yet many readers recognized 
Monkshaven as Whitby, and would likely have made the association between the famous 
fossil collecting site and the fictional town implicitly, rendering geology subtextual. In fact, 
Gaskell makes a point of being very geologically specific throughout Sylvia’s Lovers, and in 
setting many pivotal events in the littoral zone, an area of importance to Darwin’s theories of 
the geological record in Origin. In the first edition of the Origin, ammonites (the fossils taken 
as a Whitby coat-of-arms, see fig. 3) are mentioned twice as examples of sudden extinction 
(318, 321) in chapter ten “On the Geological Succession of Organic Beings”—a chapter 
closely tied to the preceding one, “On the Imperfection of the Geological Record.”591 
Ammonites are closely tied to Whitby culture and history; they were an important part of the 
tourist industry in the nineteenth century, as visitors could hunt for them or buy them from 
collectors’ shops in town.592 The monastery that overlooks Whitby—and that in part inspired 
                                                          
589 And, Henry would add, psychologically (xxiv). See King (155) on the symbolism of geographical 
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590
 White, 154. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, plesiosaurs, ichthyosaurs, and other large fossils 
were discovered in the cliffs (White, 155). Many Whitby fossils joined the collections of the British 
Museum of Natural History and the Yorkshire Museum (White, 156). 
 
591 On Whitby’s coat-of-arms, see White, 155. 
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Gaskell’s alias for the town in the novel, Monkshaven—is intimately tied into the town’s 
fossil lore: legend holds that in the seventh century A.D., the abbess Hilda hurled all the 
snakes on her monastery site over the cliff, where they turned to stone. Because of this 
traditional belief, locals often carved heads onto the ammonite fossils and adorned them with 
jeweled eyes to better sell them to nineteenth-century tourists.
593
 In chapter nine, Darwin 
discusses the kinds of discoveries that can be made at cliffs and at the shoreline, including 
the slow speed of the erosion of cliffs (283), the evidence for 
geological time provided by strata exposed by such erosion 
(284), the necessity for constant accumulation of oceanic 
sediment to produce fossils (288), and the changelessness of 
the bottom of the sea, which “not rarely [lies] for ages in an 
unaltered condition” (288). Darwin explicitly discusses the 
littoral zone, where fossils are seldom found, a phenomenon 
he explains as due to the deposits being “continually worn away, as soon as they are brought 
up by the slow and gradual rising of the land within the grinding action of the coast-waves” 
(290). Many organisms might live in this area, but few are preserved (288). Those conditions 
which are most favorable to life are least favorable to making an imprint on the fossil record, 
which requires conditions to be “stationary” (292). Any kind of rapid change is not likely to 
be recorded geologically (295-96). This is unfortunate because the geological record, Darwin 
asserts, is the only way to gain a sense of the process and progress of time: “A man must for 
years examine for himself great piles of superimposed strata, and watch the sea at work 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
592 White, 155. 
 
593 White, 155, 183. 
Figure 3: A pin showing three 
ammonites on a Whitby crest. 
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grinding down old rocks and making fresh sediment, before he can hope to comprehend 
anything of the lapse of time, the monuments of which we see around us” (282). 
 A remarkable portion of Sylvia’s Lovers is focused on describing the coastal 
landscape, its erosion (3, 213), its rockiness (34, 213), the strata-like structure of its 
ecosystems (3, 34), and its relation to the inland (4-5, 213, 214).
594
 Even when recounting the 
Siege of Acre in chapter 38, Gaskell opens with a lengthy picture of the Mediterranean 
coastal landscape, and almost seems as interested in this landscape as in the human events 
that are occurring there (424-26). The cliffs are clearly the most defining aspect of 
Monkshaven geography, though, and dictate much of the human movement in the area (34, 
371). These cliffs, containing the fossils that made Whitby remarkable to tourists, are most 
haunted by Sylvia. Particularly after her marriage but before the revelation of Kinraid’s 
impressment, Sylvia spends every free moment on the cliffs, “gazing abroad over the wide 
still expanse of the open sea,” like Darwin’s model observer, described above (350). Even 
after the birth of her child, she is drawn to this area, albeit to lower cliffs that we would 
identify as part of the littoral zone, where there “was a good space of sand and shingle at all 
low tides” (359). The narrator tells us that “once here, she was as happy as she ever expected 
to be in this world” because of her ability to abandon any sense of greater or social human 
ties, any feeling of obligation to others (359). It is here that she thrives, but this area leaves 
an imprint on her, rather than the reverse. Her story, like that of Charley’s impressment or 
Philip’s death, leaves no physical mark, an important point that I will return to later. 
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 Landscape is not simply geology to Gaskell, however, because it is inherently 
identified with the interests of the humans who eke their survival from the sea or the land, or 
the town that exists at the juncture of the two but is of neither element. And yet the elements, 
particularly the sea, are harshly unconcerned with human needs, revealing nature to be 
callous and impersonal and any human identification with it to be a mere hopeful 
projection.
595
 The bleakness of this vision is reminiscent of Thomas Hardy’s late-nineteenth-
century landscapes that sustain only the fittest, and against which human lives are rendered 
futile and miniscule.
596
 Perhaps no image in Sylvia’s Lovers is more representative of this 
than that of the massacred French at the Siege of Acre, who “lay headless corpses under the 
flowering rose-bushes, and by the fountain side” (430), mirroring “the anemones scarlet as 
blood, [which] run hither and thither over the ground like dazzling flames of fire” (425-26). 
Such a vision could very well derive from Darwin’s descriptions of nature’s brutality, the 
kind of brutality that often leads readers to misattribute Tennyson’s “nature red in tooth and 
claw” to a Darwinian worldview. Darwin’s feeble assurance at the end of chapter three, 
“Struggle for Existence,” that “we may console ourselves with the full belief, that the way of 
nature is not incessant, that no fear is felt, that death is generally prompt, and that the 
vigorous, the healthy, and the happy survive and multiply” (79)597 hardly counterbalances 
passages like the following: 
We behold the face of nature bright with gladness, we often see superabundance of 
food; we do not see, or we forget, that the birds which are idly singing round us 
mostly live on insects or seeds, and are thus constantly destroying life; or we forget 
                                                          
595 Twinn notes that although the sea “had featured in previous stories…the way it dominates this novel 
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596
 Shaw observes that even Napoleon is minimized against the background of Sylvia’s Lovers (“Other 
Historical Fiction,” 85). 
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how largely these songsters, or their eggs, or their nestlings, are destroyed by birds 
and beasts of prey; we do not always bear in mind, that though food may be now 
superabundant, it is not so at all seasons of each recurring year. (62) 
 
To call nature callously violent in Darwin’s vision would imply the possibility for a 
compassionate nature; in fact, although Darwin does identify culturally valenced patterns in 
nature, he maintains an inherent amorality in natural processes.
598
 The Malthusian violence 
of natural selection is a fact, not a value. It is easy to imagine how demoralizing such a 
philosophy could be to a humanistic and humanitarian thinker like Gaskell, who presented 
nature in her first novel as pure, enlivening, refreshing, encouraging, welcoming—everything 
that contrasted with the negativity of industrial slum life.
599
  
 The sea and land in Sylvia’s Lovers are enmeshed in a complex relationship mirrored 
by men and women generally, and by Sylvia and Charley specifically.
600
 Charley is, of 
course, a sailor who makes his fortunes first on whaling vessels and then in the navy; Sylvia 
associates him with the sea after his departure, seeking consolation from watching the waves 
and musing on his absence to the extent that Philip, her husband, is jealous of her time spent 
with the sea (359-60, 367). Daniel Robson, Sylvia’s father, was a sailor who finds life on 
shore as dull as the company of women, and a definite degradation from his sea-faring days 
(90); he claims that “goin’ to sea come natteral to a man,” further reinforcing the masculine 
gendering of the mariner lifestyle (206). The land is gendered feminine, on the other hand, 
and is associated strongly with the women in the book. Bell Robson, Sylvia’s mother, for 
example, originates from inland and needs to spend time away from the sea to recuperate 
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 Craik, 174. Gérin notes that Gaskell’s father, William Stevenson, came from a line of naval men and her 
mother, Elizabeth Holland, was “born of yeoman stock as far inland as could be, in the heart of rural 
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from a particularly bad illness (190). Sylvia is rooted in her farmlife, and both lovers 
envision her “out of doors, in the garden” (231). Sylvia feels most natural “running out into 
the fields to bring up the cows, or spinning wool, or making up butter,” so much so that she 
identifies the farm animals as part of “her ideas of humanity” (342). Her very name, though 
more suggestive of the forest than the farm, still places her as firmly terrestrial. This same 
name, she objects, is unlucky (352). 
 In the context of male/sea and female/land conflict, Sylvia’s objection to using her 
“unlucky” name for her own daughter stems not just from her sense of her own misfortunes, 
but also from a realization of the inherent unfairness in both natural and social gendering 
processes. She comments, “men takes a deal more nor women to spoil their lives,” and this 
point becomes evident when cast in terms of the gendered sea and land (475). Before any 
characters are even introduced, the conflict between the elements is powerfully established: 
“for twenty miles inland there was no forgetting the sea, nor the sea-trade; refuse shell-fish, 
seaweed, the offal of the melting-houses, were the staple manure of the district; great ghastly 
whale-jaws, bleached bare and white, were the arches over the gate-posts to many a field or 
moorland stretch” (4-5). The sea at once provides the raw elements of fertilization as well as 
a macabre image of consumption: the massive whale jawbones threaten to swallow the land. 
It is not hard to make the analogical leap from this relation of the sea and land to that of men 
and women: necessary, inevitable, but one-sidedly dangerous. On a personal level, the sea 
destroys Sylvia’s attempts at brightening and beautifying her otherwise austere homestead 
with a garden, as “the bleak sea-winds came up and blighted all endeavours at cultivating 
more than the most useful things—pot-herbs, marigolds, potatoes, onions, and such-like” 
(231). The threatening nature of the ocean is made clear as it takes the lives of many sailors, 
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but more profoundly and importantly in this novel, it thereby throws into question the 
survival of the women and children who rely on their men’s safety at sea (31). There is no 
escaping the sea’s influence, just as there is no life envisioned in this novel without men: it is 
certainly not Cranford, nor does the novel contain any viable female community, be it 
founded on ties of family, friends, or business, which differentiates it from most of Gaskell’s 
other novels. The sea, presented as a type of eternity (63), will always dominate the land, as 
men will continue to dominate women’s lives and stories, the ending of the book tells us as 
the myth of Sylvia is eclipsed by that of Philip, whose sufferings obscure those of his wife 
and devoted, chaste lover, Hester. “And so,” the narrator tells us, “it will be until ‘there shall 
be no more sea’” (502); there is no hope for change or progress. 
 Throughout the book, change seems to occur mostly in the burgeoning town through 
its increasingly important business endeavors and the representative capitalist, Philip 
Hepburn.
601
 Critics have made much of Philip being a “new man,” representing the 
mercantile future of the nation.
602
 He also differs from most other men in the novel by being 
effeminized by his trade, a point his uncle reminds him of at every opportunity (207). As the 
town occupies a liminal position between sea and land, Philip is neither fully masculine nor 
feminine.
603
 He is, moreover, consistently harassed by men and ultimately destroyed by the 
sea. Philip, in the end, is literally crushed between the land and the sea, as he jumps in the 
ocean near the cliffs to save his child from drowning, but sustains fatal internal injuries 
(493). The symbolism of Philip’s fate is overwhelming. He cannot even die without the sea 
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drawing his attention and Sylvia’s away from their reconciliation and his spiritual journey 
(494-500). One might assume that Philip’s effeminization would end in sterility, as it does 
for the Foster brothers and William Coulson, Philip’s partner in the shop. But as the sea is 
made a symbol of eternity in the book, the town is explicitly described as representing life 
(63); Philip is one of the few men in the novel successful in fathering a child, and the 
capitalistic endeavors of the town move forward, despite struggles.  
 In the end, the gendering of the land, sea, and town is nothing more than a human 
projection, a means of making sense of an otherwise impersonal if not hostile world and an 
attempt to make a connection with it.
604
 Although the novel might seem at first blush to 
uphold the pathetic fallacy, such as in the funeral scene early in the novel where the sea 
“seemed bared of life, as if to be in serious harmony with what was going on inland” (65), in 
fact we repeatedly see that the fury of the sea or the blossoming of the land does not parallel 
human experience (315, 424). Just as Sylvia finds the farm at first reassuringly protective, 
then looks to the sea for comfort, and finally turns to the town for safe haven (377), no one 
location is permanent or satisfying. Humans’ place on an essentially unchanging landscape is 
tenuous, and success in business or reproduction does not guarantee a future: the last human 
connection to the story, Philip and Sylvia’s daughter Bella, leaves Britain entirely for 
America at the end of the book and we never learn of her fate (503).
605
 The bleakness of 
Darwinian theory is realized in this novel of human struggle, failure, and disappearance 
against an uncaring English landscape. America might offer a possibility of new narratives 
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 Flint notes that because of Bella’s immigration, “there is no sense of continuity through generations, and 
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and new gendered structures playing out against a fresh landscape, but that prospect is never 
made explicit in Sylvia’s Lovers. 
Sexual Selection 
 Nowhere in the novel does Gaskell more clearly work through the moral and social 
implications of Darwin’s theories than in its presentation of mate selection; though sexual 
selection would become a more prominent theme in Darwin’s The Descent of Man, and 
Selection in Relation to Sex (1871), it still underpins what could easily be viewed as the most 
human elements of natural selection in Origin.
606
 The very title of Sylvia’s Lovers indicates 
that it is concerned with a woman’s sexual choices and those men competing for claim to her 
sexuality. Gaskell’s discarded working titles—The Specksioneer and Philip’s Idol—made the 
male competitors the central figures of concern, but her final title instead draws attention to 
the woman’s relationship to men, her position as a modifier of their status.607 It is at core a 
novel of sexual selection. Gaskell had, of course, written previously about women’s (or, 
more usually, girls’) choice of lovers, and in the cases of Mary Barton, Ruth (1853), and 
North and South, the sexually virile man ultimately wins the heroine. In Ruth, this virile man 
also happens to be a morally bankrupt seducer, and the titular character’s path to redemption 
from her selection error inevitably ends in her own death. Sylvia’s Lovers is unique among 
Gaskell’s novels in that no love interest for the heroine is clearly the right or wrong choice; 
both men are complicated, and both contain qualities of worthy lovers. In the end, Sylvia’s 
all-crucial decision is made for her by circumstances and results in a child, but also in 
suffering and premature death for the spouses. Sylvia’s seemingly perfect match—Charley 
                                                          
606 Poon argues that Gaskell anticipated many of the major themes of Descent in her fiction, although Poon’s 
own work is focused on Wives and Daughters (196). 
 
607
 D’Albertis, 106; Krueger, 141. Flint comments that “the novel’s title positions her as potential object, rather 
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Kinraid—is aware of his value in the sexual marketplace and quickly finds a superior 
marriage partner, at least by contemporary standards.
608
  
Though Darwin never applies his theory of natural selection to humans in Origin, the 
Victorian reading public immediately picked up on its implications for individual people as 
well as societies.
609
 In Sylvia’s Lovers, Gaskell frequently demonstrates how easily the 
human-animal divide breaks down, such as when she narrates a farm dog’s interiority (88), 
describes the instinctive fury of women whose sailor husbands were impressed by the navy 
(29), has Kester compare the importance of breeding in both cows and women (182), or 
presents Charley’s self-preservation instinct (217).610 Sexual attraction in the novel is 
similarly instinctive and irrational.
611
 That sexual selection should be of particular interest for 
a novelist is not surprising, given the Victorian novel’s ur-motif of courtship and marriage 
decisions. Darwin defines sexual selection in chapter four (entitled “Natural Selection”) as 
depending “not on a struggle for existence, but on a struggle between the males for 
possession of the females; the result is not death to the unsuccessful competitor, but few or 
no offspring” (88). Successful males are patriarchs, controlling females’ sexualities, having 
sole sexual access to a given female, and producing a large number of children. Sexual 
selection, to Darwin, is inherently a competition between males, and a female’s role in this 
crucial process is limited to choosing the most attractive male to mate with. He does grant 
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that this process of female selection might affect the evolution of males over “thousands of 
generations,” but clearly the influence is gradual and collective (89). Each male, on the other 
hand, lives out a dramatic process in his lifetime that Darwin describes in much greater 
detail, one in which “the males alone” inherit “special weapons” that often determine 
“victory” in this great “struggle with other males” (127, 88). In sexual selection, “the 
slightest advantage will lead to victory,” and anything from a beautiful singing voice (89) to 
“the shield” “may be as important for victory, as the sword or spear” (88). Equally important 
to the definition of sexual selection, though much less discussed by Darwin, is the process’s 
tendency “to fit the males and females to different habits of life,” of which males competing 
amongst themselves for mating opportunities is one part (158). As a consequence, Darwin 
writes, “natural selection will be able to modify one sex in its functional relations to the other 
sex, or in relation to wholly different habits of life in the two sexes” (87). Natural selection, 
then, either makes one sex dominant, adjusting the other sex to best suit its needs, or 
polarizes the behavior and lifestyles of males and females. As Gillian Beer puts it, 
“evolutionary process relies on sexual division.”612  
 Gender polarization appears as a leitmotif throughout Sylvia’s Lovers.613 The 
comment, “what different views different men and women take of their fellow-creatures” 
(119), runs as an undercurrent through most interpersonal situations in the plot, from interest 
in news (men are attracted to stories of far-off battles, women to local thefts [95]) to Sylvia’s 
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 Schor comments that “The central ‘plot,’ one written by and for men, and acted out primarily through their 
love of women, depends on the registering of difference between men and women, and its essential progress 
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mate selection (the women in her life favor Philip while the men favor Charley [78, 181]).
614
 
In her ironic commentary about historical and cultural disjunctions, Gaskell notes,  
Amongst uneducated people—whose range of subjects and interest do not extend 
beyond their daily life—it is natural that when the first blush and hurry of youth is 
over, there should be no great pleasure in the conversation of the other sex. Men have 
plenty to say to men, which in their estimation (gained from tradition and experience) 
women cannot understand; and farmers of a much later date than the one of which I 
am writing, would have contemptuously considered it a loss of time to talk to women; 
indeed, they were often more communicative to the sheep-dog that accompanied them 
through all the day’s work, and frequently became a sort of dumb confidant. (88) 
 
These opinions are also put into the mouths of the older, married farmers, such as Sylvia’s 
father Daniel, who tells Charley right after their engagement, “we’ll have a pipe and a glass; 
and that, to my thinking, is as good company as iver a woman i’ Yorkshire” (198).615 Farmer 
Corney comments of young men at a party, “They’re a set o’ young chaps as thinks more on 
t’ lasses than on baccy;—they’ll find out their mistake in time; give ’em time, give ’em time” 
(139). Such opinions are not limited to the countryside, as we see townsmen disinheriting 
women (as the otherwise kindly Fosters do to Hester, simply because she might marry) and 
limiting them to domesticated roles that Sylvia finds stifling. Sylvia struggles to connect with 
men’s narratives, as when dreaming of Charley’s fantastic seafaring stories, “there was no 
human interest for her in the wondrous scene in which she was no actor, only a spectator” 
(106). These stereotypes are pervasive across lifestyles and mutually reinforcing—there is 
nowhere for women to escape them. The mid-Victorian era in which Gaskell was writing saw 
women striving for greater legal and social equality,
616
 a fight that could from that moment’s 
vantage point be undercut by an evolutionary narrative from such a prestigious source as 
                                                          
614 Watson, 84-85. 
 
615
 Stoneman observes that “Daniel Robson’s masculinity derives from a decided separation of gender-roles” 
(97). 
 
616 D’Albertis, 131. 
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Darwin, a narrative that aspired to sole explanatory power over the entirety of the observable 
and explicable organization of nature.
617
 
 Sylvia’s ultimately successful lover—the one who marries and impregnates her—is 
Philip Hepburn, her mother’s nephew. Philip eventually gains Sylvia by offering her and her 
mother a home with him after her father is executed, they are evicted from their farm, and 
Bell becomes slightly senile in her grief. All this is not to mention, of course, the fact that he 
knows that Charley, Sylvia’s fiancé, was kidnapped by the pressgang and not drowned, as 
everyone else believes. Philip could have offered Sylvia and her mother a home, or even help 
and financial support to find lodging, without the proviso that she marry him in the bargain, 
but of course he does not do so. By social standards, his behavior is reprehensible. By 
evolutionary standards championed by Darwin in Origin, his behavior is natural and even 
admirable. In the end, reproducing is the gage of an organism’s success, not avoiding death 
or moral censure.  
 Early on, Philip believes that his self-education and business acuity will give him an 
advantage in the battle for Sylvia’s affections, and will eventually win her over (161). As it 
turns out, circumstance plays into his hands more than any personal characteristic. He takes 
advantage of the tools at hand, such as Sylvia’s destitution and Charley’s disappearance. In 
neither case is he actively attacking his competitor (drawing on Darwin’s “sword or spear”), 
but instead he relies on the instinct for self-preservation (Darwin’s “shield”). In Darwin’s 
terms, his behavior is justifiable and successful: humans, after all, are described in the Origin 
as making breeding selections based only on the potential benefit to themselves (83, 467). 
                                                          
617
 Stoneman notes that Sylvia recognizes English law does not address women’s needs (101); the law of natural 
selection, I argue, similarly fails women. Beer points out that the developmental impulse of evolutionary 
theories, including Darwin’s, “tended to restore hierarchy and to place at its apex not only man in general, 
but contemporary European man in particular” (Darwin’s Plots, 107). 
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Much of Philip’s strategy is based on his unflagging belief that his desire for Sylvia is 
justified, is essential to his being, and must be accomplished (128, 161). He holds onto this 
vision even though his aunt Bell gives up on her hope for Philip and Sylvia’s union (125), 
Sylvia consistently rebuffs him, and he acknowledges Charley’s superior fitness (206, 386). 
Despite the contrast that just about every character draws between Charley and Philip—
“Secure and exultant, his broad, handsome, weather-bronzed face was as great a contrast to 
Philip’s long, thoughtful, sallow countenance, as his frank manner was to the other’s cold 
reserve” (206)—in fact, their sexual selection strategy is nearly identical.618 Early in the 
book, Philip doubts Sylvia’s ability to make independent decisions, telling her that he should 
select her new cloak material because, “You won’t know how to choose” (25). After hearing 
about Charley’s history of abandoning flirtations (192), Philip decides that it is better for him 
to conceal the information as well as the eventual story of his rival’s disappearance because 
Sylvia would be incapable of judging in the way that he would want her to. Though Charley 
is not as overtly manipulative, he pressures Sylvia to commit to him physically and socially 
before she is ready and willing to do so. At the New Year’s party, he tricks her into kissing 
him because she does not know the rules of the forfeit game that she takes part in. Surprised 
and humiliated, she subsequently tries to avoid him and leave the party as soon as possible. 
In their private meetings leading up to their engagement, they struggle for dominance, “like 
two children defying each other; each determined to conquer” (184). Charley comes out on 
top in the end. He compels her to admit her belief in his fidelity and her own feelings for him 
before she is prepared to do so: “She was quite silent, almost trembling. He repeated the 
question as if to force her to answer. Driven to bay, she equivocated” (184). Troublingly, the 
                                                          
618 Stoneman notes that Charley and Philip “share the same basic aggression, structured by different ideologies 
of masculinity” (96). 
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opening of the final sentence in the passage, “driven to bay,” casts him in the role of the 
hunter and her in the role of a non-human animal. He likewise denies her the agency to make 
her choice on her own terms and in her own time. Tellingly, after her father approves of their 
engagement, Sylvia flees to her bedroom, allowing her father and fiancé alone to shake hands 
in solitude, “as if concluding a bargain” (197). Both lovers deny Sylvia the fundamental 
choice that Darwin presents as the only role for females in the process of sexual selection, 
which perhaps should not be surprising, given that all of Darwin’s language about male battle 
indicates a male-dominance, victor-take-all, rapine mentality essential to the process of mate 
selection. 
 The major differences between Philip and Charley are that the former is successful in 
Darwinian terms because he has a child with Sylvia, whereas we never know if the latter has 
offspring, and that Philip in the end possesses a fidelity that makes him more admirable than 
the wronged but flighty hero Charley. It takes Charley only minutes after Sylvia leaves a 
party “to turn his attention to the next prettiest girl in the room” (153), and after declaring his 
shock that Sylvia would marry another man, he courts and weds an accomplished heiress in 
what seems like no time at all (437-38). As Molly Corney Brunton, Charley’s cousin 
comments, “Kinraid were allays a fellow wi’ two strings to his bow” (437). His sexual 
selection strategy dramatically differs from Philip’s in this way.619 Even after she has 
discovered Philip’s falsehood about Charley’s death and declared herself unable to live with 
him again, Sylvia still realizes “that Philip would not have acted so; it would have taken long 
years before he could have been induced to put another on the throne she had once occupied” 
(437). Before their marriage, Philip mused frequently on his desire to be with Sylvia: 
                                                          
619 Sanders notes that Charley is ultimately not the hero of the novel, despite being “the kind of self-helping, 
self-improving, self-made man of which the Victorians so approved” (“Introduction,” xvi). 
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To Philip she was the only woman in the world; it was the one subject on which he 
dared not consider, for fear that both conscience and judgment should decide against 
him, and that he should be convinced against his will that she was an unfit mate for 
him, that she never would be his, and that it was a waste of time and life to keep her 
shrined in the dearest sanctuary of his being, to the exclusion of all the serious and 
religious aims. (128) 
 
He believes himself unable to go on living if he has to give up the hope of loving her (160). 
After their marriage, he recognizes the imbalance in their affections for each other and goes 
“on striving to deepen and increase her love when most other men would have given up the 
endeavor, made themselves content with half a heart, and turned to some other object of 
attainment” (343). Philip and Sylvia are successful in having a child together, which might 
come as a bit of a surprise, given Sylvia’s deep dissatisfaction with her marriage and the fact 
that other characters view Philip as effeminized. One would think that the considerate Philip 
would not push her to fulfill her martial sexual obligations, or that he would be impotent, but 
apparently that is not the case.
620
 As Darwin comments in the Origin, “No one can tell, till he 
tries, whether any particular animal will breed under confinement” (265); Molly echoes the 
sentiment, saying of human marriage, “It’s just luck, and there’s no forecasting it. Men is 
such unaccountable animals, there’s no prophesyin’ upon ’em” (438). Chance, not the more 
predictable and quantifiable quality of fitness, determines reproductive success in the novel, 
perhaps to everyone’s detriment.  
 Darwin suggests in Origin that offspring may inherit adaptations from their parents 
that make them more capable to win in the competition for resources and mates, the “struggle 
for life” (61).621 This, unfortunately, often results in the children out-competing, and 
rendering extinct, their parent species (172, 321). Philip does, indirectly, die because of 
                                                          
620 Beer points out that “the emphasis in Darwin’s account is always upon productivity rather than on congress; 
on generation rather than on sexual desire” (Darwin’s Plots, 116). 
 
621 According to Richards, “Darwin believed that virtually all traits, useful or not, would be heritable” (62). 
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Bella: after jumping in the ocean to save her, he is dashed against the cliffs. But we never 
know how successful Bella is in future life. The last words of the novel tell of her marriage to 
a distant cousin of the Fosters and her immigration to America (503). Whether she survived, 
whether she had children, and whether she had a happy or lengthy marriage is left 
unresolved. The future is not so easy to determine, and the results of following the 
evolutionary rules are not guaranteed. This uncertainty is consistent with Darwinian theory, 
as Beer points out, because “Nowhere does Darwin give a glimpse of future forms: and 
rightly so, since it is fundamental to his argument that they are unforeseeable, produced out 
of too many variables to be plotted in advance.”622 Gaskell is not necessarily endorsing a 
worldview ruled by ruthless, strategic battle for survival that overrides concerns like human 
happiness and fulfillment, but she is applying its consequences to a social vision.
623
 Darwin 
would seem to advocate a brighter vision of evolution, but Gaskell takes the darkness of his 
own theory to a logical conclusion that he would shy away from, as flirting with nihilism (76, 
126). 
Time and Progress 
Darwin is considered a historian by modern critics because of his influence on his 
society’s understanding of the nature of time.624 This is in part, Beer notes, because “How 
things came to be as they are is his great argument.”625 As Coral Lansbury describes 
                                                          
622 Beer, Darwin’s Plots, xix. 
 
623 Flint, 52. Krueger notes that Sylvia’s Lovers documents the failure of “attempts to make women’s lives and 
stories conform with apparent ease to patriarchal plots” (138); Darwin’s narrative of sexual selection can 
come across as a very patriarchal plot. 
 
624 Shaw notes that the Origin offered “a model of the new historical method, whereby scattered facts are 
brought together into a whole and the laws of evolution are given a settled foundation” (“Other Historical 
Fiction,” 76). 
 
625 Beer, Darwin’s Plots, 68; original emphasis. 
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Gaskell’s vision of the task of a historian, the role is not incompatible with Darwin’s theory 
of constant adaptation: “The obligation to record the past faithfully is extended to the reader 
who must not be permitted to imagine that he stands at a fixed point in time watching all 
things change around him. Even as he reads, the society of the reader is assuming new forms, 
and by his recall of the past the historian is himself affecting the process of change.”626 The 
Origin does contain a number of comments on the pace and progress of timescales. Darwin 
takes care to reiterate that species and landscapes change extremely slowly and by such fine 
degrees that the variations are almost unnoticeable (84, 89, 283, 432).
627
 The best location for 
studying and comprehending the vast timescape of the earth is a cliff with exposed strata that 
is still undergoing the process of erosion—and even so, such a site must be studied carefully 
for years (282). Such focused study does not guarantee an accurate sense of geohistorical 
time, however, and Darwin even suggests that such comprehension exceeds the limits of the 
human mind: “What an infinite number of generations, which the mind cannot grasp, must 
have succeeded each other in the long roll of years!” (287). Although Darwin vaguely 
references “many paleontologists” who believe in a progressive view of evolution, he himself 
does not endorse such a vision, even though his work was widely taken up at the time—and  
is still discussed now—as epitomizing the Victorian Whig vision of progress (345).628 It is  
easy to understand why: he frequently discusses evolution as an “accumulative” process (30, 
45, 84, 170, 284, 467), which gives a sense of forward motion to natural selection, and his 
famous branching bush image (see fig. 4) suggests multiplicity but a general upwards and 
                                                          
626 Lansbury, Novel of Social Crisis, 163. 
 
627 Nonetheless, as Levine points out, for Darwin’s theory, “everything is always or potentially changing, and 
nothing can be understood without its history” (Darwin and the Novelists, 16; original emphasis). 
 
628
 Campbell, “Scientific Revolution,” 368; Greene, 301; Herbert and Norman, 148; Ruse, “Origin of the 
Origin,” 12. 
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outwards notion of growth.
629
 He also claims that the constantly changing conditions of the 
struggle for existence determines species’ traits, but says that if the same conditions should 
reoccur in the same location after a lapse of time, the exact form that filled that ecological 
niche in the past would not and could not reappear: “the two forms—the old and the new—
would not be identically the same; for both would almost certainly inherit different characters 
from their distinct progenitors” (315).630 A 
group’s existence is continuous but singular—
once it is gone, it is gone forever (316). This 
linear notion of time, which is not quite 
progressive but could easily be misunderstood 
as such, is unforgiving. 
 Gaskell positions the human in the 
grand scale of history.
631
 In Sylvia’s Lovers, 
Gaskell reflects on the process of writing a 
historical novel in the vein of Sir Walter Scott.
632
 Her metacommentary, however, does not 
seem to be primarily concerned with the long shadow cast by the Author of Waverly.
633
 
                                                          
629
 On Darwin’s image of the tree of life, see Campbell, “Why Was Darwin Believed?,” 212; Choi, 288; and 
Desmond and Moore, 217. 
 
630
 This point may seem self-evident, but it was deeply troublesome to even scientific thinkers of the time like 
Lyell; as Herbert and Norman rephrase the idea, “each species is modified by its history” (145). 
 
631 Marroni, 164. 
 
632
 The book is set approximately “sixty years” before the current period, as in Scott’s famous subtitle to 
Waverly; Gaskell’s chosen time period is also significant for being during the French Revolution (Shaw, 
“Then and Now,” 40). See also Shaw, “Then and Now,” 38. Shaw notes that “Sixty years is a liminal point 
in time past: memory of it either does not exist amongst the living, or is so hazy and transient as to be 
discountable” (“Introduction,” x). 
 
633 Rignall comments that “unlike Scott she does not come down finally on the side of the modern world” (23) 
and that Gaskell draws more attention to the fictionality of historical reconstructions (27). See also 
Figure 4: Darwin’s so-called tree-of-life from 
Origin. 
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Instead, she seems more interested in the notion of historical disjunction, the idea that we can 
feel ourselves comfortably superior to past generations because conditions have changed so 
essentially that we do not have to relate to their struggles. Such ironically self-satisfied 
statements test her readers’ sense of progress,634 as she pushes on the notion that “It is 
astonishing to look back and find how differently constituted were the minds of most people 
fifty or sixty years ago” because of how much people acted by emotion and intuition rather 
than rationality, even among “the more educated” class (318), or that mid-Victorian readers 
are more consistent with their moral principles in their daily lives than prior generations: 
“one of the greatest signs of the real progress we have made since those times seems to be 
that our daily concerns of buying and selling, eating and drinking, whatsoever we do, are 
more tested by the real practical standard of our religion than they were in the days of our 
grandfathers” (98).635 Moreover, Gaskell strives to make her readers question the sense of 
smugness gained from the moment’s historical vantage point: 
Is it because we are farther off from those times, and have, consequently, a greater 
range of vision? Will our descendants have a wonder about us, such as we have about 
the inconsistency of our forefathers, or a surprise at our blindness that we do not 
perceive that, holding such and such opinions, our course of action must be so and so, 
or that the logical consequence of particular abhorrence? (68) 
 
Her characters, moreover, find their own timescapes undermined. At the funeral of a sailor 
murdered while resisting the pressgang, Sylvia recognizes the minuteness of a human life—
or even of all human life—when compared to the natural world that temporarily sustains it: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
d’Albertis, 108. 
 
634
 Flint, 49; Foster, 158. Uglow notes that Gaskell’s faith in progress might have been in part undermined by 
the senseless fratricide of the American Civil War (510); see also Shaw, “Other Historical Fiction,” 86. 
 
635 Henkin points out that some Victorians saw the animalistic origins of humanity, which Darwinian theory 
reinforced, in capitalistic endeavors: “The same rugged individualism of the ape and tiger were manifest in 
the Victorian world of fierce competition, pitiless appetite for wealth, and idolatry of material things” (222-
23). 
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“she had come down the long church stair with life and death suddenly become real to her 
mind, the enduring sea and hills forming a contrasting background to the vanishing away of 
man” (75). Sylvia, as mentioned earlier, is the character who spends time like Darwin’s 
model geological observer, watching the slow but steady process of the sea eroding away the 
cliffs. She is aware of deep geological time and recognizes the regularity of natural processes 
like the ebb and flow of the waves (359-60), and is thereby emboldened to undertake her oath 
to never live with Philip as his wife again (383), disregarding her old friend Kester’s warning 
of the inhuman nature of the length of “niver” (319) and the horror of others in her 
community that she would set an infinite boundary on her anger. Of course, Sylvia does 
forgive Philip at the end of the book, demonstrating (as Darwin asserted) even a studied 
human being’s inability to fully grasp the notion of time. Nowhere is this more wittily shown 
than in the discussion of St. Sepulchre, a chapel founded by a knight in the Middle Ages for 
retired soldiers “to attend the daily masses he ordained to be said till the end of all time 
(which eternity lasted rather more than a century, pretty well for an eternity bespoken by a 
man)” (459). Human beings hold no dominion over time. If anything, as Jenny Uglow puts it, 
the novel “depicts an endless struggle amid the flux of time.”636 
 Gaskell’s timescape in Sylvia’s Lovers is different from—and ultimately more 
depressing than—Darwin’s. If Darwinian theory offers no notion of progress, then on what 
can we base an optimistic vision of development? Even though the Monkshaven of mid-
century “is altered now into a rising bathing place,” rather than a struggling seaport whose 
economy revolved around whaling, we are left with the sense that there is no real 
improvement: “at the ebb of a spring-tide, you may hear the waves come lapping up the 
shelving shore with the same ceaseless, ever-recurrent sound as that which Philip listened to 
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in the pauses between life and death” (502). Conditions have not changed for human beings 
in the environment that they live and die by, and Sylvia and Philip are representative of the 
species in being unable to adapt to the changing events in their lives.
637
 Philip is the character 
who most clearly represents this vision of time. As the most intellectual figure in the book, 
the self-made capitalist of whom the Victorians would theoretically heartily approve, Philip 
is well-positioned to muse on the notion of progress. He is struck by the parallels between his 
love triangle with Sylvia and Charlie and that of the youth of Widow Rose, his landlady: 
“Then he went on to wonder if the lives of one generation were but a repetition of the lives of 
those who had gone before, with no variation but from the internal cause that some had 
greater capacity for suffering than others. Would those very circumstances which made the 
interest of his life now, return, in due cycle, when he was dead and Sylvia was forgotten?” 
(240).
638
 Nothing varies over time but degree of suffering, and even that suffering will be 
experienced over again by untold people. Rather than succumbing to a Schopenhauerian 
depression, however, Philip looks to historical narratives to inspire him, to Jacob’s fourteen-
year labor for his beloved, Rachel, or to the story he reads of the medieval Lord Guy, whose 
wife Phillis reconciles with him on his deathbed (246, 466). The “pretty story of the Countess 
Phillis,” however seemingly unrealistic, does repeat in the most tragic of ways—Sylvia 
forgives Philip on his deathbed, but their moments together are short and unsatisfying, 
followed quickly by Sylvia’s own death and forgotten in the local legend that vilifies Sylvia’s 
behavior (471). People seemed fated to repeat patterns: Daniel cannot help but rebel against 
the pressgang again after having done so in his youth; at her father’s arrest, Sylvia is 
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 Marroni, 163, 174. Beer points out that in Darwinian theory, “The individual organism does not evolve in the 
course of its life” (Darwin’s Plots, 38). 
 
638 Uglow describes this beautifully as a vision of “the repetitive nature of human experience, a flowing and 
ebbing tide washing through time” (511). 
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described in very similar terms to the “furies” of women whose husbands were taken up by 
the pressgang at the beginning of the novel. There is no real narrative of escape—even Bella, 
in leaving Monkshaven, does so by marrying a cousin, as her parents did. As Kate Flint 
notes, “No confident answer to the problem of emotional pain is offered in Sylvia’s Lovers; 
no theological consolation is proffered.”639 There is not only no teleology—there is no 
meaningful movement of any kind, just slight variation within endless repetition.
640
 Human 
suffering is Sisyphean. Darwin’s Origin would suggest that variation is not only constant and 
certain but also generates newness, despite the larger patterns that he identifies in natural 
history. Once again, Gaskell’s vision of the implications of Darwinian theory are far more 
nihilistic than Darwin would be willing to present them, though not inconsistent with his 
ideas.  
Death, Remembrance, and Narrative 
 Darwin was already an authoritative figure when he published Origin; with his theory 
of natural selection, he claimed an explanatory power over not only the past and the present 
(i.e. that his methodology is the only way to understand how things were and how they 
currently are), but he also denied any predictability of the future. His work, as many critics 
have noted since, drew on the values and narratives of his time and also attempted to rewrite 
some of them, as we see in sexual selection, for example. Those things which his theory 
could not explain—“The laws governing inheritance” (13), the “laws of the correlation of 
growth” (12), “the inextricable web of affinities between the members of any one class” 
(434)—are deemed unknowable. Yet at the same time, Darwin reveals the fictionality 
                                                          
639 Flint, 52. Sanders interprets suffering in Sylvia’s Lovers through a Christian framework of spiritual 
purification (“Varieties of Religious Experience,” 23), but the novel lacks any consolatory note, religious or 
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 D’Albertis, 134. 
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underlying some of the work of natural historians, such as when he admits that his term 
“Struggle for Existence” is meant to be largely metaphorical (62) or in his repeated assertion 
that the distinction between “species” and “varieties” is one of convenience and represents 
“no essential distinction” (276; see also 48). He tells us that he has found the key to 
understanding some of nature’s most mysterious processes, and yet he describes human’s 
efforts to create and explain as “feeble” and ranks “the works of Nature” as “immeasurably 
superior” to “those of Art,” while admitting that he uses Art to comprehend and describe 
Nature (61).  
 Darwin’s Origin is not a grand narrative in the sense that Chambers’s Vestiges was, 
starting with solar nebulae and tracing the development of life from plants to angels. The 
Origin is more of a tract, anticipating objections to his ideas and attempting to persuade 
readers to align with his theory based on his mass of research.
641
 Darwin claims an 
objectivity—an amorality—for his theory, as discussed earlier in terms of the inherence of 
struggle, suffering, and death to natural selection (61, 172). He rejects the Christian agenda 
underlying natural theology, declaring himself anti-creationist (167), and says that the only 
hope for increasing our understanding of the natural world requires “not look[ing] to some 
unknown plan of creation” (434). Yet there is an implicit value system in much of Darwin’s 
terminology: those “dominant” species that succeed in the struggle for existence are 
contrasted with those that fail, which are termed “inferior” (327); rare species or traits are “of 
subordinate value” (418); adaptations that help organisms survive are called “profitable” 
(172). Perhaps more interestingly, Darwin uses metaphors and similes that explain scientific 
ideas in terms of linguistics. Thus, breeds are likened to dialects in not having definite origins 
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(40); rudimentary organs are compared to letters in a word that are not pronounced (455). 
Most extensively, Darwin comments,  
I look at the natural geological record, as a history of the world imperfectly kept, and 
written in a changing dialect; of this history we possess the last volume alone, relating 
only to two or three countries. Of this volume, only here and there a short chapter has 
been preserved; and of each page, only here and there a few lines. Each word of the 
slowly-changing language, in which the history is supposed to be written, being more 
or less different in the interrupted succession of chapters, may represent the 
apparently abruptly changed forms of life, entombed in our consecutive, but widely 
separated, formations. (310-11) 
 
In terms of this simile, Darwin’s theory of natural selection comes as close as anything 
available to a universal translator. 
 Both Gaskell and her husband had a lifelong interest in linguistics, which is well 
documented by critics and historians.
642
 Sylvia’s Lovers in particular was taken to task for its 
use of Yorkshire dialect by contemporaneous critics,
643
 although critics have subsequently 
noted that it was groundbreaking in that the eponymous heroine speaks a nonstandard dialect, 
and that dialect is not used for comic purpose.
644
 There is very little that is comic in this story 
of struggle, death, and narrative distortion. It has been frequently noted that the epigraph to 
Sylvia’s Lovers comes from the end of section LVI of Tennyson’s In Memoriam,645 the heart 
of the poem’s evolutionary doubt: 
“So careful of the type?” but no. 
From scarped cliff and quarried stone 
She cries, “A thousand types are gone: 
I care for nothing, all shall go. 
 
“Thou makest thine appeal to me: 
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 See, for example, Uglow, 72. William Gaskell believed that dialects underwent a process of evolution, and 
he presented evidence for this claim in his “Lectures on Lancashire Dialect” (Uglow, 513-14). 
 
643 Easson, 432-55; Flint, 45; Shaw, “Introduction,” xx; Uglow, 530. 
 
644 Krueger, 141; Spencer, 40.  
 
645 Gaskell, like many of her time, greatly admired In Memoriam (Gérin, 244; Shaw, “Elizabeth Gaskell,” 45). 
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I bring to life, I bring to death: 
The spirit does but mean the breath: 
I know no more.” And he, shall he, 
 
Man, her last work, who seem’d so fair, 
Such splendid purpose in his eyes, 
Who roll’d the psalm to wintry skies, 
Who built him fanes of fruitless prayer, 
 
Who trusted God was love indeed 
And love Creation's final law— 
Tho’ Nature, red in tooth and claw 
With ravine, shriek’d against his creed— 
 
Who loved, who suffer’d countless ills, 
Who battled for the True, the Just, 
Be blown about the desert dust, 
Or seal’d within the iron hills? 
 
No more? A monster then, a dream, 
A discord. Dragons of the prime, 
That tare each other in their slime, 
Were mellow music match’d with him. 
 
O life as futile, then, as frail! 
O for thy voice to soothe and bless! 
What hope of answer, or redress? 
Behind the veil, behind the veil. 
 
Gaskell takes from this section the last three lines, the human cry for comfort and answers to 
the crisis evoked by evolutionary findings that can only imagine resolution after death.
646
 Her 
audience, however, would have brought to mind the rest of the famous section that struggles 
with a harsh—even cruelly callous—Nature, the fear of not just humankind’s extinction but 
the species’ entire erasure from the record of the world, and the grotesquely animalistic basis 
of humanity.
647
 Though, of course, Tennyson published this poem well before Darwin’s 
                                                          
646 Uglow sees Gaskell as “deliberately edit[ing] In Memoriam, to make a negative positive, or at least hopeful” 
(506), but the epigraph can also read as a despairing cry of a person struggling to hold onto faith in the wake 
of loss. 
 
647 Shaw, “Elizabeth Gaskell,” 47; Uglow, 506.  
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Origin appeared, the prominence that Origin brought to evolutionary debate made many 
readers from that day to this evaluate Tennyson’s lines in light of the brutality of natural 
selection.
648
 But there is more to the selection of this epigraph than just the priming of 
readers to consider the darkest implications of evolutionary theory in the novel to follow. The 
use of Tennyson, rather than Darwin, indicates Gaskell’s interest in the power of literary 
evolutionary narratives.  
 If considered from the perspective of biological evolutionary narrative, the story of 
Sylvia’s Lovers would be that of the unfit failing to reproduce and the dominant succeeding 
in their battles for the best mates and resources. In this scenario, it does not matter that 
Daniel was executed, because he had already succeeded in reproducing; Philip would clearly 
be the hero of the tale, not for his attempt to find redemption as a marine or for his 
faithfulness to Sylvia after she had cast him out, but because he outwitted Charley and left 
his offspring with sufficient resources; Sylvia’s anguish is irrelevant because she (like 
females generally in Darwin’s narrative) exists as a vessel through which the successful male 
passes on his lineage; the only marker of the events that passed, a couple of generations after 
the action, would be the presence of Sylvia and Philip’s descendants thriving in the area. But 
that is not the story we get. As Andrew Sanders observes, “We end not with success, but with 
failure and death.”649 Gaskell presents her readers with a complex tale in which all are trying 
to do their best, even if they are misguided—missed connections (such as between Hester 
and Philip, or Hester and William Coulson, or even Sylvia and Philip) occur constantly. 
Psychological reactions are integral to understanding events.
650
 Human suffering is given its 
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649 Sanders, “Introduction,” xvi. 
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due weight. Death is not something that is simply a byproduct of natural processes, but rather 
is a profound occurrence that individuals struggle to come to terms with. If we were not 
given the imaginative historical narrative by Gaskell, we would have no sense of the events 
that had passed: Bella has immigrated, those people who experienced the events firsthand 
have died, and the only remainders of the events are the crumbling almshouses that Hester 
built in memory of Philip and “the tradition of the man who died in a cottage somewhere 
about this spot,—died of starvation while his wife lived in hard-hearted plenty not two good 
stone-throws away” (502). The only means of recovering the past is through historical work 
translated through a literary lens. Evolutionary theory can inform history, certainly, but 
purely biological narrative is insufficient as historical method. There are many individual 
stories nested within the overall narrative that can only be hinted at: Coulson’s forsaken sister 
(192), Jem the consumptive marine whose wife walks until her feet are bloody to meet his 
ship (456), Crazy Nancy who is institutionalized after being abandoned by her lover (187-
88), Philip’s ancestors who are remembered only through the initials carved on an old oak 
chest (156); even the seemingly surface-level Kester has a hidden story of suffering, “for 
Kester, when turned out of the condemned cell, fairly broke down into the heavy sobbing he 
had never thought to sob again on earth” (316, emphasis added). Each of these stories could 
be its own novel, and delving into the nested plots would extend the book far past its 500-odd 
pages. Gaskell models her alternative method at the end of the novel, where the “lady” 
interviewer talks with the “bathing woman” and “a few old people” to learn the strands of 
legend that she then builds up into the story that we just finished reading (502). In fact, this 
narrative frame closely parallels the way that Gaskell researched her story while in Whitby, 
mining the memories and oral traditions of the older locals, especially women, and talking 
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with everyone who might be able to help her construct her narrative.
651
 Her story, tapping 
into traditions of the reappearing lover, thereby becomes more than a period piece; it 
becomes a grand narrative like Darwin’s, but one that is “mythical, fateful, [and] symbolic” 
as well as empirical.
652
 As Lansbury notes, for Gaskell, “Legend without history is mindless 
feeling….History without legend is a dry catalog that seeks in vain to master and subdue 
passion.”653 Like Darwin, she practiced the methods she preached. Sylvia’s Lovers presents 
us with a fictional engagement with history that nonetheless is a serious attempt to process 
and make Darwin’s argument both tangible and human. 
CONCLUSION: DARWINISM’S SOCIAL LEGACY, OR SPENCERIAN THEORY 
 As compared to Chambers’s much-maligned Vestiges, Darwin’s Origin was received 
as a respected scientific work; even its popularity did not work against it, as Vestiges’s did, in 
large part because the Origin is a somewhat difficult although still very readable book.
654
 The 
controversies that followed Origin’s publication, and that are still ongoing today, are both too 
well known and too extensive to warrant thorough discussion here. The darkest implications 
of Darwinian theory—and those most significant to social history—are in fact those that are 
conflated with the work of Herbert Spencer. 
 Spencer originated the phrase “survival of the fittest” in 1852, and Darwin’s 
resistance to the phrase was overcome to the extent that he included it in the fifth (1869) and 
sixth editions (1872) of Origin.
655
 Despite his use of Spencer’s infamous phrase, Darwin 
                                                          
651 Schor, 181; Shaw, “Elizabeth Gaskell,” 53; Shaw, “Other Historical Fiction,” 85; Uglow, 482-83. 
 
652
 Qtn. from Henry, xxviii. See Craik (141), Lansbury (Elizabeth Gaskell, 98), Shaw (“Elizabeth Gaskell,” 43) 
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653 Lansbury, Elizabeth Gaskell, 94. 
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worked to distance himself from Spencer personally and professionally because he thought 
that Spencer put too much stock in the deductive method to form conclusions about natural 
processes and because Spencer also was less hesitant to assert that the term “fittest” 
conveyed a value judgment.
656
 
Spencer’s essays in the Westminster Review (1857-58) were widely read and are often 
described as anticipating Darwin’s theories.657 His take on evolutionary theory, however, was 
particularly influential on social theory in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
and, as a consequence, remains controversial. Though Spencerian evolutionary theory has 
received less critical attention in literary studies than Darwinian theory, it warrants 
consideration in the work of George Eliot especially, the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: 
“The Shape and Limits of Mental Development:  
George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda and Spencerian Evolutionary Psychology” 
 
 George Eliot (1819-80) offers perhaps one of the most generative and daunting 
studies of the interrelation of scientific and literary discourse in the nineteenth century. At the 
center of intellectual and scientific debate as the editor of the Westminster Review for much 
of the 1850s, Eliot maintained her place as a light of the London intelligentsia throughout her 
adult life, as a breathtakingly erudite woman, the partner of George Henry Lewes (an 
intellectual whose interests spanned the philosophical and scientific), and the cohost of an 
elite London salon, not to mention the acquaintance and correspondent of many of the 
leading thinkers of the day. Her final completed novel, Daniel Deronda (1876), has often 
been taken as the capstone to her oeuvre. And yet when literary critics consider evolutionary 
theory in Eliot’s work generally and in Daniel Deronda in particular, most study Charles 
Darwin’s influence, following in the footsteps of Gillian Beer’s seminal Darwin’s Plots 
(1984). Such an approach undervalues Eliot’s intellectual engagement with the evolutionary 
theory of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), her one-time beau and lifelong friend. This chapter 
seeks to address this critical gap, focusing particularly on Daniel Deronda in light of 
Spencer’s evolutionary psychology. 
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 Spencer is responsible for “establishing evolutionary science as a master discourse” 
in the mid- to late nineteenth century, persuading his contemporaries that evolution could 
inform all branches of natural, physical, and social science; he also became a foundational 
figure in a number of social sciences by transitioning fields like sociology, anthropology, and 
especially psychology from personal and philosophical reflections to biologized practices 
informed by standards and statistics.
658
 Moreover, he was the foremost propounder of 
organicism—“the notion that there are certain basic similarities of structure and function 
between societies and biological organisms”—in Victorian Britain.659  
 Nonetheless, Spencer has been and remains a deeply unpopular figure in historical, 
literary, cultural, and scientific studies. Several historians of science and literary critics have 
outlined the reasons for this neglect; on the whole, the trend can be explained by a tendency 
to caricature or scapegoat Spencerian political thought as Social Darwinism while 
simultaneously fearing any association with that disreputable doctrine. The fashionability of 
Darwinism has also obscured consideration of other Victorian evolutionary theories.
660
 When 
it comes to Eliot, then, literary critics tend to dismiss Spencerian thought as incompatible 
with Eliot’s social vision, treating it as mechanistic, misogynistic, dogmatic, and socially 
regressive.
661
  
 A few studies of Spencer and Eliot as mutually informing thinkers and writers exist, 
although most trace Spencerian themes in Eliot’s work by either regarding Eliot as entirely 
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659 Qtn from Paxton, 5; and Taylor, Introduction, xiv. See also Shuttleworth, Nineteenth-Century Science, 9-10. 
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accepting Spencer’s ideas or as entirely opposed to them.662 More often, critics use key 
Spencerian terms in describing Eliot’s project without an awareness or acknowledgement of 
their likely origin, or of the discourse between these giants of the mid-Victorian London 
intelligentsia from which they arose; this tendency occurs particularly in discussions of 
psychology, ethics, and organicism.
663
 The dominant critical trend has considered Darwin as 
representative of mid- to late-Victorian evolutionary theory and seen Eliot’s work in 
particular as Darwinian.
664
 Traits of Eliot’s fiction that are identified as Darwinian, however, 
could just as easily been seen as Spencerian: emphasis on mutation, environmental 
influences, transition, contingency and circumstance, and the generation of alternatives.
665
 
This may be a matter of both evolutionary theorists deriving their ideas from a shared 
scientific and cultural discourse and so “develop[ing] closely parallel conceptions,” or from 
mutual influence—Darwin lists Spencer among evolutionary thinkers whose work preceded 
his own in Origin.
666
 Eliot in particular might have been put off by Darwin’s tendency to use 
anthropomorphic language about nature and design, although scholars frequently note that 
Eliot was troubled by Spencer’s tendency to generalization.667  
Eliot and Spencer maintained an intellectual and personal relationship over nearly 
three decades, and as a consequence their work was mutually informative. Eliot was 
immersed in evolutionary ideas and interested in the power of scientific images long before 
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her acquaintance with Darwin’s work, in part because Spencer was an early proponent of 
evolutionary theory, and in the nineteenth century, she was considered a Spencerian rather 
than a Darwinian.
668
 Eliot was particularly influenced by Spencer’s synthesizing of ethics 
with evolutionary development on an individual psychological and global cultural level.
669
 
Moreover, philosophical preoccupations link the two. Spencer was considered by many to be 
the most important philosopher of his age, and Eliot engages in philosophical writing in her 
novels not “in the sense that they provide literary clothing for philosophical ideas,” but as 
active works of thought experiments, structured observations, and arguments that lead to 
conclusions.
670
 Eliot’s philosophy, like Spencer’s, was deeply enmeshed in the scientific 
concepts, debates, and methodologies of the day, so much so that Diana Postlethwaite opens 
the Cambridge Companion to George Eliot chapter on science with an 1876 passage from 
Henry James in which a character defends Eliot’s use of scientific neologisms: “So long as 
she remains the great literary genius that she is, how can she be too scientific? She is simply 
permeated with the highest culture of the age.”671 This sentiment extended to social sciences 
like psychology and sociology, because such fields were not easily distinguishable from 
natural sciences in the Victorian era, and Spencer further blurred those boundaries.
672
  
 This chapter first outlines Spencer’s evolutionary thought and biography, focusing 
particularly on his intellectual and personal relationship with Eliot. After considering the 
relationship from Eliot’s perspective, I shift attention to analyzing Daniel Deronda in light of 
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Spencerian evolutionary psychology, ethics, and philosophy. Ultimately, I maintain that not 
only did Eliot both rely upon and critique Spencerian frameworks in a complicated manner, 
but also that she approached similar topoi—nationality, trauma, experience, inheritance, 
gender, sympathy, epistemology—informed by a Spencerian synthesis, in which concepts of 
human development and limitations on both the individual and social level must be informed 
by evolutionary theory in order to be properly understood. Her main point of distinction from 
Spencer’s ideology resides in her focus on the individual case study rather than 
generalizations at the level of societies, global movements, or philosophical abstraction. In 
focusing on the individual as the embodiment of evolutionary principles and conflicts, Eliot 
is able to demonstrate the variety of adaptive responses people take to their life situations and 
so overcomes false, antithetical extremes that opponents of the theory might set up. This 
variety, however, suggests that a general movement to an evolutionary endpoint is hardly 
discernible if it exists at all, and so Eliot is less optimistic than Spencer about human 
progress, adopting her typical meliorist stance. 
HERBERT SPENCER’S LAMARCKIAN EVOLUTIONARY SYNTHESIS 
 Spencer’s evolutionary theory—as articulated in its most succinct and focused form 
in “Progress: Its Law and Cause” (1857)—is grand, progressive, and universal, beginning in 
nebula and ending in human culture. His views are not entirely unlike Robert Chambers’s.673 
There are some important differences between Chambers’s work and Spencer’s, however: 
Vestiges was much more controversial and commercially successful, but Spencer’s work was 
not published anonymously, his evolutionary theory was explicated in a number of essays 
and volumes across a wide variety of scientific fields, and his reputation for intellectual rigor 
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brought a supportive elite readership to his evolutionary system.
674
 Spencer also opposed 
Vestiges because he thought that evolution “could only be brought about by adaptation rather 
than progression,” that is, by the innate unfolding of a teleological development according to 
a universal plan that Vestiges promoted.
675
 Spencer’s exposure to evolutionary theories dated 
back to his early life—his father was a member of the Derby Philosophical Society, founded 
by Erasmus Darwin in 1783, and Spencer’s work as a railway engineer in his early twenties 
brought him in contact with fossils that piqued his interest in geology, leading him to Charles 
Lyell’s Principles of Geology in 1840.676 Lyell deeply opposed the evolutionary theory of 
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, which essentially proposed that organisms grow increasingly 
complex over time and adapt to their environmental pressures as they become more 
differentiated from each other; these adaptations, acquired in individual organisms’ lifetimes, 
are inherited by their offspring.
677
 The problem with Lyell’s attempt to discredit Lamarck in 
his Geology was that he went into so much detail that many readers, including Spencer, 
found this first exposure to Lamarckian theory intriguing and persuasive.
678
 Lamarckianism 
was attractive to Spencer, like others, because as Gillian Beer explains it, the theory is 
optimistic, “propos[ing] a world of intelligent desire rationally satisfied,” in which “bad 
behaviour results in loss and degradation” but positive, adaptive behavior gives rise to 
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“intelligent succession” in “a world apparently more or less stable.”679 Spencer committed to 
Lamarckianism for the remainder of his life, bringing to the theory his own concept of the 
inheritance of acquired mental characteristics—instincts, habits, beliefs—and so incorporated 
biology into the previously philosophical fields of psychology and sociology.
680
 Spencer also 
infamously coined the phrase “survival of the fittest” in Principles of Biology (1864) to better 
describe Darwin’s “natural selection” as an evolutionary process that eliminates inferior 
traits; for him, Lamarckian use-inheritance differed by selecting for positive, adaptive traits 
and allowing for survival and advance.
681
 
 Spencer is widely considered to be more of a scientific popularizer than a scientist in 
his own right
682; this minimizing of Spencer’s contributions to nineteenth-century science 
misrepresents how his contemporaries viewed him and how his systematizing was consistent 
with most other scientific figures of the century (including Darwin and Lyell), not to mention 
how powerful his influence on scientific thought was. Spencer is responsible for permanently 
changing scientific terminology so that the theory of evolution is still referred to as such 
today, as opposed to “the development hypothesis” or the many variations that were 
previously in currency.
683
 He felt that “evolution” better captured the universal process of 
increasing complexity, increasing heterogeneity, increasing differentiation (i.e., 
specialization of functions), and increasing integration (i.e., coordination and 
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interdependence of differentiated components) of organisms and societies.
684
 Spencer’s 
interests ranged through a wide variety of disciplines, including philosophy, history, natural 
history, sociology, and psychology, which might make his career seem scattered or 
dilettantish, but in fact he saw evolution as the unifying principle underlying all of them
685
:  
While we think of Evolution as divided into astronomic, geologic, biologic, 
psychologic, sociologic, etc., it may seem to a certain extent a coincidence that the 
same law of metamorphosis holds throughout all its divisions. But when we recognize 
these divisions as mere conventional groupings, made to facilitate the arrangement 
and acquisition of knowledge—when we regard the different existences with which 
they severally deal as component parts of one Cosmos; we see at once that there are 
not several kinds of Evolution having certain traits in common, but one Evolution 
going on everywhere after the same manner.
686
 
 
Evolution does not just apply to physical or biological spheres to Spencer, however, but also 
to “the development of Society, of Government, of Manufactures, of Commerce, of 
Language, Literature, Science, Art”; he calls this process “Super-organic Evolution,” and 
locates its roots in the same kind of organic evolution that is observable in the nonhuman 
animal kingdom.
687
 Spencer counters skeptics who cite the inobservability of the process 
with the argument that evolution is slow, but can produce “marked changes” over the 
millions of years that it has to operate;
688
 in his typically aggressive manner, he argues that 
Creationists have no facts to support their own theory and calls their ideas understandable 
only as coming from “the uneducated and the ill-educated,” and likens such a viewpoint to 
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the naïve “incredulity” of a person surprised to see “a boy, grown into a man” after a number 
of years.
689
 Spencer was remarkably consistent in his views on evolution in the nearly three 
decades that Eliot was familiar with him and his work: evolution, to him, was progressive,
690
 
continuous, universal, observable in all life forms and societies no matter how small and 
localized,
691
 and tending toward increasing happiness.
692
 Spencer applied evolutionary theory 
to human beings as individuals and societies far before Darwin was comfortable doing so—
earning him a place as an important early anthropological thinker—and he considered how 
national characters might be attributable both to environmental pressures that societies face 
and to the inheritance of adaptations to such pressures.
693
 Spencer believed that human 
evolution was to proceed not primarily through physical adaptations, because 
industrialization eliminated or circumvented many environmental pressures, but instead 
through mental and moral progress, especially as people and societies learn increasingly to 
cooperate in a globalized world.
694
 Spencer also viewed women as more inherently altruistic 
than men, and so more morally evolved; depending on one’s perspective, then, Spencer’s 
sociology can seem either to restrict women or to regard women as the drivers of 
evolutionary change, since “the moral progress of humanity is best measured” by the 
standard of women’s improved social standing and sympathetic force.695 
                                                          
689 Spencer, “The Development Hypothesis,” 382, 380. On Spencer’s anti-Creationist arguments, see “The 
Development Hypothesis,”377-82. 
 
690 Spencer, “Progress: Its Law and Cause,” 2-3.  
 
691 Spencer, First Principles, “Part II: The Known,” 538. 
 
692 Spencer, Principles of Psychology, 620. 
 
693 Richards, Darwin, 285; Taylor, Philosophy, 62; Zappen, 154. 
 
694 Bowler, Non-Darwinian Revolution, 138; Francis, 291; Richards, Darwin, 272-73. 
 
695 Qtn. from Gray, 222; see also Francis, 53; Paxton, 211; Toise, 134-35. 
  230 
 Unlike Darwin, who was independently wealthy, Spencer needed to support himself 
with his writing. He therefore “was more than happy to include controversial and explicitly 
political argumentation in his published scientific treatises,” and often turned to social theory 
in part because it “generally sold better than more specialized scientific work.”696 He usually 
published his writings serially in periodicals and then issued them in volumes to maximize 
his exposure and profits.
697
 Spencer was canny enough to hitch his wagon to Darwin’s 
Origin—particularly the respect accorded it in professional scientific circles—and the 
Darwin circle opened to Spencer because of his commitment to promoting evolutionary 
theory, even though he felt natural selection played at best a small role in evolution and never 
gave up on Lamarckianism as a primary explanatory method.
698
 Before Spencer’s alliance 
with Darwinism, his sales were low: two hundred copies of Principles of Philosophy between 
1855 and 1862, seven hundred and fifty of Social Statics between 1851 and 1862, two 
hundred copies of Principles of Psychology between 1855 and 1856, and an additional thirty-
five by 1860.
699
 On the other hand, Spencer’s post-Origin philosophical opus, First 
Principles, was published in 1860 and met a welcoming scientific public open to its 
grounding of evolutionary theory in “a Kantian epistemology and a critical realism”; its 
initial purchasers included J. S. Mill, Darwin, T. H. Huxley, and Joseph Dalton Hooker.
700
 
Spencer’s Study of Sociology (1873), published as three-book volumes just one month after 
the series of articles that comprised the same material finished their run in the Contemporary 
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Review, sold over 26,000 copies.
701
 His sociology considered the evolution of cultures from 
different historical periods and geographical regions, a perspective which “prompted sharp 
criticism from British historians in the 1870s.”702 Spencer’s widest audience was reached 
through his Data of Ethics (1879), which promoted his philosophical theories and social 
scientific approach to altruism.
703
  
 Spencer’s social philosophy is often pigeonholed as social Darwinism, but in fact his 
legacy is quite wide-reaching: he is considered foundational both to modern libertarian and to 
modern socialist movements.
704
 That two such diverging political theories could be inspired 
by Spencer points to the complicated nature of his social thought, which is generally unfairly 
boiled down to “survival of the fittest.” Spencer opposed government-mandated 
benefaction—such as the New Poor Law of 1834—based on the belief that it was ineffective 
in alleviating suffering in the short-term and that it inhibited the development and inheritance 
of altruistic behavior in the species as instincts in the long-term. Spencer also believed, 
however, that a perfect, universal altruism would be the endpoint of social evolution.
705
 This 
would, in turn, make government unnecessary in the future utopia.
706
 Michael Taylor 
explains this complicated Spencerian notion, based on Lamarckian principles of inheriting 
acquired characteristics: 
the moral qualities which formed “character” were similar to physical powers to the 
extent that each required exercise to reach their full development. If individuals were 
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permitted the freedom to exercise these qualities, as well as to experience the 
consequences of their conduct, then their moral powers would be strengthened and 
passed on from generation to generation according to the Lamarckian mechanism of 
the inheritance of acquired characteristics. With each generation the moral powers 
would grow, until eventually they would become “organic” in the race and behaving 
morally would become (quite literally) second nature. Thus his objection to “state 
interference”—for example in their form of the Poor Law—was that by absolving 
individuals of their personal responsibility, either for self or others, it weakened the 
moral qualities, thereby undermining character and indefinitely postponing the 
promised future time when every individual would spontaneously act in a moral 
way.
707
 
 
Social evolution, to Spencer, necessitates individual adaptation to social life, widespread and 
voluntary cooperation, and a government small enough not to impede such a movement 
toward a universal peace, happiness, and radical equality.
708
 Thus, not only is evolution 
through adaptation and inheritance of acquired traits progressive, it is also purposive and 
moral.
709
 Spencer was perhaps the most influential nineteenth-century theorist of 
evolutionary ethics as well as of altruism, with the 1870s witnessing three of his major 
publications promoting an altruistic vision of individual and social evolution: the second 
edition of The Principles of Psychology (1870-72), The Study of Sociology (1873), and The 
Data of Ethics (1879).
710
 Spencer’s wide popularity and influence might be partly due to the 
fact that his vision of evolutionary theory was a “more ‘humanized’ biological process” than 
most—including Darwin’s natural selection—and as such, “did not necessarily entail the 
moral bankruptcy that was claimed for evolutionary theory by anxious commentators.”711 
Despite Spencer’s focus on the development and perfection of human morality—or perhaps 
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because of it—he was unpopular with the Victorian religious establishment, in its many 
forms: Anglicans and Dissenters alike felt that viewing evolution as a moral force was 
subversive and distracted from the “true” path to moral growth because it minimized 
individuality.
712
 Spencer was not particularly concerned with such critiques, however, 
because of his own unwavering agnosticism and lack of a particular crisis of faith, like that 
experienced by so many Victorian intellectuals, from Carlyle to Darwin to Eliot.
713
 
The Afterlife of Spencer’s Thought and Reputation 
 Twentieth-century critics were not very sympathetic to Spencer’s philosophy or 
literary influence, in part because his famous philosophical notion of the Unknowable (to be 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter) came across as “a pathetic Victorian attempt 
at spiritual survival in a world without God.” To the Victorians, on the other hand, Spencer’s 
thought was deeply compelling—his concept of the Unknowable was a “necessary 
counterpart” to the exponentially increasing investigations of the Knowable.714 Spencer was 
widely considered to be “one of the world’s greatest philosophers,” “the philosopher of his 
time”715; in fact, he might have been the first philosopher to sell one million copies of his 
work during his lifetime.
716
 Spencer was at the height of his fame in the 1870s and 1880s, 
primarily because of his Synthetic Philosophy, which brought an evolutionary perspective to 
a number of biological and social scientific fields as well as to philosophical and theological 
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concerns.
717
 As a consequence, Spencer could not be ignored by major Victorian thinkers, 
even if they had preferred otherwise.
718
 As one historian of science puts it, “Spencer’s work 
established an intellectual climate for several generations of theorists, who became imbued 
with his perception of the mental evolution of organisms and their social dependencies.”719 
Though Spencer was never a celebrity per se, his status as a major thinker spread around the 
globe, so that he has been described as “the first international public intellectual whose 
views—on everything from politics and religion to the most humane way to kill lobsters—
were listened to by a large and devoted audience.”720 While biographers and historians of 
science at the turn of the century idolized Spencer, other thinkers parodied his extensive 
system, as we can see in William James’s quip that, for Spencer, “evolution is a change from 
a no-howish untalkaboutable all-alikeness to a somehowish and in general talkaboutable not-
all-alikeness by continuous sticktogetherations and somethingelseifications.”721 
Spencer was particularly popular in the United States, where he undertook a three-
month speaking tour in 1882 that was successful in spite of his lack of charisma because of 
the ease of adapting some of his ideas to Emersonian notions of self-reliance, to 
industrialists’ need for a philosophy to justify their economic power, and to the general 
postbellum search for an evolutionary system to explain the seemingly Godless behavior of 
the Civil War.
722
 The term “social Darwinist” was first used to describe Spencerian adherents 
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in America after 1900, where his influence spread over a wide variety of fields, including 
psychology, sociology, philosophy, political theory, economics, ethics, and theology.
723
 
Consequently, the American novelist Jack London is most frequently cited by literary critics 
as deeply influenced by Spencer’s evolutionary philosophy.724 The American novelist Frank 
Norris also both engaged and critiqued Spencerian theory in works from the first decade of 
the twentieth century.
725
 Spencer’s literary influence was not limited to the United States, 
however, and can be seen in Anton Chekov’s novels, Friedrich Nietzsche’s ethics, and at 
least one of Olive Schreiner’s novels.726 In Britain, Eliza Lynn Linton wrote about Spencer in 
her fictionalized memoir, H. G. Wells used a Spencerian character as the hero in The Food of 
the Gods (1904), and Thomas Hardy was deeply impressed by Spencer’s concept of the 
Unknowable, so much so that he wrote that Spencer’s philosophy might have been more 
important for him than Schopenhauer’s.727 Spencer also tends to appear as an important 
cultural influence for well-read characters in literature of the 1880s through early 1900s, 
most notably in Sarah Grand’s The Heavenly Twins (1893).728 His ideas might have found 
their deepest engagement in Eliot’s oeuvre, however. 
Spencer and Eliot 
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Famously, Herbert Spencer shared with George Eliot “the only romantic episode in 
an apparently loveless life.”729 The two met in the offices of John Chapman, the publisher 
who employed and housed Eliot when she first moved to London; she quickly came to share 
the opinion of such intellectuals as George Henry Lewes, Thomas Henry Huxley the 
scientific popularizer, and John Tyndall the physicist that Spencer was “a forceful and 
original thinker.”730 Eliot and Spencer shared a similar upbringing among Midlands 
Dissenters, with little formal education, but a drive to move to the intellectual hub of the 
country in London and to succeed there through writing.
731
 Although Spencer rejected Eliot’s 
attempts to move their relationship from companionate and intellectual to romantic and 
marital, he kept a photograph of her in his bedroom until his death in 1903; he also did not 
destroy her love letters to him, suggesting that her affection meant something more to him 
than he ever admitted.
732
 Critics tend to blame Spencer’s inability to develop romantic 
feelings for Eliot on the fact that she defied his evolutionary and gender categories, as 
physically and intellectually more masculine than average, but at least one biographer blames 
his frigidness on his concern that getting involved with a woman would bring out in him his 
father’s abusive tendencies.733 Spencer remained supportive of Eliot and Lewes’s 
relationship,
734
 and was even sympathetic toward Eliot’s decision to marry John Cross near 
the end of her life; he was pleased that Eliot and Cross were rereading his Ethics and 
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Sociology together, believing that Eliot maintained agreement with him on most points.
735
 He 
commented in his Autobiography that this sympathy extended to the point that his “influence 
might have been more manifest in further works if she had lived to write them.”736 Eliot 
particularly praised Spencer’s “Progress: Its Law and Cause” and Principles of Psychology, 
even suggesting a particular sentence that Spencer used as inspiration for his Psychology 
(jettisoning a different phrasing of Mill’s).737 Although multiple critics have commented on 
Spencer’s desire to deny Eliot’s influence upon his thought and work,738 such judgments are 
unfair: he cited Eliot’s help in his Psychology, he wrote to an American correspondent that he 
and Eliot were mutually influential, and John Fiske (an American Spencerian) quoted 
Spencer’s opinion that Eliot “is the greatest woman that has lived on the earth—the female 
Shakespeare, so to speak.”739 Eliot’s and Spencer’s common developing interest in altruism 
is paradigmatic of their co-constitutive intellectual influence.
740
 Although Spencer was not 
particularly inclined toward the arts, including literature, he valued her openness to 
intellectual discussion and came “to respect her serious view of fiction as an art form”; he, in 
fact, once asked that the London Library remove all novels except Eliot’s because he felt 
they were the “only serious works.”741 
GEORGE ELIOT 
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Mary Anne Evans (who changed her name to Mary Ann in 1836, Marian in 1850, 
back to Mary Ann in 1880, and of course famously adopted George Eliot as a nom-de-plume 
in 1859, each renaming reflecting a major life change and decision to reinvent herself)
742
 
spent the first half of her life in a religious family in the Midlands, and the second half as one 
of the brightest and most influential literary lights in London. As one biographer puts it, she 
“was born into Jane Austen’s England and died in Thomas Hardy’s. Although she lived only 
sixty-one years—as against the four score of several other Victorian writers—she spanned 
perhaps the most important years of the nineteenth century.”743 She retains her place, “along 
with Dickens [as] the preeminent novelist of the nineteenth century.”744 Her astonishing 
breadth and depth of intellectualism still makes her work a daunting study for present-day 
literary critics who have a century and a half of other critical work to contend with. Eliot’s 
novels are both deeply psychological and social, concerned with aesthetics, gender politics, 
and philosophy at the same time as physical, biological, and social science. Her role as the 
editor of the Westminster Review in the early 1850s put her in touch with many of the most 
prominent thinkers of the age, and enabled her “to speak with familiarity and authority…to 
and about most of the important scientific theorists of her time.”745 Her movement from a 
nominally Anglican household to evangelical religious fervor to an independent freethinker 
broadened her sympathies and understanding of the contentious issues that science raised in 
the mid-nineteenth century, but also prepared her to accept seemingly revolutionary changes 
in thought, including evolutionary theory, that deeply disturbed many of her contemporaries. 
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In many ways, she is also representative of the Victorian Era in her tendency toward 
gradualist and meliorist social philosophies, rather than radicalism.
746
 
Eliot’s Relationship with Spencer 
Eliot met Spencer in 1851, but they became closer in 1852, after she relocated to 
London and her complicated relationship with Chapman stalled; Spencer invited her to 
performances at concert halls and theaters, which he was required to attend and review as 
part of his responsibilities as a sub-editor for the Economist.
747
 Biographers tend to agree that 
Eliot was drawn to Spencer largely because of her intense loneliness, both romantic and 
intellectual, and the fact that he was probably the closest to an intellectual equal she had 
encountered.
748
 Their intellectual relationship continued long after her hopes for romance 
were crushed by his blatant rejection of her expressions of love in July of 1852.
749
 
Redeemingly, Spencer was responsible for introducing Eliot and Lewes twice, once casually 
in 1851 and the second time in the (successful) hope of sparking a romantic interest between 
his friends in 1852.
750
 Spencer also earned Eliot’s acceptance for evolutionary theory long 
before Darwin’s Origin was published, although his view of evolution has been called a 
“conservatizing influence” on her thought, particularly where it concerns feminism.751  
George Eliot’s journals demonstrate her long personal and intellectual engagement 
with Spencer. Her entries involving him are usually almost telegraphic in their brevity, 
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recording Spencer’s visits and talks, without much detail about what the conversation 
entailed.
752
 She refers to him with pity on a personal level, especially on Christmases, as 
“our…lonely friend.”753 She occasionally records their conversational subjects as having to 
do with philosophy, Eliot’s writing, or Spencer’s work, including his long-planned 
autobiography.
754
 Long after their initial publication, however, Eliot notes that she is 
rereading some of Spencer’s major writings, including his Principles of Psychology in 1879 
and his Principles of Sociology in 1880, demonstrating that her engagement with his work 
was long-term and cyclical, so that his ideas retained their salience for her for decades.
755
 
George Eliot’s letters tell a similar story. Spencer makes fairly frequent appearances 
in her correspondence as a subject, particularly to her friend Sara Hennell. Throughout the 
1850s, Eliot regularly enthuses about Spencer’s writings to Hennell. She praises his article on 
the Universal Postulate in the October 1853 issue of the Westminster Review as “first-rate” 
and notes that its ideas made the author “a great deal talked of” at Cambridge756; she 
describes his article on the “Genesis of Science” “grand,” and leading her to believe that he is 
“an original and profound philosophical writer” whose psychological studies will earn him a 
place in history.
757
 First Principles comes in for particular praise, as “superior to anything he 
has done before” because “it is less barely intellectual—the considerations are larger”; she 
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declares herself “supremely gratified by” this “result of his riper thought.”758 Nearly two 
decades later, we find Eliot advising Spencer to focus on his “Ethics,” as “something more 
needed than even the completion of the Sociological portion” of his oeuvre.759 After more 
than twenty years of acquaintance, Eliot writes of Spencer that she believes herself “indebted 
to him for much enlargement and clarifying of thought.”760 She frequently writes of 
Spencer’s visits that they are pleasant, he is cheerful, and the conversation is clever, 
welcome, stimulating, and enjoyably argumentative.
761
 Although Eliot acknowledges a gulf 
between her opinions on “art and classical literature” and Spencer’s, she notes that “His is a 
friendship which wears well, because of his truthfulness: that makes amends for <other> 
many deficits.”762 Her most recurring complaint about Spencer is his lack of sympathy, not 
just with Eliot and Lewes personally, but as a capacity.
763
 Graciously, Eliot repeatedly 
forgives Spencer this lack of sympathetic interest, saying “what a man is not conscious of he 
must not answer for,” and her last recorded words on him, two and a half weeks before her 
death, endorsed his genius: “He has so much teaching which the world needs.”764 
Summary and Critical Appraisal of Daniel Deronda 
Daniel Deronda opens at a roulette table in Leubronn, where Gwendolen Harleth, an 
attractive but headstrong woman, finds her luck turn for the worse at the moment that she 
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notices a handsome stranger, Daniel Deronda, watching her from across the room. She 
returns to her chambers to find a letter revealing that her family’s meager fortune has been 
lost and she is being called home by her mother. The narrative then shifts back several 
months to Gwendolen’s move with her family, which consists of her twice-widowed mother 
and four half-sisters from the second marriage, to be close to the guidance of her uncle, the 
Reverend Gascoigne. We learn of Gwendolen’s desire for independence and admiration, and 
of her complex psychology generally, in part as we see her courted by the heir to the local 
minor aristocracy’s fortune. She plans to accept Mallinger Grandcourt’s marriage proposal 
before discovering that he fathered four children with a mistress, Lydia Glasher, who 
believes herself to be his only rightful wife, and so Gwendolen flees to the continent to 
gamble away her distress. The narrative then shifts to Daniel, who was raised by 
Grandcourt’s uncle, Sir Hugo Mallinger, and is widely believed to be Sir Hugo’s illegitimate 
son. We read of Daniel’s rude awakening to this possibility as an adolescent, his subsequent 
anxiety on the subject, and his consequent altruism toward those he considers wronged or 
suffering. While rowing the Thames one day, Daniel discovers a striking young woman 
trying to drown herself and saves her; she turns out to be Mirah Lapidoth, a Jewish singer 
who fled her father’s attempts to sell her into concubinage, but who has been unable to 
discover the mother and brother she was separated from as a child. Daniel takes her to the 
house of a college friend, Hans Meyrick, where Mirah can be cared for by the Meyrick 
women. Mirah is desperate to be reunited with her mother and brother, Ezra Cohen, but 
Daniel’s search for them is hesitant, marked by an antisemitism he is not fully conscious or 
proud of, and which eventually leads him to a rather stereotypical pawnbroker by the name of 
Mirah’s brother. This pawnbroker has as a houseguest a consumptive but remarkable 
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intellectual Jew called Mordecai, who is convinced from the first that Daniel is also a Jew, 
sent to help him complete his own Zionist mission to create a Jewish nation—something 
Daniel vehemently, almost fearfully denies. Meanwhile, Gwendolen returns home and finds 
herself needing to choose between an unpleasant governess position and Grandcourt’s suit, 
and selects the latter. She learns, to her dismay, that her husband is not as innocuous as she 
believed during courtship, and strives to control her every gesture. In her misery, she turns to 
Daniel as a guide toward self-improvement, a role he takes on hesitantly and partially. Daniel 
discovers over time, by humoring him and trying to better understand his thought, that 
Mordecai is actually Mirah’s brother and so reunites the siblings. He also receives a 
summons from his long-lost mother to travel to Genoa to see her. When this long-awaited 
meeting occurs, however, Daniel finds not the broken waif he imagined for years, but a 
princess (by marriage) who was once the most celebrated singer in Europe—she reveals his 
Jewish heritage, which she considered a form of bondage and tried to keep from him by 
having him raised by one of her most devoted admirers as an English gentleman. Daniel 
bumps into Gwendolen and Grandcourt, who were forced to put ashore in Genoa by some 
damage done to their Mediterranean yacht; angered by this coincidence, Grandcourt insists 
that Gwendolen accompany him in a sailing expedition, during which he is knocked from the 
boat and drowns while his wife freezes, unable to throw him the rope he calls for, until she 
jumps in the sea in a belated and useless gesture. Gwendolen is tortured by the image of 
Grandcourt’s drowned face, and brought home by her uncle and mother to recuperate, having 
gained very little from her husband’s will. Daniel tries to comfort her, but leaves to claim his 
grandfather’s trunk of philosophical and religious papers from Germany—his heritage—then 
returns to England to reveal his ethnicity to Mirah and Mordecai. Mirah and Daniel marry, 
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but Mordecai dies before they can leave for their much-discussed journey to the East, where 
Daniel plans to study the situation of Jews to consider the possibilities for a renewed national 
center. 
 Eliot’s final completed novel was written between 1874 and 1876, though she began 
research for it in mid-1873, and it was published in monthly Books or Parts from February 
through September 1876.
765
 The action of the novel is set one decade in the past, from 1864 
through 1866, as is evident from the political debates and contemporaneous events 
referenced by the characters: the American Civil War and consequent Cotton Famine in 
Britain, the Morant Bay Rebellion, Otto von Bismarck’s push for German unification, and 
the debate leading up to the Second Reform Bill.
766
 And yet these significant global events 
and other social justice concerns of the day slip into the background in Daniel Deronda, 
fleshing out without dramatically informing the narrative.
767
 Thus, while critics have referred 
to the novel as “a capstone” of Eliot’s oeuvre, her “her final long statement in fiction,” they 
also acknowledge that it is “the final and comprehensive expression of George Eliot’s 
idealism” on a personal, individual level and that it is deeply experimental.768 From the time 
of its publication, Daniel Deronda was critiqued as divided between its “Jewish” (aka 
Daniel) and “English” (aka Gwendolen) halves, a move away from the organic integration of, 
say, Middlemarch, where the Dorothea and Lydgate plotlines similarly diverge but were seen 
to hold together better in an overall vision; Eliot was frustrated by this interpretation of the 
novel, since, as biographer Frederick Karl puts it, “she saw the material as associative, 
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reciprocal, and interlocked.”769 She was heartened, however, by the generally positive 
response from the Jewish community.
770
  
PSYCHOLOGY: EXPERIENCE MEETS INHERITANCE 
 Key to understanding the character’s motivations and relationships in Daniel 
Deronda is understanding their basis in Spencerian psychology.
771
 In 1855, Spencer 
published his Principles of Psychology, which proposed a neurally based associationist 
psychology that relied on Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics—in this case, 
such characteristics were mental, or as Spencer puts it, “psychical.” Spencer’s major 
contribution to the field of psychology was to be the first to apply evolutionary principles to 
it, and so to make it a biological, scientific study—the social science that it is today.772 
Psychology, Spencer claims, is in many ways a master science, and in fact displays 
phenomena such as evolution and adjustment to internal and external circumstances that “all 
other sciences” also demonstrate.773 For Spencer, nervous system firings in response to 
stimuli lead to the formation of neural pathways, which associate such stimuli with certain 
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circumstances or outcomes; these generate instincts, defined by Spencer as “complex reflex 
action” that is not substantially differentiated from habits; neural associative pathways also 
generate memories, which he says arise from “forming fragments of correspondences.”774 
The more an animal (whether human or nonhuman) repeats certain experiences, the stronger 
its neural associations become, although if an “exceptional” experience occurs that is “utterly 
at variance with the ordinary course of nature,” it can also form an uncommonly strong 
association.
775
 Such associations manifest themselves as consciousness. Emotions, 
rationality, even the human notion of free will are explicable at (and reducible to) this 
automatic cognitive level.
776
 These associations are inherited as physical traits:  
Hereditary transmission, displayed alike in all the plants we cultivate, in all the 
animals we breed, and in the human race, applies not only to physical but to psychical 
peculiarities. It is not simply that a modified form of constitution produced by new 
habits of life, is bequeathed to future generations; but it is that the modified nervous 
tendencies produced by such new habits of life, are also bequeathed: and if the new 
habits of life become permanent, the tendencies become permanent. This is illustrated 
in every creature respecting which we have the requisite experience, from man 
downwards.
777
 
 
In humans specifically, Spencer believes that the inheritance of acquired mental 
characteristics or habits can be observed most clearly by comparing different races, 
demonstrating what might seem to be an essentialist anthropological tendency, typical of 
many nineteenth-century systematists including Darwin, to identify “warlike, peaceful, 
nomadic, maritime, hunting, commercial races—races that are independent or slavish, active 
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or slothful”; it is important to note, however, that these “national characters,” as Spencer 
describes them, are complex responses to environmental phenomena that have warranted 
well-adapted habits of life, which in turn have become “organic” over time.778 His views are 
a little more nuanced and open to change, then, than some of the stadial evolutionary 
anthropological thinkers who drew on essentializing racial hierarchies in order to justify 
European repression of colonized peoples. 
 Eliot and Lewes both deeply admired Spencer’s Psychology, seeing it for the 
conceptual leap forward that it was, writing highly of its evolutionary and associational 
frameworks, and lending copies to friends.
779
 Daniel Deronda expresses a similar concern 
with psychology, which Eliot calls “a strange spiritual chemistry going on within us, so that a 
lazy stagnation or even a cottony milkiness may be preparing one knows not what biting or 
explosive material” (269). Like Spencer, Eliot praises psychology as a supreme field of 
study, though in her case the concern is with exploring what the “chemical process” tells us 
about the dynamics of the individual human mind and interactions between people rather 
than with outlining the mental processes that are shared between human and nonhuman 
animal species, as in Spencer (362). Her final novel is sprinkled with key terms from 
Spencer’s particular brand of associationist evolutionary psychology outlined in Principles of 
Psychology, including “impulse,” “habit,” “nerves,” “reflex,” “impression,” and “automatic.” 
Eliot provides for the reader such salient examples of reflexive and destructive psychological 
processes as “The navvy waking from sleep and without malice heaving a stone to crush the 
life out of his still sleeping comrade…[who] lack[s] the trained motive which makes a 
character fairly calculable in its actions” (269). It is a striking example, but one that Eliot 
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leaves underexplored. Two of the most in-depth case studies of associationist psychology and 
heritable mental characteristics in a Spencerian evolutionary vein are of Gwendolen 
Harleth—whose mental associations and inheritances are ultimately destructive and lead to 
an evolutionary endstop—and Daniel Deronda—whose traits are redemptive and promise 
progress for the future of his family and nation. 
 Gwendolen and Daniel are both ciphers to themselves and to those around them 
because of their lack of knowledge about their ancestries, which in Spencerian psychological 
terms determines their baseline psychological tendencies. Gwendolen, we are told, is 
particularly subject to her habitual mental traits, “simply following her antipathy and 
inclination, confiding in them as she did in the more reflective judgments into which they 
entered as sap into leafage” (102). Gwendolen has no memory of her father, though she is 
aware that he came from an upper-class, perhaps aristocratic family, whose members felt that 
he had stepped down so much in marrying Gwendolen’s mother that they are uninterested in 
her (17). Gwendolen refuses to ask her mother about her father, or even about her mother’s 
life prior to her second, disastrous marriage, so the characters and readers alike are left 
uncertain about which of Gwendolen’s traits were inherited from each side of the family and 
which arose from Gwendolen’s own life experiences.780 We receive some suggestive hints, 
however: Gwendolen’s maternal grandfather made his fortune in the West Indies (17, 51), 
and the problematics of being descended from such an imperialist and likely slaveowner are 
alluded to through the character of Grandcourt, who refers to “the Jamaican negro” as 
“beastly” in polite conversation and who, the narrator tells us, would have preferred 
extermination to pacification (279, 507). So it may be Gwendolen’s grandfather to whom she 
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owes her frequently cited snake-like quality that is attributed at one point to “a trace of 
demon ancestry” (55), not to mention her fits of violence that cause her, for example, to kill 
her sister’s canary simply because it irritates her (18). Then again, Gwendolen’s mother is so 
conscious of her daughter’s paternal inheritance that she worries Gwendolen will likewise die 
from a riding accident (62). Gwendolen is drawn to horses, as her father apparently was, an 
inclination that could be attributed to a long-standing habit of the upper classes to use horses 
for fighting and recreation; she says “I never like my life so well as when I am on horseback, 
having a great gallop, I think nothing. I only feel myself strong and happy” (92-93). 
Gwendolen’s desire to participate in the hunt is instinctual but explicitly not developed from 
her own experience: “The colour, the stir of the field had taken possession of Gwendolen 
with a strength which was not due to habitual association, for she had never yet ridden after 
the hounds—only said she would like to do it” (57). Her fearlessness in action, her “inborn 
energy of egoistic desire,” “that sense of superior claims which made a large part of her 
consciousness,” and her determination to have her own way at all costs to others (58, 33, 11, 
32-33) are all reminiscent of Matthew Arnold’s presentation of the upper classes (aka the 
Barbarians) in Culture and Anarchy (1867-68), further gesturing toward her mental and 
emotional inheritance from her father.
781
 It also explains her comfort with her upward social 
mobility, which several other characters observe makes it seem as though she was born and 
raised in the aristocracy rather than marrying into it. 
 If Gwendolen’s father is primarily responsible for her inherited mental characteristics, 
then, Nancy Henry has persuasively argued that her stepfather is to blame for her habitual 
associations with terror. Henry demonstrates that many of Gwendolen’s unusual fears, such 
as sleeping away from her mother or finding herself alone in a field, are explicable as the 
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result of sexual assault, giving a double meaning to the title of the first book, which refers to 
Gwendolen: “The Spoiled Child.”782 Gwendolen, we are told, is “subject to physical 
antipathies” (101), as “the life of passion had begun negatively in her” (67), and we see her 
aversion to physical and emotional intimacy from men, such as when she rebukes Grandcourt 
for kissing her neck (275-76). Perhaps because of her early sexual trauma, Gwendolen has a 
“liability…to fits of spiritual dread,” which are not religious but rather associated with a loss 
of a sense of willpower, causing the narrator to call “helpless” “terror” “her native” emotion 
(51, 52, 247). Gwendolen herself does not understand “these occasional experiences, which 
seemed like a brief remembered madness, an unexplained exception from her normal life” 
(51). According to Spencer’s psychological principles, this terror would get stronger each 
time it is re-experienced as it reinforces the neural pathway. This is exactly what we see with 
the notorious “dead face.” When Gwendolen’s family moves into their new home, her 
younger half-sister opens a hinged panel that reveals “the picture of an upturned dead face, 
from which an obscure figure seemed to be fleeing with outstretched arms” that causes 
Gwendolen to shudder and angrily rebuke Isabel for “open[ing] things which were meant to 
be shut up,” before locking the panel and pocketing the key herself (20). During a later 
tableau vivant performance, the vibrations from a “thunderous chord” struck on the piano 
cause the panel to open suddenly; the audience is startled, but Gwendolen screams and 
freezes “like a statue into which a soul of Fear had entered: her pallid lips were parted; her 
eyes, usually narrowed under their long lashes, were dilated and fixed” (49). Jill Matus notes 
that “The incident of the panel…introduces the novel’s exploration of the effects of shock on 
a particularly susceptible consciousness. If the painting provokes an exaggerated response in 
                                                          
782
 Henry 217, 225-28; See also Herzog, Penner, and Reimer. Matus argues that Gwendolen displays “textbook 
symptoms of trauma or PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder)” at a time when “the concept of trauma as a 
psychic wound was barely on the horizon” (59). 
  251 
the way it springs into view, it is also terrifying because it is a return of something that has 
already caused Gwendolen fear.”783 Although she tries to suppress this experience from her 
own memory and from those of her witnesses, Gwendolen never really moves beyond this 
experience. The less control she is able to assert in her marriage, the more terror she finds 
herself experiencing, perhaps in part because of the unavoidable sexual intimacy with her 
husband. When Gwendolen fantasizes about murdering Grandcourt, her fear is of perpetual 
guilt, which takes the form of “a white dead face from which she was for ever trying to flee 
and for ever held back” (577); and when he finally drowns, Gwendolen witnesses the dead 
face transferred from art to her imagination to reality, and finds herself mentally 
incapacitated through the end of the narrative, reflecting “I shall never get away from it” 
(590). The dead face, then, seems to represent a revenge fantasy on a controlling and sexually 
exploitative male—first her stepfather, and then her husband—which exerts more power over 
Gwendolen’s consciousness each time the image appears to her internally or externally, as 
her associations with it are reinforced. She needs Daniel to help her form new associations 
with her own actions, to teach her how to think in new ways, a role that he is not entirely 
capable of fulfilling. 
 Although many readers find themselves more interested in Gwendolen’s 
psychology—which, ironically, becomes increasingly less of a concern for the narrative as it 
progresses
784—Graham Handley notes that “Daniel is just as psychologically integrated as 
Gwendolen.”785 He also as clearly represents the Spencerian integration of associationist 
psychology with Lamarckian use-inheritance. Daniel’s most defining mental association 
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through most of the narrative is with his unknown mother. The idea that he is illegitimate and 
that his mother might have suffered or still be suffering strikes him when he is an adolescent, 
“enter[ing] his mind, and… chang[ing] the aspect of his habitual feelings” as he “brought 
such knowledge into an association with his own lot” for the first time (141), giving him “a 
new sense in relation to all the elements of his life” (142). Thus, he is sensitive to comments 
on his appearance because he is under the impression that he resembles his mother (158), and 
he rescues Mirah because her attempt at drowning herself “stirred a fibre that lay close to his 
deepest interest in the fates of women—‘perhaps my mother was like this one’” (162), even 
though “the habit of his mind [was] to connect dread with unknown parentage” (177). 
Otherwise, “Daniel’s tastes were altogether in keeping with his nurture” (143). Thus, even 
when Daniel finds out that he is Jewish, he cannot entirely identify as such, telling his 
mother, “The effect of my education can never be done away with. The Christian sympathies 
in which my mind was reared can never die out of me….But I consider it my duty—it is the 
impulse of my feeling—to identify myself, as far as possible, with my hereditary people, and 
if I can see any work to be done for them that I can give my soul and hand to, I shall choose 
to do it” (566). Leonora’s skepticism about Daniel’s ability to embrace what he views as his 
grandfather’s mission has to do with the fact that, like his beloved Mirah, he “is attached to 
the Judaism [he] knows nothing of” (570). Experience and inheritance are not necessarily 
unified or even unifiable. Daniel himself takes an ambivalent stand on the issue, arguing that 
“To delight in doing things because our fathers did them is good if it shuts out nothing better; 
it enlarges the range of affection—and affection is the broadest basis of good in life,” but that 
ultimately age or continuity is not in itself a reason for retaining the habits of one’s ancestors 
(357). 
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Early in the book, Daniel reflects, “I am not sure that I want to be an ancestor….It 
doesn’t seem to me the rarest sort of origination” (138), and for most of the book it seems 
that he may avoid this participation in the biological evolutionary processes that are 
necessary for the inheritance of acquired habits. (Spencer and Eliot both opted out of such 
evolution by themselves dying childless.) In fact, although Daniel marries Mirah in the final 
chapter, Daniel Deronda is unique among Eliot’s comic novels for the lack of children at the 
end, replaced instead by a vision of national purpose that is unachieved, as Daniel has not left 
England to pursue his Zionistic education.
786
 From his childhood onward, the narrator subtly 
underscores the importance of his “inborn” characteristics, like affection and “lovingness” 
(145), the same terms his mother Leonora later uses to describe his father’s all-consuming 
traits (541).
787
 Mordecai pushes his vision of spiritual union based on shared inheritance too 
hard on Daniel, both before and after Daniel discovers his Jewish heritage, and Daniel pushes 
back, saying, “what we can’t hinder must not make our rule for what we ought to 
choose….Don’t ask me to deny my spiritual parentage when I am finding the clue of my life 
in the recognition of my natural parentage” (643). The notion of choosing natural or spiritual 
inheritance for oneself or for another is unthinkable for Daniel (430, 538), who instead 
subscribes to the notion of inherited mental characteristics on a personal and a broad species 
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level
788
; he defines his understanding of this Lamarckian notion, repackaged in Spencerian 
psychology as 
an inherited yearning—the effect of brooding, passionate thoughts in many 
ancestors—thoughts that seem to have been intensely present in my grandfather. 
Suppose the stolen offspring of some mountain tribe brought up in a city of the plain, 
or one with an inherited genius for painting, and born blind—the ancestral life would 
lie within them as a dim longing for unknown objects and sensations, and the spell-
bound habit of their inherited frames would be like a cunningly-wrought musical 
instrument, never played upon, but quivering throughout in uneasy mysterious 
moanings of its intricate structure that, under the right touch, gives music. Something 
like that, I think, has been my experience. (642)  
 
This issue is brought to the forefront of the narrative when Daniel meets his mother, Leonora, 
who tried to circumvent the inheritability of her father’s character by having her son raised in 
England without the knowledge of his ancestry, but who finds over time that despite her lack 
of “consent” to the process, she is compelled to “obey something tyrannic” (540-41). 
Troublingly, will and individual aspirations, especially for women, are ultimately suppressed 
in the grand historical arc of male heredity. As Daniel expresses it, “Your will was strong, 
but my grandfather’s trust which you accepted and did not fulfill—what you call his yoke—
is the expression of something stronger, with deeper, farther-spreading roots, knit into the 
foundations of sacredness for all men” (568). The male pronoun seems here to be of 
significance as not just the referent to humanity so common at the time, but as a 
reinforcement of a specifically patriarchal process that is cruel but compelling as an 
explanation for the persistence of personality traits evolved over time and through families. 
Although Daniel tries to sympathize with his mother, he fulfills his grandfather’s desire to 
utilize the female generation to reproduce his own ego (544) by identifying his excitement 
about finally discovering his heritage as a “a quivering imaginative sense of close relation to 
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the grandfather who had been animated by strong impulses and beloved thoughts, which 
were now perhaps being roused from their slumber within himself” (585). Sally Shuttleworth 
notes, although she does not explore at any length, that “Physiologically the Jews represent a 
cultural and religious unity, a historical continuity that is lacking in fragmented European 
society,” and so provide the perfect Spencerian case study for Eliot.789 Although Mordecai 
insists on sharing a soul with Daniel, Daniel himself only accepts the idea of sharing a 
“latent” (544) soul with his grandfather (638), which is possible because of the “sensibility” 
of Daniel’s neural “fibre,” which would not be feasible for someone of “duller…affection” 
(617). Although Daniel and the narrator frequently recur to spiritual language, as is evident 
from his references to discovering or inheriting an “added soul” (638), Eliot also recurs to 
Spencerian neural language, referring to Daniel’s ancestry as an “electric chain,” nerves 
having been understood as running on electrical impulses since Luigi Galvani’s experiments 
in the 1780s (617).
790
 Of course, as mentioned above when Daniel says that his education can 
never be done away with, the inheritance of his ancestral mentality is not all-determining; his 
own habits and education have made their indelible mark on his psychology, preventing him 
from “profess[ing] to believe exactly as my fathers have believed,” just as his “fathers 
themselves changed the horizon of their belief and learned of other races” (620). The process 
of blending habit and inheritance has been going on for ages, and is vital to progress and 
development. 
 Gwendolen and Daniel are, of course, not the only characters who manifest 
Spencerian psychological principles, both associationist and inherited acquired mental traits 
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in a Lamarckian evolutionary strain. The Meyricks, for example, are described as unique 
because of their “streaks of eccentricity” inherited from both parents, creating mental 
structures “like medieval houses with unexpected recesses and openings from this into that, 
flights of steps and sudden outlooks” (167). The Meyricks also subscribe to a notion of the 
heritability of personal traits, suggesting that it is a common, lay explanation for mental 
characteristics; of Mirah, Mrs. Meyrick says that she is convinced that she must have had “a 
good woman” as a mother: “you may know it by the scoundrel the father is. Where did the 
child get her goodness from? Wheaten flour has to be accounted for” (190). Mirah herself 
revels in the thought that her own preponderance of suffering comes from her inherited place 
“in the long song of mourning that has been going on through ages and ages” in the Jewish 
community (183), and although she is not raised with much religious knowledge, she enjoys 
synagogue “because it brings back to me the same feelings—the feelings I would not part 
with for anything else in the world,” feelings of association with her mother and her people 
(305). Her brother, Mordecai, has deeply engrained neural pathways, so that even when he is 
happy to discover his long-lost sister, he experiences  
that peculiar nervous perturbation only known to those whose minds, habitually 
moving with strong impetus in one current, are suddenly compelled into a new or 
reopened channel. Susceptible people whose strength has been long absorbed by a 
dominant bias dread an interview that imperiously revives the past as they would 
dread a threatening illness. Joy may be there, but joy, too, is terrible. (496)  
 
Although Mordecai uses the Cabbalistic doctrine of the rebirth of souls to express a similar 
concept (461), his notion of souls that are merged across generations to carry knowledge 
through time and accomplish nationalistic goals is essentially Spencerian (425-27, 449, 457-
58) in its presentation of national heritage as “the inborn half of memory” that “lives in [a 
people’s] veins as a power without understanding” (457). For Daniel and the narrative, 
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however, Mordecai’s enthusiasm is slightly misplaced, as Daniel cannot fully inherit a 
brother-in-law’s soul, although he can possess and embrace a grandfather’s; the novel 
ultimately upholds Lamarckian use-inheritance of acquired associationist pathways as a 
biological process. 
ALTRUISM AND SYMPATHY: THE GENDER DIVIDE AND HALTING EVOLUTION 
 Although Eliot does not overly subscribe to a notion of teleological development, 
many of the characters’ trajectories in Daniel Deronda—especially those of Gwendolen and 
Daniel—are traceable as a progression toward increased altruism and sympathy. Despite the 
fact that his name is typically associated with the callousness of social Darwinism, Spencer 
actually believed that Super-organic Evolution—the evolution of human social groups—was 
tending toward a utopic realization of perfect altruism among all people. Possession of 
sympathy on an individual and a social level is necessary to achieve this end, and a marked 
increase in sympathy is a sign of cultural evolution.
791
 Music and art, particularly those forms 
that bring a person into immediate physical or imaginative vision of another’s emotional 
“gestures and expressions of face” succeed in “giv[ing] life to the otherwise dead words in 
which the intellect utters its ideas; and so enable the hearer not only to understand the state 
of mind they accompany, but to partake of that state. In short, they are the chief media of 
sympathy.”792 His concern with altruism as the endpoint of social evolution is a theme that 
Spencer takes up primarily in work that postdates Eliot’s composition of Daniel Deronda, 
particularly his Ethics (1879), but as a frequent visitor to Eliot’s home who discussed his 
ideas far in advance of actually collecting them in a publishable form, Spencer might very 
                                                          
791 Spencer, “On the Origin and Function of Music,” 329. 
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 Spencer, “On the Origin and Function of Music,” 329. See Noble on Darwin’s later developed, but similar, 
theory of sympathy and literature (118-19). 
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well have shared his notions on the subject with Eliot before she wrote her final completed 
novel. Then again, Eliot’s own well-established views on the importance of sympathy could 
have affected Spencer’s notions on the subject.793 In a passage reminiscent of Eliot’s 
meliorist sentiments—in Spencer’s work that she often listed as the one she most admired, no 
less—Spencer writes,  
That spirit of toleration which is so marked a characteristic of modern times, and is 
daily growing more conspicuous, has thus a far deeper meaning than is supposed. 
What we commonly regard simply as a due respect for the right of private judgment 
is really a necessary condition to the balancing of the progressive and conservative 
tendencies—is a means of maintaining the adaptation between men’s beliefs and their 
natures. It is therefore a spirit to be fostered.
794
 
 
Eliot’s only novel set in her present, then, takes as a primary focus the state of sympathy in 
her society and the future of altruistic motives.
795
 Daniel Deronda is deeply concerned with, 
as Suzy Anger puts it, “the obstacles in the way of understanding others, but judges that there 
are better and worse ways of getting around those obstacles and that there are pressing moral 
reasons for attempting to do so.”796 
Critics and by other characters in the book refer to Daniel as the most sympathetic 
character, even as a person perfectly embodying the principles of sympathy and altruism.
797
 
                                                          
793 Eliot’s concerns with sympathy and altruism are not often attributed to Spencer, but instead to Comte or 
Feuerbach (see, for example, Anger, “Eliot and Philosophy,” 77, 80) 
 
794 Spencer, First Principles, “Part 1: The Unknowable,” 130. 
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 Lovesey, 505; Welsh, 69. 
 
796 Anger, Victorian Interpretation, 97. Anger goes on to comment, intriguingly, that the free indirect discourse 
that opens the novel “both enacts and thematizes the human mind’s capacity to move between third-person 
and first-person representations” and so the capacity to experience sympathy (Victorian Interpretation, 119-
20). Levine makes a similar point, though he sees this authorial strategy as extending through much of the 
narrative (Dying to Know, 183-84). Kurnick notes that “the very look of the page, in which large blocks of 
narrative text carefully adjudicate the claims of competing characters, functions as an objective correlative 
of the sympathetic imagination, working as a slow but sure solvent of the partialities that fuel the diegesis to 
assure us that somewhere, at least, those claims are reconciliable” (491). 
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Readers need to approach such assessments critically, however, and consider more fully how 
Daniel interacts with others and how others respond to his attempts to sympathize with them. 
The narrator tells us that Daniel’s sympathetic consciousness was developed as an adolescent 
when he first suspected that he is his “uncle” Hugo’s illegitimate son, a notion that “had 
given a bias to his conscience, a sympathy with certain ills, and a tension of resolve in certain 
directions, which marked him off from other youths much more than any talents he 
possessed” (149). His sympathetic mental habits lead him to altruistic behaviors, to  
acts of considerateness that struck his companions as moral eccentricity. “Deronda 
would have been first-rate if he had more ambition”—was a frequent remark about 
him. But how could a fellow push his way properly when he objected to swop for his 
own advantage, knocked under by choice when he was within an inch of victory, and 
unlike the great Clive, would rather be the calf than the butcher? (151)  
 
This tendency particularly comes out in his university years and in his sacrifice of his own 
studying to help his friend Hans, who has an eye inflammation, cram for his exam instead. 
This generosity with his time, of course, entails disadvantage to his own course of study and 
to his hopes of securing a fellowship to impress his uncle. Daniel’s sympathy is excessively 
diffusive—in the narrative’s terminology, “many-sided” and “flexible”—to the extent that it 
could “hinder any persistent course of action” and “neutralize sympathy” (307). This 
personality trait is not just a matter of emotional complication, but one of paralysis of “that 
indignation against wrong and that selectness of fellowship which are the conditions of moral 
force” (308). At the beginning of the narrative that causes him to have a more specific 
sympathetic focus—that identification of himself as a Jew that leads to “his judgment no 
longer wandering in the mazes of impartial sympathy, but choosing, with that noble partiality 
which is man’s best strength, the closer fellowship that makes sympathy practical” (638)—
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 Welsh is typical of critical attitudes toward Daniel, commenting, “For George Eliot, Deronda is undoubtedly 
the closest to an affective center of the novel,” with an ethos modeled on Eliot’s own (70). 
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Daniel actively courts a negation of his sense of self in an excessively sympathetic “half-
speculative, half-involuntary identification of himself with the objects he was looking at, 
thinking how far it might be possible habitually to shift his centre till his own personality 
would be no less outside him than the landscape” (160). Such an attempted negation of self is 
impractical, and overlooks how much his ego in fact guides his actions. Daniel himself is not 
aware of the problematics of his own particular brand of sympathy and altruism, but he is 
bothered by the ways that others make claims on his sympathy. Daniel is particularly irritated 
that others view him as a mentor with no wants of his own, as “entirely off the same plane of 
desire and temptation as those who confess to him” (397); as he says to Mirah after the 
Meyricks liken him to Buddha willingly letting himself be eaten by a tiger, “Even if it were 
true that I thought so much of others, it would not follow that I had no wants for myself. 
When Bouddha let the tigress eat him he might have been very hungry himself” (399). Daniel 
is, in fact, not purely sympathetic and/or altruistic. His ego often inhibits sympathy with 
others, such as when he first attends a synagogue and assumes that his feelings of 
transcendence are his alone, that he is “the only person in the congregation for whom the 
service was more than just a dull routine” (311). Even his rescue and support of Mirah as she 
is at the brink of drowning herself comes from his identification of her with his own history 
(176), as his “deepest interest in the fates of women” spring from the thought that “perhaps 
my mother was like this one” (162).798 So while his sympathy with others originates in a 
sense of his own otherness and in his interest in his mother’s fate, it seems to end there as 
well, at least when it comes to women. 
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 Anger notes that “even Deronda and Mirah, the characters who most surely have the moral disposition the 
novel praises, confront interpretative impasses which suggest that a hermeneutics of sympathy is very 
difficult to attain” (Victorian Interpretation, 122). 
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 The most successful transference of sympathy between two people in the novel is 
between Daniel and Mordecai, and even that relationship is not perfect or entirely 
sympathetic. The world at large, and Daniel’s family in particular, thinks that Daniel is under 
a delusion in his humoring of Mordecai, and is motivated primarily by Mordecai’s low social 
position—perhaps a worthy subject of altruism, but an overdevelopment and misapplication 
of sympathy (437, 615). This perspective is not entirely off the mark. The narrator repeatedly 
tells us that Daniel is aware that much of Mordecai’s beliefs are illusions, and he hesitates to 
overly commit to a sympathetic union because that would entail a certain submissiveness that 
Daniel feels would be detrimental to both of them (428-29); the sympathy that he does 
extend to Mordecai comes from the compulsions of his conscience and his inborn 
sensitiveness (423-24, 436). Daniel is “receptive” to Mordecai’s needs, but only to an extent 
that does not conflict with his own egoism (425). Even once Daniel discovers his Jewish 
heritage and recognizes that he has inherited his grandfather’s Zionistic mission, both of 
which align his sense of self more with Mordecai’s and so bring him into closer sympathetic 
possibilities with Mordecai’s vision, Daniel resists an entire sympathetic merger and feels the 
need to pursue an educational mission to the East to decide on his own course that may or 
may not align with his deceased brother-in-law’s visions (643, 688).799 At the end of the 
novel, we have not even seen Daniel depart for the East, and it is unclear whether he in fact 
will follow through on this one step that keeps open the possibility of implementing 
Mordecai’s Zionistic dreams someday. “It was otherwise with…Mordecai,” however, as the 
narrator makes a point of showing us (404). His need for a sympathetic other can come 
                                                          
799 Anger notes that Daniel sympathizes with Mordecai only in what he finds pragmatic—an “uncharacteristic” 
difficulty—and that he instead turns to his family’s documents as objects of his sympathy; I argue, instead, 
that such a failure of sympathy is entirely characteristic of Daniel and that he instead turns to sympathize 
with those ancestors whose acquired mental traits he has inherited (Victorian Interpretation, 124, 129). 
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across as demanding and insensitive (429), but his model for this is noble, “like a poet among 
people of a strange speech, who may have a poetry of their own, but have no ear for his 
cadence, no answering thrill to his discovery of latent virtues in his mother tongue” (451-
52).
800
 Daniel, although nurturing at times in what can be considered a feminine, maternal 
vein, in fact does not approach this ideal of sympathy to the extent that Mordecai does. 
Mordecai searches for a spiritual transmission of self that circumvents traditional 
Spencerian/Lamarckian inheritance of mental characteristics (489) in the idealized “maternal 
transference of self” (425; see also 455) that the narrator describes as far and away stronger 
and more compelling than romantic, heterosexual passion (407), entailing as it does toil, 
renunciation, endurance (455), and “spiritual perpetuation” (425).801 
Daniel’s attempted transference of sympathy with his biological mother is not nearly 
as successful as even the deeply flawed parental relationship Mordecai forges with Daniel, 
however. When Daniel meets his mother for the first time as an adult, he anticipates 
extending his sympathy to “the suffering and the confession” coming from a place of deep 
emotionality (539). He quickly discovers, however, that the best that he can extend her is 
“compassion” (539, 569). Leonora is not interested in the emotional union that sympathy 
would bring to the two of them, and creates a “spiritual distance” between herself and her 
son, which confuses and hurts him (536). The narrator reflects that Daniel displays a 
sensibility tending toward sympathy and suffering that is more typically feminine than his 
mother’s, using religious language to describe how “to Deronda’s nature the moment was 
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 Anger observes that “Although Ezra employs a rhetoric of selflessness, we might see a form of appropriation 
in his conduct….Mordecai’s desires, however, are for the good of a larger community, something that Eliot 
along with many Victorian social theorists understood as involving selflessness” (Victorian Interpretation, 
124). 
 
801 Willburn is typical of critical response in assuming that because Mordecai insists on a spiritual union with 
Daniel, such a goal is actually achieved (271). 
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cruel: it made the filial yearning of his life a disappointed pilgrimage to a shrine where there 
were no longer the symbols of sacredness” (566).802 His mother’s “frank coldness” repels 
him, giving him “impulses of indignation at what shocked his most cherished emotions and 
principles,” and he starts to view his mother as though “she had been a stranger who had 
appealed to his sympathy” (542). We find that he is not capable of extending much sympathy 
to a stranger, if we define sympathy as the affinity with another that leads to mutual influence 
or unity, the ability to share another’s feelings, rather than just feeling compassion for 
suffering. Leonora recognizes this and asks her son, accusatorily, “Shall you comprehend 
your mother—or only blame her?” (540). Leonora explains twice over to an incredulous 
Daniel that she did not have affection for him as a child, that she “wanted to live out the life 
that was in [her], and not to be hampered with other lives” (536-37) or undergo the 
“subjection” that “love makes of men and women” (571). While she is proud of her 
independence and the fact that men were subject to her instead of vice versa, Daniel cannot 
bring himself to believe in the authenticity of such emotions, in the idea that a woman could 
want to avoid sympathy with father, husband, and son and could instead find fulfillment in 
her profession, as he is impressed by “a grave, sad sense of his mother’s privation” (571). For 
Leonora, though, the privation is being forced into traditional domestic roles and not being 
able to express her artistic gift to a receptive public. She says,  
Every woman is supposed to have the same set of motives, or else to be a monster. I 
am not a monster, but I have not felt exactly what other women feel—or say they feel, 
for fear of being thought unlike others. When you reproach me in your heart for 
sending you away from me, you mean that I ought to say I felt about you as other 
women say they feel about their children. I did not feel that. (539; original emphasis) 
 
                                                          
802 Other critics make the point that Daniel’s sympathy is typically coded feminine (Flint, 176; Vigderman, 30; 
Wilt, 328). 
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Finally, she comes to realize that there is an inherent disconnect between the sexes, and that 
men are incapable of entering into full sympathy with a woman,
803
 explaining to Daniel,  
You are not a woman. You may try—but you can never imagine what it is to have a 
man’s force of genius in you, and yet to suffer the slavery of being a girl. To have a 
pattern cut out—“this is the Jewish woman; this is what you must be; this is what you 
are wanted for; a woman’s heart must be of such a size and no larger, else it must be 
pressed small, like Chinese feet; her happiness is to be made as cakes are, by a fixed 
receipt.” (541) 
 
Unprepared for this kind of apologia, Daniel ceases to identify himself with his mother—the 
basis for his sympathetic personality in his youth—and instead looks to a spiritual union with 
his grandfather, meanwhile choosing for himself a wife who eagerly accepts her domestic 
and religious subordination.
804
 Leonora is contemptuous of her father’s heritage, saying that 
his complete lack of sympathy marked him as the kind of man who turns his “wives and 
daughters into slaves”; such men “would rule the world if they could; but not ruling the 
world, they throw all the weight of their will on the necks and souls of women. But nature 
sometimes thwarts them. My father had no other child than his daughter, and she was like 
himself” (541). Daniel will never fully achieve sympathetic union with his grandfather—he 
also inherited his father’s innate loving nature, and his experiences of sympathizing with the 
suffering of the downtrodden have formed neural, associative habits that cannot be undone—
but his inability to enter into such sympathy with his mother does not bode well for the most 
sympathetic character in the novel, one who should be the most socially evolved according to 
Spencer’s schema, and who therefore should represent the greatest progression in 
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 Although Anger, as is typical of literary critics writing on the novel, upholds Daniel as a paradigm of 
sympathy, she notes that Leonora’s challenge here does undermine Deronda’s identity as a sympathizer 
(Victorian Interpretation, 125, 128). 
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contemporaneous society. By the end of the novel, the altruistic utopia that Spencer dreams 
of seems further in the future than ever. 
 Gwendolen’s relationship with Daniel is equally complex, and further reinforces the 
point that full sympathy is impossible across gender lines, even when directed from the most 
developed male to the most damaged woman in the narrative.
805
 Gwendolen suffers 
immensely under the repression of her psychologically abusive husband. The narrator’s 
description of her emotional pain is moving: “Inarticulate prayers, no more definite than a 
cry, often swept out from her into the vast silence, unbroken except by her husband’s 
breathing or the plash of the wave or the creaking of the masts; but if ever she thought of 
definite help, it took the form of Deronda’s presence and words, of the sympathy he might 
have for her, of the direction he might give her” (577). She relies on the notion of Daniel’s 
available guidance and sympathy to keep herself from acting in a destructive way, on the 
idea, more than the reality, of Daniel’s sympathetic support. Daniel’s initial extension of 
sympathy to Gwendolen arises from “something beyond his habitual compassionate fervor,” 
from sexual attraction and from a sense of his ability to redeem and rescue her (273-74). But 
as with others who believe him to be purely altruistic, Daniel resists Gwendolen’s 
construction of him as selfless: “He was not a priest. He dreaded the weight of this woman’s 
soul flung upon his own with imploring dependence” (591). He is not entirely without insight 
into Gwendolen’s psychological motives, such as when she gambles on marriage in a similar 
desperation that motivated her to lose all her money at the casino in Leubronn (273). But it is 
to Gwendolen that Daniel explains his notion of sympathetic insight arises from a projection 
of egoism onto another (387). He decides, therefore, that Gwendolen’s emotional turmoil 
comes from having too narrow a sphere in which to develop and exercise sympathetic ideas 
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(387), that her sense of guilt after failing to act quickly enough to save her drowning husband 
was exaggerated and did not reflect anything more than “an inappreciably instantaneous 
glance of desire” (597), that she is “mastering herself with a determination of concealment” 
even under “a severe physical shock” (589)—though we know from the narrator that 
Gwendolen’s shock is primarily psychological and has been well established through her 
emotional and physical traumas. Daniel’s “misunderstanding” of her words and motivations 
is repeated throughout their interactions (qtn from 687; see also 381 and 657) and “widened 
his spiritual distance from her,” making “it more difficult [for her] to speak” openly to him 
(595). Daniel sometimes actively restricts his sympathy for Gwendolen, out of fear of overly 
committing himself to an English woman when he feels that his obligations lie with those 
who share his newfound heritage (599-600, 654). Even while trying to counsel Gwendolen 
through her emotional turmoil after Grandcourt’s death, he cannot avoid egoism in their 
interactions, as “Any one overhearing his tones would have thought he was entreating for his 
own happiness” rather than for hers (658). Although Gwendolen herself is no paradigm of 
sympathetic extension, “Only by reading Eliot’s novels as dramatizing an ethics of sympathy 
can one adequately register Gwendolen’s narrative,” and how intricately it is connected to 
Daniel’s, despite famous statements to the contrary by the likes of F. R. Leavis and Henry 
James, who proposed excising the Jewish sections of the novel to focus on Gwendolen 
instead.
806
  
 Lest it seem like the narrative—and this Spencerian interpretation of it—is 
excessively harsh on Daniel, it should be noted that nearly all men in the narrative routinely 
fail to extend sympathy to women. In one of the most telling anecdotes in this vein, the 
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narrator relates the conversation between a fourteen-year-old miller’s daughter and her 
mother; the girl “could not believe that high gentry behaved badly to their wives, but her 
mother instructed her—‘Oh, child, men’s men: gentle or simple, they’re much of a 
muchness’” (298). As Alexander Welsh comments, “The novel exposes power rather than 
celebrates love.”807 Grandcourt, for example, projects a sympathetic front before marriage 
(257), although we come to learn through the narrator that he has never practiced sympathy 
in his day-to-day life (364). While this deception is justifiable under Darwin’s schema of 
sexual selection, as described in chapter 3, it is reprehensible in Spencerian terms, because it 
inhibits the evolutionary inheritance and increase in sympathy and altruism. As the narrator 
tells us, “he had no imagination of anything in her but what affected the gratification of his 
own will” (474) and “His object was to engage all his wife’s egoism on the same side as his 
own” (509); even if he is aware of Gwendolen’s feelings, he does not entirely understand the 
motivations behind them, attributing them to shallow stereotypes of women (509, 574). This 
lack of sympathy becomes his undoing, as it “condemns [him] to a corresponding stupidity” 
(509) about the inevitability of his own plans and others giving into them. Less thoroughly 
reprehensible men, like Gwendolen’s uncle Gascoigne, also fail this litmus test; Gascoigne is 
able to intuit Sir Hugo’s opinions about Grandcourt’s will in a single conversation and so 
demonstrates men’s ability to sympathize with other men, although he tells himself that “he 
felt the humiliation through the minds of the women who would be chiefly affected by it,” a 
belief based on the “innocent conviction that his niece was unaware of Mrs Glasher’s 
existence, arguing with masculine soundness from what maidens and wives were likely to 
know, do, and suffer, and having had a most imperfect observation of the particular maiden 
and wife in question” (649). Reverend Gascoigne’s generalizations about women prevent 
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him from recognizing the psychological and experiential particularities of the woman he 
believes himself to be sympathetically connecting with.  
Mordecai, likewise, who is so interested in a sympathetic connection with Daniel, 
fails to make one with his sister, Mirah, after they are reunited. He subscribes to the vision of 
the Jewish woman’s mind that Ezra Cohen the pawnbroker articulates as God’s will, as “a 
child-bearing, tender-hearted thing” (491), the same vision that Daniel’s grandfather adhered 
to and that drove his daughter to send her son away from the faith. When Mirah is suffering 
the torment of jealousy in her belief that Daniel is romantically involved with Gwendolen, 
Mordecai believes that she is only concerned about whether Daniel is moving away from him 
(563). Later Mordecai relates the story of a Jewish woman who switches places with the 
beloved of a Gentile king that she herself loves, so that she is executed instead of the 
condemned woman; Mordecai interprets this story as demonstrating that “women are 
specially framed for the love which feels possession in renouncing,” whereas Mirah 
disagrees and instead argues that the Jewish woman became a martyr so that the king would 
never be able to be fully happy or to forget her—Mordecai dismisses this interpretation out 
of hand (629). Mordecai here again shows himself unaware of Mirah’s inner life and 
motivations, and uninterested in considering women’s psychologies as differing from his 
preexisting schemas.  
Only Herr Klesmer, the musical genius, is really successful in experiencing and 
expressing sympathy toward women, both toward Mirah and Gwendolen in their requests for 
his career advice and toward Catherine Arrowpoint, his future wife, whose beauty is “most 
powerful” after they make a sympathetic connection, a connection that the narrator describes 
as “manifold” and triumphant (203, 204). Perhaps his sympathetic powers are due to his 
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status as a musician—a primary art form for the conveying of sympathy to Spencer—or as an 
outsider, culturally and economically.  
 Men who are part of the dominant culture have no particular need to develop 
sympathy with women, which perhaps explains why Klesmer is the most sympathetic man 
and Daniel makes a close second. Not clearly identifying with any cultural or economic 
system, they both think outside the rules of the sexual selection marriage market, as they 
themselves do not entirely have a place in it. As the epigraph to chapter X reads, 
What women should be? Sir, consult the taste 
Of marriageable men. This planet’s store  
In iron, cotton, wool, or chemicals— 
All matter rendered to our plastic skill, 
Is wrought in shapes responsive to demand: 
The market’s pulse makes index high or low, 
By rule sublime. Our daughters must be wives, 
And to be wives must be what men will choose:  
Men’s taste is women’s test. (83)  
 
Women’s taste is not of particular concern to “eligible” men, but might be of more concern 
to those outside the most respectable social pale. The narrator goes on to ask, “What in the 
midst of that mighty drama are girls and their blind visions?” and immediately answers, 
“They are the Yea or Nay of that good for which men are enduring and fighting. In these 
delicate vessels is borne onward through the ages the treasure of human affections” (103). 
Given the importance of women to a Spencerian evolutionary schema, we cannot ignore the 
novel’s repeated demonstration that “a man cannot resolve about a woman’s actions, least of 
all about those of a woman like Gwendolen, in whose nature there was a combination of 
proud reserve with rashness, of periously-poised terror with defiance, which might 
alternately flatter and disappoint control” (354). Control and dominance need to be taken out 
of the equation for gender relations to be equalized, and for society to progress through 
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development of sympathy to the point of truly egoless and global altruism. How exactly that 
can happen, though, remains an open question, implying that the time scale on which such 
evolution would occur is massive.
808
 Kate Flint notes that Daniel Deronda is not only Eliot’s 
“most eloquent” but also her most “radical, of all her treatments of gender,”809 and as such 
leaves us with a profound indeterminacy about solutions to social problems, such as the 
failure of sympathy between men and women:  
Any “solution,” in [Daniel’s] case, as in Gwendolen’s, for the Jewish people as for 
the English woman, must lie outside the bounds of current realist fiction. They must 
lie in a social future for her fictional characters of which, for once, Eliot can expect 
her readers to know nothing. Women, in particular, are going to find no guidance in 
the plotted lives which they encounter in their habitual reading; not, it would seem, in 
the current condition of England, or indeed in its colonies. Rather than searching for a 
preexistence script, the plots of the future remain to be written.
810
 
 
This notion of failure of sympathy, of the realist novel, and of all knowledge of the future is 
unsettling, but Spencerian in its embrace of the Unknowable. 
THE SPENCERIAN UNKNOWN AND UNKNOWABLE: LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC EPISTEMOLOGY 
 Spencer was a foundational figure to a number of social sciences, but not a blind 
adherent of scientific epistemology. Science, for Spencer, is the best means of gaining 
knowledge about the world, for “comprehending all positive and definite knowledge of the 
order existing among surrounding phenomena.”811 The kind of knowledge that science can 
realize is the focus of the second half of Spencer’s philosophical opus, First Principles, but 
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the first half is focused on what he calls “the Unknowable.” The Unknowable consists of that 
part of consciousness that “transcends knowledge” and “passes the sphere of experience”—
this is the domain of religion.
812
 Just as the two halves of the book are required to construct a 
whole philosophical system, so too are the Unknowable and the Known ontological 
correlatives. According to Spencer,  
he who contemplates the universe from the scientific point of view must learn to see 
that this which we call Religion is similarly a constituent of the great whole; and 
being such, must be treated as a subject of science with no more prejudice than any 
other reality. It behooves each party to strive to understand the other, with the 
conviction that the other has something worthy to be understood; and with the 
conviction that when mutually recognized this something will be the basis of a 
complete reconciliation.
813
 
 
Thus, Spencer attempts to intervene in the Materialist-Spiritualist controversy, suggesting 
that each side is groundless because the only legitimate religious or scientific epistemology 
must take into account “the Unknown Cause as co-extensive with all orders of 
phenomena.”814 As Spencer articulates this idea in his essay “Progress: Its Law and Cause,” 
much of which he recycles into “The Known” section of First Principles, embracing the 
reality of the Unknown entails the recognition that all religious and scientific pursuits bring 
one “face to face with the unknowable,”815  that “the Universe is an insoluble problem”:  
Alike in the external and the internal worlds, [the scientist] sees himself in the midst 
of perpetual changes, of which he can discover neither the beginning nor the end. If, 
tracing back the evolution of things, he allows himself to entertain the hypothesis that 
all matter once existed in a diffused form, he finds it utterly impossible to conceive 
how this came to be so; and equally, if he speculates on the future, he can assign no 
limit to the grand succession of phenomena ever unfolding themselves before him. 
On the other hand, if he looks inward, he perceives that both terminations of the 
thread of consciousness are beyond his grasp: he cannot remember when or how 
                                                          
812 Spencer, First Principles, “Part 1: The Unknowable,” 31. 
 
813 Spencer, First Principles, “Part 1: The Unknowable,” 35. 
 
814 Spencer, First Principles, “Part II: The Known,” 548. 
 
815 Spencer, “Progress: Its Law and Cause,” 60. 
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consciousness commences, and he cannot examine the consciousness that at any 
moment exists; for only a state of consciousness that is already past can become the 
object of thought, and never one which is passing.
816
 
 
Or, put another way, “absolute knowledge is impossible” because “under all things there lies 
an impenetrable mystery.”817 This is an essentially Kantian ontological vision, in which 
human consciousness is limited to knowledge of the phenomenal world, behind which the 
noumenal existence is unreachable.
818
 All knowledge is ultimately symbolic, standing in for 
actualities, and true in so far as it fulfills the predictions about the world that is based upon it; 
this is the case for both religious and scientific ideas.
819
 Most important for human 
consciousness is an awareness of its own limits, the symbolic nature of its cognitions.
820
 Just 
because the Unknowable is in fact, always and ultimately unknowable, does not mean that 
the pursuit of knowledge should be abandoned; the more science studies the world’s 
characteristics, both known and unknowable,  
the more marvelous in their attributes [they appear] the more they are investigated, 
and are also proved to be in their ultimate natures absolutely incomprehensible—as 
absolutely incomprehensible as sensation, or the conscious something which 
perceives it—whoever clearly recognizes this truth, will see that the course proposed 
does not imply a degradation of the so-called higher, but an elevation of the so-called 
lower.
821
 
 
This pursuit provides an appreciation for details of the world, an overturning of traditional 
hierarchies, a questioning of preexisting categories, an awareness of the limits of human 
                                                          
816 Spencer, “Progress: Its Law and Cause,” 59. 
 
817 Spencer, “Progress: Its Law and Cause,” 60. 
 
818 Richards, Darwin, 328. 
 
819 Spencer, First Principles, “Part 1: The Unknowable,” 43, 80. 
 
820 Spencer, First Principles, “Part 1: The Unknowable,” 123. 
 
821 Spencer, First Principles, “Part II: The Known,” 548. 
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knowledge. The Unknowable also resists incorporation into literary and scientific 
narrative.
822
 
 Eliot both begins and ends Daniel Deronda with the Spencerian Unknowable. The 
epigraph to Chapter 1 suggests that people need to be more aware that both scientific and 
imaginative approaches to representing the world are immersed in symbolism and 
uncertainty: 
Men can do nothing without the make-believe of a beginning. Even Science, the strict 
measurer, is obliged to start with a make-believe unit, and must fix on a point in the 
stars’ unceasing journey when his sidereal clock shall pretend that time is at Nought. 
His less accurate grandmother Poetry has always been understood to start in the 
middle; but on reflection it appears that her proceeding is not very different from his; 
since Science, too, reckons backwards as well as forwards, divides his unit into 
billions, and with his clock-finger at Nought really sets off in medias res. No 
retrospect will take us to the true beginning; and whether our prologue be in heaven 
or on earth, it is but a fraction of that all-presupposing fact with which our story sets 
out. (3)
823
 
 
Any human attempt at representing that which is Unknowable to human consciousness is 
nothing more than a misguided effort to reassure oneself that the vast mysteries of the 
universe are knowable and manageable. Or, as George Levine puts it, Daniel Deronda 
“leaves us yet with the empiricist’s sense of the limits of human consciousness.”824 The “all-
presupposing fact” referred to at the end of the opening passage turns out to be a series of 
questions, an attempt to judge a woman’s appearance, and to gauge her interiority on that 
basis (3). Human consciousness, as Spencer points out, is only knowable to an extent, and the 
narrator reinforces this point about Gwendolen, who is so erroneously judged on appearances 
                                                          
822 Garratt, 176. 
 
823 The most common critical approach to this famous epigraph is not Spencerian, but can be summed up by 
Shuttleworth’s assessment that it “challenges the dominant assumptions of the realist text” and the 
distinctions between scientific and literary methodologies and epistemologies (Nineteenth-Century Science, 
175-76). 
 
824 Levine, “Eliot’s Hypothesizing,” 49. 
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in the first chapter, and who even halfway into the novel is not entirely predictable: 
remember, “a man cannot resolve about a woman’s actions, least of all about those of a 
woman like Gwendolen, in whose nature there was a combination of proud reserve with 
rashness, of periously-poised terror with defiance, which might alternately flatter and 
disappoint control” (354). The limits of the knowable differ from person to person, 
depending on each one’s capacity for sympathetic imagination, as Catherine Arrowpoint’s 
“limit of the conceivable did not exactly correspond with her mother’s” (203).825 Daniel is a 
proponent of embracing the Unknowable, as “he dreaded, as if it were a dwelling-place of 
lost souls, that dead anatomy of culture which turns the universe into a mere ceaseless answer 
to queries, and knows, not everything, but everything else about everything—as if one should 
be ignorant of nothing concerning the scent of violets except the scent itself for which one 
had no nostril” (308). The ineffable qualities of experience, especially aesthetic enjoyment 
that arises from embracing the “sense of poetry in common things,” enlarge one’s perspective 
even if they cannot help one “escape suffering from the pressure of that hard 
unaccommodating Actual, which has never consulted our taste and is entirely unselect” 
(321). After rereading Darwin’s Origin, Eliot wrote to a correspondent “to me the 
Developmental Theory and all other explanations of processes by which things came to be, 
produce a feeble impression compared with the mystery that lies under the processes,” and 
this novel that so deeply engages with Spencerian evolutionary social science comes to rest 
on unraveling and accepting the nuances of the Unknown.
826
 At the end of the novel, portions 
of what seem to be the Unknowable turn out in fact to just be previously unknown and 
become Known at the moment: 
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 Toise argues that the limits of the Unknowable are defined by gendered subjectivity (141). 
 
826 GEL, III: 227. 
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There comes a terrible moment to many souls when the great movements of the 
world, the larger destinies of mankind, which have lain aloof in newspapers and other 
neglected reading, enter like an earthquake into their own lives….Then it is as if the 
Invisible Power that has been the object of lip-worship and lip-resignation became 
visible….Then it is that the submission of the soul to the Highest is tested, and even 
in the eyes of frivolity life looks out from the scene of human struggle with the awful 
face of duty, and a religion shows itself which is something else than a private 
consolation. (689) 
 
Though there is a grave weightiness to this experience, it is essential to personal growth, to 
the greater movement of human consciousness, to the development of Super-organic 
Evolution. The end of the novel, then, with the potential of Daniel’s educational, Zionistic 
voyage to the East; of Gwendolen’s hope for healing; of Mordecai’s dying Hebrew 
“confession of the divine Unity, which for long generations has been on the lips of the dying 
Israelite” (695) is not mystical but epistemological—a recognition of the greater universal 
forces that are Unknowable and inseparable from any pursuit of knowledge and any growth 
on an individual or social level.
827
 
CONCLUSION: ELIOT’S NOVELS AS SPENCERIAN SCIENCE 
One anecdote of Eliot’s early relationship with Spencer stands out as telling of her 
critical awareness of his methodological flaws, but indulgence of his quirks and ultimate 
respect for his idealism. On 29 June 1852, Eliot wrote to Hennell, “I went to Kew yesterday 
on a scientific expedition with Herbert Spencer, who has all sorts of theories about plants—I 
should have said a proof-hunting expedition. Of course, if the flowers didn’t correspond to 
the theories, we said, ‘tant pis pour les fleurs’.”828 Eliot tends to cast key words or phrases, 
especially in her letters, in French as “a way of making the situation somewhat arch, even 
                                                          
827
 As Shuttleworth notes, Eliot is arguing here that people “should remain open to hitherto unexplored 
alternatives or different forms of thought” (“Language of Science,” 275). Gwendolen’s future as a single 
woman and Daniel’s Zionistic vision are equally openended and dreamlike, full of possibilities but no 
certainties (Vigderman, 33). 
 
828 GEL, II: 40. 
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comic,” according to at least one biographer.829 So while it is easy enough to dismiss the 
subjects that are unaware of being studied for not fitting to a preconceived system, as 
Spencer might have done (along with a number of other scientists and scientific thinkers of 
every age), it is far harder to maintain an awareness of the problematics of the individual 
case, as Eliot did in this early experience and continued to do through Daniel Deronda. This 
is one important role for Eliot’s literature in the scientific project: as a psychological, 
individualized, social study of the many complications of evolutionary theory, needed as a 
correlative to Spencer’s spearheading of the theory’s spread through an unprecedented 
number of disciplines. Her work thus modifies and limits his Synthetic Philosophy by 
grounding his grand generalizations in particularities that are relatable to daily life, in 
individual psychological case studies situated in concrete communities; neither project could 
have succeeded without the other. And critics never tire of citing Eliot’s experimental 
methodologies in her novels, as she wrote in a letter to her publisher in 1876—the time of 
Daniel Deronda’s publication: she viewed her writing as “a set of experiments in life—an 
endeavour to see what our thought and emotion may be capable of—what stores of motive, 
actual or hinted as possible, give promise of a better after which we must strive.”830 This 
viewpoint leads us to the second way Eliot’s novels participated in Spencerian scientific 
discourse: as science. Darwin himself in private writings and in The Expression of Emotions 
in Man and Animals (1872) viewed fiction as equivalent in empirical observations to 
anthropological studies, as a social science providing reliable data.
831
 Lewes wrote that 
                                                          
829 Karl, 80 n1. 
 
830 GEL, VI: 216-17. See also Karl, 556; Levine, “Introduction,” 18; Rosenthal, 778; Shuttleworth, Nineteenth-
Century Science, 180. 
 
831 In particular, he cites the work of Scott, Dickens, and Eliot by name (Noble 103-7). 
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literature is a means of transmitting ideas through an entire culture or race at a speed far 
exceeding that of biological transmission—via a Spencerian inheritance of acquired mental 
characteristics—and operates on the level of conscious associative patterns.832 Thus, 
literature in many ways serves the end that Mordecai hopes to achieve through a sympathetic 
union of souls with Daniel: use-inheritance on a maternal pattern that circumvents literal 
maternity or paternity. For her contemporaneous audience, and for the intelligentsia who 
gathered around her, then, Eliot was practicing Spencerian evolution, just in a form that was 
available and palatable to her—intellectual rather than biological reproduction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
832 Garratt, 189-90. 
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Coda: The Neo-Victorian Continuation 
 
 Neo-Victorian novels, which adopt Victorian settings and characters but are written 
after the mid-twentieth century, tackle many of the themes and issues discussed in this 
dissertation project. These modern-day novelists are living with the scientific and literary 
inheritance of the nineteenth century and so try to adopt contemporary perspectives to 
understand what are now traditional problems.
833
 Neo-Victorian novelists puzzle through 
issues that their Victorian forebears explored in The Last Man, Aurora Leigh, Sylvia’s 
Lovers, and Daniel Deronda—such as the place of faith and art in a scientized and 
industrialized world, the possibility of authentic human connections and sympathy in a 
globalized era, the role of humans in a non-anthropocentric universe, and the shape of time 
when viewed from a deep geological perspective. Neo-Victorian writers also touch on some 
of the broader connecting themes that I have identified as central to the arc of this 
dissertation project but which remain implicit in Mary Shelley’s, Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning’s, Elizabeth Gaskell’s, and George Eliot’s novels: women intellectuals’ 
negotiations of scientific knowledge in a time when generalists were becoming increasingly 
displaced by specialists, including a focus on the value of literary historical narratives in an 
era of emerging scientific ones, the nature of realism in a time when seemingly fantastic 
                                                          
833
 As Bowler and Cox note, Neo-Victorian fiction tends to tackle such “key issues” as “gender criticism’s 
engagement with the nineteenth-century inheritance, the problematic commodification of nostalgia, and the 
implication of projecting notions of present-day ‘trauma culture’ backwards in time” (6). Evolutionary 
theory is a common topic in Neo-Victorian fiction, Gutleben argues, because it allows “contemporary fiction 
to register instances of further crises, especially the loss of faith in man” (207). 
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theories were becoming established as factual (or at least reputable), and the complexities of 
sexuality that arise from evolutionary theories (i.e., Should we accept humans as bestial, or 
would that lead to the disintegration of society? Can and should we stick with traditional 
partnering patterns in the face of rapid social change? How can an individual navigate an 
awareness of new conflicts between the carnal and the social without having his or her 
psyche destroyed in the process?). Neo-Victorian novels often explore the intellectual and 
social relationship of women with evolutionary theory because, as Catherine Pesso-Miquel 
puts it, “the Darwinian theme reminds us that evolution is not necessarily synonymous with 
progress and that societies can change for worse as well as for better,” even within comic 
novels—ironically, modern times might not offer women writers the same opportunities as 
the Victorian era.
834
 
 Although space and time restrictions prevent a fuller consideration of Neo-Victorian 
novelists’ treatments of Victorian women’s roles in genre systems evaluating evolutionary 
theories, this coda will touch on a few key works to demonstrate the continuing relevance of 
this dissertation topic to contemporary thinkers. Some novelists, like John Fowles, explicitly 
muse on evolutionary theory’s role in redefining Victorians’ sense of self; others, like Michel 
Faber, weave evolutionary theory into the cultural background that affects different Victorian 
characters’ psyches to varying extents. The Neo-Victorian novels that I hope to explore in 
greater depth as I continue to develop this project resist scientizing trends of the nineteenth-
century: such works demonstrate, as Jessica Straley puts it, that “pitiless realism was not the 
only successful descendant of the encounter between the theory of evolution and literature” 
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and defy the idea that “Literature, philosophy, and even religion…[must] be secondary [to 
science education] for the modern individual.”835 
 A. S. Byatt emphasizes affective responses to narrative over objective knowledge 
claims in order to highlight the importance of embodied knowledge, the role of literature as a 
“mode of knowledge,” and the constructedness of all narratives; the Neo-Victorian novel 
offers her the opportunity to “re-centre the literary text as a medium for cultural memory” 
because of the intellectual freedoms that she identifies as inherent to the Victorian era.
836
 
Byatt’s Angels and Insects (1992) contains within it two stories: “Morpho Eugenia,” about a 
natural historian and adventurer who marries the daughter of his primary sponsor only to 
discover that she is involved in a years-long incestuous relationship with her brother, and 
“The Conjugial Angel,” which focuses on spiritualist séances in the home of Tennyson’s 
sister, Emily Jesse. The two parts of the collection cohere through concerns over scientific 
developments evacuating human life of meaning, not just de-anthropocentrizing but denying 
a spiritual component to humanity and the universe.
837
 Tennyson’s In Memoriam runs 
through both, as that “nature red in tooth and claw” in the first and in the extensive mourning 
that Victorians undertook on a daily basis in the second. In “Morpho Eugenia,” the reader is 
primarily privy to a man’s perspective, and not just any man but a scientist whose career as a 
natural historian, collector, and adventurer leads him to misjudge and misunderstand women 
because he translates their behavior into the animal contexts with which he is most familiar. 
                                                          
835 Straley, 585, 590. 
 
836 Qtn. from Mitchell, “Feeling it,” 267; and History and Cultural Memory, 94. See also Mitchell, History and 
Cultural Memory, 104; and Wells, 539. 
 
837
 Campbell furthermore sees the stories as connected by a concern with “the relationship of women to this 
world and to language” in “a world shaken by the perceived conflict between science and religion,” “and 
both depict women who are able to enter and alter male discourse” (147). She goes on to note that “The two 
stories are also concerned with sexual classification and the special vulnerability of women to rigid labeling” 
(150). 
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Sexual mores in the human world are more complicated and misleading than in the animal 
kingdom, however, and this bestializing of humans through metaphor is shown to be as 
problematic as the personification of animals. Charles Darwin’s methods of collecting, 
systematizing, and theorizing about the natural and social world are taken to task.
838
 Beauty, 
which is so emphasized in The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871) but 
which also plays a prominent role in Origin of Species (1859), is revealed as an inadequate 
guide to behavior and value.
839
 This theme is nowhere more evident than in the title: 
“Morpho Eugenia” is the name of an exquisite and rare butterfly, and “Eugenia” is the name 
of the main character’s wife, who is likewise seemingly lovely and surprisingly interested in 
marrying downward socially. In fact, the human Eugenia is corrupt and the butterfly is soon 
forgotten in the narrative as anything but an initiator to a hideously deceptive and 
manipulative relationship.
840
 Lord Alabaster, Eugenia’s father, struggles through his loss of 
faith and tries to follow Darwin’s model by constructing a quasi-philosophical tract based on 
natural historical research, but he finds himself inextricably tangled in theological 
conundrums and unconvincing arguments. More generally, the plundering of the natural 
world for wealthy collectors’ curiosity and pleasure is revealed as wasteful and cruel. The 
stretches of scientific writing that interrupt the narrative are dull, unnecessarily extended, 
confusing, and distracting from the main plot’s human interests.841 When Matty Crompton, a 
                                                          
838 Finney makes a similar point in stating: “the desire to anthropomorphize the animal world under the 
influence of Darwinism is made to seem…untenable” in “Morpho Eugenia” (73). 
 
839 Byatt herself made the connection between “Morpho Eugenia” and Darwin, though she also said it was 
inspired by George Eliot’s work, especially in relation to Darwinism (“True Stories,” 176). 
 
840 Gutleben notes that the scientist’s blindness to his personal life demonstrates that “William was deluded by 
mere sexual attraction, proving thus incapable of rising above the animal patterns of which he is so 
cognizant” (210). 
 
841 Gutleben comments that “The Darwinian affiliation between man and animals is finally proven faulty, it 
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dependent relative in the Alabaster home, decides to pursue science exploration and not just 
pedagogical science writing in fictional narrative form, she has to do so under the aegis of a 
man, and so must give up her tenuous position in British society and her character as a 
respectable woman.
842
 
 In the second story, the “Conjugial Angel,” we see women’s stories and perspectives 
playing a central role not just in the narrative but in Victorian society more generally.
843
 
Spiritualism is presented as an attempt to reinvest the individual human life with meaning in 
the face of fears over the materiality and finality of death. Byatt highlights in particular 
women’s frustration at being forced into secondary or invisible roles, such as the elision of 
Emily Tennyson’s mourning of Arthur Henry Hallam in In Memoriam, the famous tract of 
emotional struggle over personal loss and the loss of a stable vision of humankind in the face 
of early Victorian scientific developments.
844
 Spiritualism is treated as a respectable and 
engaging outlet for women’s professional and personal inquiry into universal patterns.845 As 
such, spiritualism becomes the scientific project’s correlative in many ways.846 Ghosts, to the 
mediums’ minds, are displaced by “new knowledge” and so need help connecting with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cannot explain the specificity of human behaviour and particularly not of man’s artistic resorts” (211). 
842 Alfer and de Campos note that although the consequences of the plot of “Morpho Eugenia” are harsh for 
women, ultimately it is a story of sexual selection and “the moral of this Darwinian fable is survival, not 
forgiveness—biological rather than moral altruism” (133-34). Campbell takes a more positive approach to 
Matty’s plot, claiming that the character “is empowered by participating in the scientific discourse of her 
time and by creating her own text as a means of communicating with and freeing the man she loves” (159). 
 
843 As Williamson puts it, “Byatt’s literary resurrection creates a space in which received ideas about Victorian 
literature can be reconsidered and rethought to give them a new critical life” (110). 
 
844 In an essay published separately from and later than this volume, Byatt acknowledged the feminist urge of 
this recovery work (“True Stories,” 185). 
 
845 Wells argues that “Byatt’s fiction holds a special appeal for female readers, since her work deals with the 
power that stories can have to suggest new possibilities, beyond historical constraints, for women’s lives” 
(540). 
 
846 Shuttleworth makes a similar point, claiming that “The pursuit of natural history and of spirit rappings were 
both motivated by a desire to extend the boundaries of knowledge, to broaden apprehension beyond the 
confines of daily life” (152). 
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living through the barriers erected by science and technology between modern people and 
deep human tradition (171). Evolutionary theory especially evokes a need for spiritual 
reassurance, as one character puts it, because “we cannot bear the next thought, that we 
become nothing, like grasshoppers and beef-cattle. So we ask them, our personal angels, for 
reassurance. And they come, they come to our call” (171).847 Evolution implies an 
equivalence in the natural world, a global democracy, because all creatures are subject to the 
same pressures and processes, including humans. Therefore, “if there were not death and 
judgement, if there were not heaven and hell, men were no better than creepy-crawlies, no 
better than butterflies and blowflies” (189), and such an idea is insupportable for women 
especially, who are doing the physical work of social reproduction, which might be rendered 
meaningless in such a vision and which certainly seems to be elided in men’s evolutionary 
narratives.
848
 
 A. S. Byatt’s Possession (1990) interweaves the story of modern-day scholars with 
seemingly direct presentations of the actions and thoughts of the Victorian authors they are 
studying.
849
 As Nick Bentley notes, this particular treatment of the nineteenth century 
demonstrates Byatt’s “interest in the way narratives of the past affect people in the 
present.”850 The novel is full of references to those scientists prominent in my dissertation, 
including Cuvier, Buckland, Eliot, Lyell, Wallace, Huxley, Lamarck, and Darwin, but these 
                                                          
847 Finney phrases this idea thus: “Haunted by the narratives of Lyell and Darwin, Victorians turned to other 
narratives such as Swedenborg’s to restore their sense of purposefulness and form in a world threatened by 
random chance and formlessness” (85). 
 
848 Kontou similarly describes “the various ways in which natural history and spiritualism can be seen as locked 
together in a dialogue over man’s physical and psychical evolution” in “The Conjugial Angel” (114-15). 
 
849
 Holmes claims that “Possession is Victorian in the configuration of its narrative as well as in subject matter” 
but that simultaneously, “a desire to appropriate, however tentatively and ironically, the humane values of 
the great tradition of the nineteenth-century novel and to establish, however tenuously, continuity between 
the present and the past” (322, 333). 
 
850 Bentley, 140. 
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figures are peripheral to the plot. Seemingly, evolutionary theorists are part of the cultural 
landscape, but no more so than spiritualism—each attempts to understand the world with new 
tools, which are partial and biasing. Modern scholarship is revealed as deadening through 
ironic references to the “Ash Factory,” not a crematorium as the name might suggest but a 
dim basement office dedicated to sorting through documents relevant to the life of the poet 
Randolph Henry Ash. Similarly, one of the main characters, Roland Mitchell, thinks of 
textual work as “exhum[ation]” of something that had been “laid to rest” (4). The Victorian 
subjects absorb the identities of their modern investigators, like Mortimer Cropper, who 
drives a hearse-like car, carries around a mysterious black box, and takes to grave robbing. 
James Blackadder, the British counterpart to the American Cropper, finds that, like Cropper, 
his identity is so lost in his scholarship that he cannot distinguish his own ideas from those of 
the dead author he has devoted his life to studying (34). Those professionals who manage 
vibrant intellects are generalists, capable of breathing life into their work because they value 
experiences outside of it (such as Leonora Stern and Euan MacIntyre). Victorians are vexed 
figures in this binary because of their generalist tendencies on one hand but the 
destructiveness of their pursuits on the other (20, 33).
851
 Ash, who seems to be a combination 
of Tennyson and Browning, displays narcissism not just through always including his own 
name as a symbol in his work, but also through his violent collection and dissection of 
marine life.
852
 His collection room at the seashore resembles a torture chamber. As one of his 
                                                          
851 We can see such a generalist intellectual training as part of the “traditional forms” for which Buxton notes 
Byatt is “an enthusiastic advocate” because of the “plenitude” they offer (Buxton, 100). In an interview, 
Byatt commented that she was drawn to the Victorians because of their generalist tendencies, because 
“everything was part of one thing: science, religion, philosophy, economics, politics, women, fiction, poetry. 
They didn’t compartmentalize—they thought BIG” (Stout, 14). See also Mitchell, “Feeling it,” 266-67. 
 
852 On the similarities between Ash and Browning, see Campbell, 109. Franken also claims that Ash is a 
composite of Matthew Arnold and G. H. Lewes (87), and Kelly adds Wordsworth, Morris, Ruskin, and 
Carlyle to the list (81). 
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biographers describes his methods, Ash “unwittingly, with his crashing boots covered with 
liquid india-rubber, as much as with his scalpel and killing-jar, deal[t] death to the creatures 
he found so beautiful, to the seashore whose pristine beauty he helped to wreck” (269). Such 
destructive anatomizing is reflected in his later scholars’ attempts to dissect and pin down his 
writing in such a precise way as to take all the life out of it.
853
 Female Victorian artists, on 
the other hand, like Christabel LaMotte and Blanche Glover, refuse to kill organisms for 
scientific pursuits; understanding and possessing does not require killing for them (177). 
Ash’s wife Ellen demonstrates a similarly well-adjusted ethic by studying Lyell’s writings in 
a way that balances the religious doubts it inspires with its persuasiveness and relevance 
(242-43). Modern feminist scholars seem to be better at seeing into vibrancy of past than 
their male colleagues as well.
854
 
 Paired with its gendered and temporal distinctions, Possession concerns itself with 
understanding the role of sexuality in contemporary and Victorian life.
855
 A hyperfocus on 
sexuality is presented as a modern pastime, as a lens that distorts not only how we look at the 
world but how we understand others as doing so (267-68, 276). It is not clear that previous 
generations did not share an identical concern with sexuality, but Byatt’s narrative argues 
that we cannot make that assumption. Sexuality does seem to be an undercurrent for 
Possession’s Victorians, for example, but in many cases modern readers have constructed 
such themes and trends from their own perspectives.
856
 Sexuality looks different for the 
                                                          
853 Helmers also notes that this scene casts Ash as a rapist of the natural world (155). 
 
854 Campbell notes that in Possession, “Byatt shows the reductive, cramping construction of women in two 
periods of history, but she also shows women’s potential for creative self-assertion and empowerment, 
available especially when women work together” (128). 
 
855 Sadoff and Kucich argue that such a focus on sexuality is typical of postmodern literature (xi). 
 
856 As Fletcher puts it, “Possession communicates an impatience with our post- (or anti-) Victorian openness 
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Victorians, such as in the Ashes’ prolific writing that sublimates the thwarted consummation 
of their physical relationship (499).
857
 Ash and LaMotte may live more vibrant lives than the 
modern people whose stories orbit theirs, but readers have access to these experiences 
through an omniscient narratorial shift that may or may not be accurate.
858
 These vibrant, 
personal, and especially sexual experiences are untranslatable and unrecoverable if 
unrecorded, as is often the case.
859
 In this way, human lives are analogous to the fossils that 
Ash, LaMotte, and their modern-day counterparts seek on the cliffs of Whitby (292): only 
knowable in tangible fragments.
860
 Ash and LaMotte’s affair at Whitby links Possession in 
important ways to Elizabeth Gaskell’s Sylvia’s Lovers (which is mentioned in the book 
explicitly [263]) because in both cases, experiences at this precise location were 
contemporaneous with Darwin’s publishing of Origin and produced alternative narratives to 
that famous evolutionary tract.
861
 Possession subtitles itself a Romance, and its first epigraph 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
about sexuality” (160). 
 
857 Mitchell argues that “Byatt thus reverses what might be expected of representations of sexuality in the 
Victorian era and the late twentieth century. On the one hand, she draws her Victorians as frank and 
relatively uninhibited in their sexuality, whilst on the other, she creates twentieth-century characters whose 
relationship proceeds slowly, mutely, and with little physical contact” (History and Cultural Memory, 112). 
 
858 Buxton calls these narrative shifts “‘transgressive’ time capsules” and sees them as a way to satisfy a natural 
human curiosity, shared by Roland and Maud (100). 
 
859 Hadley notes that the third and final temporal shift in the novel, the Postscript, in particular “provides the 
reader with privileged access to events for which there are no textual traces” (“Feminine Endings,” 189. See 
also 190-91). 
 
860 Su likewise connects fossils and identity in the novel, arguing that “Possession, in particular, suggests that 
collecting can in certain instances help individuals to imagine alternative identities” (685). 
 
861 Bentley notes that the novel begins with the discovery of literary letters in a scientific work, Giambattista 
Vico’s The New Science (1725), and that this scientific theory posits that “‘truth’ is not only accessed by 
scientific fact and the language that science uses but that it can also be registered in the imaginary and 
literary motifs and symbols that a culture produces” (Bentley, 140-41). And although there are no marriages 
at the end of Possession, like Sylvia’s Lovers the novel upholds heterosexual reproduction as the path 
forward for western society (see Fletcher, 155 and Hadley, “Feminine Endings,” 191). Morse also notes the 
connection with Sylvia’s Lovers (155). 
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from Nathaniel Hawthorne’s House of the Seven Gables suggests that Byatt is taking a 
license with fact that Eliot, for example, would likely not have allowed herself:  
When a writer calls his work a Romance, it need hardly be observed that he wishes to 
claim a certain latitude, both as to its fashion and material, which he would not have 
felt himself entitled to assume, had he professed to be writing a Novel. The latter 
form of composition is presumed to aim at a very minute fidelity, not merely to the 
possible, but to the probable and ordinary course of man’s experience. The former—
while as a work of art, it must rigidly subject itself to laws, and while it sins 
unpardonably so far as it may swerve aside from the truth of the human heart—has 
fairly a right to present the truth under circumstances, to a great extent, of the writer’s 
own choosing or creation. . . . The point of view in which this tale comes under the 
Romantic definition lies in the attempt to connect a bygone time with the very present 
that is flitting away from us. 
 
This idea of Romance rather than realism is reflected most clearly when the narrative shifts 
to the actions and thoughts of the Victorian characters. Ultimately, however, the distinction 
between novel and Romance does not make a difference for the reading experience, because 
all of the narrative feels true, which is accomplished partly through an authoritative 
omniscient narratorial voice and partly through an expert use of free indirect discourse.
862
 A 
readerly tendency to suspend disbelief is minimally disturbed by the narrator’s strategies and 
so realism seems to dominate a supposed Romance.
863
 As Hilary Schor argues, for Byatt, the 
Victorian novel offers the still-relevant recognition that “realism may not be comfortable, but 
that discomfort may be the source of our most generative imaginings.”864 After all, realism is 
                                                          
862 Campbell observes that the conclusion to the novel accomplishes this end as well, by containing three 
endings “two for the characters’ knowledge, one for the reader’s” that are “both formally satisfying and true 
to the contingent reality of the practical world” (138). Su views Byatt’s free handling of the past less 
positively, citing “Byatt’s apparent preference for what might be called a usable past over an absolutely 
accurate one” (704). 
 
863 Buxton notes that “While Maud and Roland exhibit a scholarly postmodernist sensibility, the text itself 
exhibits a strong suspicion of that epistemic condition, even a condemnation of it. For all its postmodern 
gestures, Possession is first and foremost a ‘straight’ narrative, a realistic fiction” (98). See also Hadley, 
Fiction of Byatt, 90. 
 
864 Schor, 248. 
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more about complexity than it is about thwarting or fulfilling readers’ and characters’ 
desires.
865
 
 While Byatt seeks to use the fruitfulness and vitality of the Victorian era as a means 
for working through contemporary problems, other Neo-Victorian fiction more overtly 
imposes a modern perspective on the past, finding its narratives lacking.
866
 John Fowles’s 
The French Lieutenant’s Woman (1969), which is often cited as the first Neo-Victorian 
novel, reaches back to the Romantic period with references to Mary Anning and Jane Austen. 
Like Austen in Persuasion (1818), Fowles sets important sections of his novel in Lyme 
Regis, the famous location of Anning’s remarkable paleontological discoveries that fueled 
the theorizing of male scientists including Cuvier. Charles Smithson, the male protagonist, 
shares his first name with Darwin; this connection is reinforced by the narrator’s tendency to 
refer to Smithson almost exclusively by his first name and Darwin almost exclusively by his 
surname—it is as though the two persons, “Charles” and “Darwin,” are not sufficiently 
distinguished. When Charles is discovering fossils and making natural historical connections, 
then, it is hard not to imagine Darwin overlaid on his activities.
867
 Charles’s fossil hunting 
expeditions for sea urchins is a dilettantish way to try to contribute to the age’s scientific 
investigations, as he looks for rare fossil specimens that he paradoxically collects for his own 
private display (45). Fowles seems unaware of or unconcerned with the paradox between the 
                                                          
865 Llewellyn, 32. 
 
866 Gauthier, 37. 
 
867 Letissier, treats the novel as an originating Neo-Victorian text in large part because of its focus on Darwinian 
conflicts: “The three citations from On the Origin of Species inserted into The French Lieutenant’s Woman 
raise seminal questions that are frequently re-encountered in later neo-Victorian fictions: the deterministic 
influence of influence of inheritance (Chapter Three); the ruthless Malthusian law of the gap between 
population growth and food increase, and the advantage that adaptive capacities confer upon some chosen 
individuals (Chapter Nineteen); and finally how natural selection leads to the formation of new species, 
alongside the extinction of others, and how those who are the closest to changing improving specimens 
suffer the most (Chapter Fifty)” (“Trauma by Proxy,” 75-76). 
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desire for knowledge and the private hoarding that were the motivation and result of so much 
Victorian natural history, while Byatt explicitly points to the problematics of those practices 
in “Morpho Eugenia” and Possession. Much of what Byatt explores implicitly, however, 
Fowles discusses explicitly: the importance of generalization to Victorian scientific pursuits 
(48-49), the way that literature can substitute for experience for women (53), 
industrialization’s division of humans and the natural world that could not be breached by 
natural history (68-69), the artificiality of “realist” historical fiction (96), the differences 
between Victorian and modern day approaches to sexuality (268), the way that anxiety about 
death drives scientific inquiry (294), and human beings’ unique evolutionary ability to 
choose adaptive behavior (296). Fowles also makes narratorial intrusions more literal, as the 
authorial voice regularly interjects not just sentence-long comparisons to modern events and 
mindsets, but also pages-long history lessons; the fictional author also appears as a character 
as a stranger on a train (405-7) and finally an observer on the sidewalk at the end of the novel 
(452).
868
 The false endings of chapters 44 and 60 also draw readers’ attention to the 
artificiality of historical narrative.
869
 Perhaps most compelling in Fowles’s novel, however, 
are his insights about how humans’ relationship with time is dramatically altered by 
evolutionary theories. He writes of Charles’s epiphany on this subject: 
In a vivid insight, a flash of black lightning, he saw that all life was parallel: that 
evolution was not vertical, ascending to a perfection, but horizontal. Time was the 
great fallacy; existence was without history, was always now, was always this being 
caught in the same fiendish machine. All those painted screens erected by man to shut 
out reality—history, religion, duty, social position, all were illusions, mere opium 
fantasies. (206) 
                                                          
868 Acheson notes that Fowles’s play with limited omniscience is a way to object to mid-twentieth-century 
novelists’ use of omniscience narration, though I would argue that it is also a reflection of the Darwinian 
worldview of which Fowles is so self-conscious throughout the novel (399). 
 
869 Hadley takes Fowles to task for these multiple endings, as “the narrator of Fowles’s novel elides the 
complexity of Victorian endings” in the smugness of a postmodern form (“Feminine Endings,”185). 
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As a consequence of the artificiality of human social structures, “The scientist is but one 
more form; and will be superseded” (295). No pursuit of knowledge is better than any other, 
and no tradition can stand up in the face of deep geological time and the bare physicality of 
biological existence. Charles, the amateur scientist, is unable to fully implement this insight 
in his life and is borne under psychologically and socially by its reality. Sarah Woodruff, the 
titular sexualized woman, on the other hand, uses social structures to her benefit and as a 
consequence becomes biologically and artistically productive at the end of the novel.
870
 
 Michel Faber’s The Crimson Petal and the White (2002) is a Dickensian look at the 
social rise of a “virtuous” prostitute and the many strata of society that she encounters.871 Set 
in the 1870s, Faber’s novel includes an intrusive narratorial voice, like Fowles’s, but it fades 
quickly after the first few chapters, only to reappear in an acknowledgement at the end that 
the author “was far too young in the 1870s to pay proper attention to everything [he] should, 
so this account is no doubt riddled with inaccuracies” (838). Keeping up the pretense of 
authorial presence in a work of Neo-Victorian fiction allows Faber to use a third-person 
limited voice in addition to free indirect discourse that grants readers more direct access to 
characters’ thoughts, both of which strategically make the reader aware of the bias of any 
modern perspective on Victorians. Nonetheless, evolutionary theory prominently appears 
when characters are struggling with their sexual identities. The versatile prostitute Sugar is 
described as “straining as if for a Lamarckian feat of evolution, her jaw trembling slightly, 
her mouth falling open with effort” (128) while trying to keep her head high as she is being 
                                                          
870 Fletcher notes that “It is precisely the dispersal of the figure of woman across time that makes…[it so that] 
history cannot contain Sarah; she stands outside of her age” as a timeless symbol (105). 
 
871 Chialant makes the connection between Faber and Dickens, calling Faber’s omniscient narrator an “urban 
flàneur in the Dickensian mode” (44), although Louttit argues that the narratorial style is more indebted to 
Henry Mayhew (330-31). 
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undressed by a customer. A fellow prostitute wonders if men find Sugar so attractive because 
of the “animal serenity” that she projects, making her “[appear] to be wholly at one with her 
clothing, as if it were her own fur and feathers” (31). Her repression of the body underneath 
her clothing is exactly what, ironically, attracts men to her for sexual encounters, just as a 
man of the church, Henry Rackham, is both appalled by the bestiality of the human body and 
aroused by it, especially body hair (339-40). Crimson Petal picks up temporally where 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation left off: at a time after Eliot’s final novel, when Darwin had 
become the general face of evolutionary theory.
872
 This modern novel brings an eroticism to 
evolutionary theory by emphasizing that Victorian angst about Darwinism was less about the 
ape in the family tree than the ape under the suit of clothing. While Faber adopts the 
Dickensian structure of making London seem at first overly complex and frightening but in 
the end demonstrating that everyone mentioned in the novel is interconnected, Faber is not at 
all squeamish about the muck of Victorian and modern urban life: from discussions of 
condoms to references to diarrhea, he does not shy away from dotting London’s streets with 
decomposing animal carcasses and dog feces.
873
 In doing so, he escalates the sense of realism 
of his novel, and situates his own book alongside Darwin’s as one of those perpetually in-
demand works that treat “the fabric of our society” irreverently in order to expose the truth of 
the biological life beneath it (69). Like Darwin, Faber adopts an open and unresolved ending 
                                                          
872 This timing in relation to Eliot’s work is not likely a coincidence; as Shiller notes, “neo-Victorian novels 
employ Eliot’s sense of history [as fundamentally quotidian, a series of private moments and undocumented 
acts] as a referent” (540). 
 
873
 Letissier claims that in The Crimson Petal, “Eschatology is defeated by scatology” as Faber approaches 
realism from an emphasis “on odours, smells, fragrance and stench” that taps into a modern “nostalgia for 
the real…[that] could probably only be found at the pre-symbolic stage” (“The Crimson Petal,” 120, 122, 
123). 
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to his book, and in a way both inspired by and perverting of Darwin’s Descent of Man, Faber 
also resituates women’s physical and emotional experiences as valid and central to history.874 
 Studying nineteenth-century women’s interventions in moments of potential social 
crisis can give us pause as we consider the implications for twentieth- and twenty-first-
century culture of the rise of scientific privilege and perspective. The Neo-Victorian fictions 
of A. S. Byatt, John Fowles, Michel Faber, and others provide compelling modern examples 
of the enlightening possibilities of looking back to the models and concerns raised by 
Victorian literature and science. Georges Letissier notes that “Neo-Victorian novelists are 
interested in the way in which human consciousnesses, individually or collectively, respond 
to epistemological challenges,” and I would add that such novelists also look to the 
nineteenth century for examples of adaptive and nonadaptive ways to do so, focusing on 
evolutionary theory as a particularly salient test case.
875
 As Fowles puts it in The French 
Lieutenant’s Woman, the accessibility of Victorian science was “better for…the human 
being” than the “narrow oubliette” in which humanists and generalists were later shut up by 
scientific specialization and professionalization—in fact, he maintains, it is a model that 
society ought to follow today (48-49).
876
 As modern-day humanists, this is an imperative to 
which we should give careful consideration. 
 
                                                          
 
874 Preston makes a similar point, stating, “The novel draws most of its thematic material from the limitations 
placed on women’s scope for action in the nineteenth century, and it is unsparing in its detail of how women 
suffer at the hands of men” (102). Letissier notes that “Mutability and fluidity are characteristics of high 
Victorianism which Faber stresses,” in large part through emphasizing “departures from well-established 
gender norms” (“The Crimson Petal,” 118). 
 
875 Letissier, “Trauma by Proxy,” 95. 
 
876
 Adams likewise suggests that for Byatt in Possession, “the contemporary characters are necessarily less 
‘real’ than their Victorian predecessors…because their cultural beliefs deny them a sense of autonomy and 
individuality” (112). 
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